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Abstract
This thesis is mainly devoted to the study of the role of evolutionary-game theory in
the design of distributed optimization-based controllers. Game theoretical approaches
have been used in several engineering fields, e.g., drainage wastewater systems, band-
width allocation, wireless networks, cyber security, congestion games, wind turbines,
temperature control, among others. On the other hand, a specific class of games, known
as population games, have been mainly used in the design of controllers to manage a
limited resource. This game approach is suitable for resource allocation problems since,
under the framework of full-potential games, the population games can satisfy a unique
coupled constraint while maximizing a potential function.
First, this thesis discusses how the classical approach of the population games can
contribute and complement the design of optimization-based controllers. Therefore, this
dissertation assigns special interest on how the features of the population-game approach
can be exploited extending their capabilities in the solution of distributed optimization
problems. In addition, density games are studied in order to consider multiple coupled
constraints and preserving the non-centralized information requirements. Furthermore,
a close relationship is established between the possible interactions among agents in a
population with the constrained information sharing among different local controllers.
On the other hand, coalitional games are discussed focusing on the Shapley power index.
This power index has been used to assign an appropriate rewarding to players in function
of their contributions to all possible coalitions. Even though this power index is quite
useful in the engineering context, since it involves notions of fairness and/or relevance
(how important players are), the main difficulty of the implementation of the Shapley
value in engineering applications is related to the high computational burden. Therefore,
this dissertation studies the Shapley value in order to propose an alternative manner
to compute it reducing computational time, and a different way to find it by using
distributed communication structures is presented.
The studied game theoretical approaches are suitable for the modeling of rational
agents involved in a strategic constrained interaction, following local rules and making
local decisions in order to achieve a global objective. Making an analogy, distributed
optimization-based controllers are composed of local controllers that compute optimal
inputs based on local information (constrained interactions with other local controllers)
in order to achieve a global control objective. In addition to this analogy, the fea-
tures that relate the Nash equilibrium with the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a
constrained optimization problem are exploited for the design of optimization-based
controllers, more specifically, for the design of model predictive controllers. Moreover,
the design of non-centralized controllers is directly related to the partitioning of a sys-
tem, i.e., it is necessary to represent the whole system as the composition of multiple
sub-systems. This task is not a trivial procedure since several considerations should
v
be taken into account, e.g., availability of information, dynamical coupling in the sys-
tem, regularity in the amount of variables for each sub-system, among others. Then,
this doctoral dissertation also discusses the partitioning problem for large-scale systems
and the role that this procedure plays in the design of distributed optimization-based
controllers. Finally, dynamical partitioning strategies are presented with distributed
population-games-based controllers.
Some engineering applications are presented to illustrate and test the performance
of all the proposed control strategies based on game theoretical approaches, i.e., the
Barcelona water supply network, multiple continuous stirred tank reactors, system of
multiple unmanned aerial vehicles, and a water distribution system.
Keywords: population games, density games, Nash equilibria, cooperative games,
Shapley power index, partitioning, distributed control, model predictive control, dynam-
ical tuning, large-scale systems.
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Resumen
Esta tesis doctoral consiste principalmente en el estudio del rol que desempen˜a la
teor´ıa de juegos evolutiva en el disen˜o de controladores distribuidos basados en opti-
mizacio´n. Diversos enfoques de la teor´ıa de juegos han sido usados en mu´ltiples campos
de la ingenier´ıa, por ejemplo, en sistemas de drenaje urbano, para la asignacio´n de anchos
de banda, en redes inala´mbricas, en ciber-seguridad, en juegos de congestio´n, turbinas
eo´licas, control de temperatura, entre otros. Por otra parte, una clase espec´ıfica de jue-
gos, conocidos como juegos poblacionales, se han usado principalmente en el disen˜o de
controladores encargados de determinar la apropiada asignacio´n de recursos. Esta clase
de juegos es apropiada para problemas de distribucio´n dina´mica de recursos dado que,
en el contexto de juegos poblacionales, los juegos poblacionales pueden ser usados para
maximizar una funcio´n potencial mientras se satisface una restriccio´n acoplada.
Primero, esta tesis doctoral presenta co´mo el enfoque cla´sico de los juegos pobla-
cionales pueden contribuir y complementar en el disen˜o de controladores basados en
optimizacio´n. Posteriormente, esta disertacio´n concentra su atencio´n en co´mo las car-
acter´ısticas de los juegos poblacionales pueden ser aprovechadas y extendidas para dar
solucio´n a problemas de optimizacio´n de forma distribuida. Adicionalmente, los juegos
con dependencia de densidad son estudiados con el fin de considerar mu´ltiples restric-
ciones mientras se preservan las caracter´ısticas no centralizadas de los requerimientos de
informacio´n. Finalmente, se establece una estrecha relacio´n entre las posibles interac-
ciones de los agentes en una poblacio´n y las restricciones de intercambio de informacio´n
entre diversos controladores locales. Tambie´n, se desarrolla una discusio´n sobre los juegos
cooperativos y el ı´ndice de poder conocido como el valor de Shapley. Este ı´ndice de poder
ha sido usado para la apropiada asignacio´n de beneficios para un jugador en funcio´n de
sus contribuciones a todas las posibles coaliciones que pueden formarse. Aunque este
ı´ndice de poder es de gran utilidad en el contexto ingenieril, ya que involucra nociones
de justicia y/o relevancia, la principal dificultad para implementar el valor de Shapley
en aplicaciones de ingenier´ıa esta´ asociado a los altos costos computacionales para en-
contrarlo. En consecuencia, esta disertacio´n doctoral estudia el valor de Shapley con el
fin de ofrecer una alternativa para calcular este ı´ndice de poder reduciendo los costos
computacionales e incluso contemplando estructuras distribuidas de comunicacio´n.
Los enfoques de la teor´ıa de juegos estudiados son apropiados para el modelamiento
de agentes racionales involucrados en una interaccio´n estrate´gica con restricciones, sigu-
iendo reglas locales y tomando decisiones locales para alcanzar un objetivo global. Real-
izando una analog´ıa, los controladores distribuidos basados en optimizacio´n esta´n com-
puestos por controladores locales que calculan acciones o´ptimas basados en informacio´n
local (considerando interacciones restringidas con otros controladores locales) con el fin
de alcanzar un objetivo global. Adicional a esta analog´ıa, las caracter´ısticas que relacio-
nan el equilibrio de Nash con las condiciones de Karush-Kuhn-Tucker en un problema de
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optimizacio´n con restricciones son aprovechadas para el disen˜o de controladores basados
en optimizacio´n, ma´s espec´ıficamente, para el disen˜o de controladores predictivos.
Por otra parte, el disen˜o de controladores no centralizados esta´ directamente rela-
cionado con el particionado de un sistema, es decir, es necesario representar el sistema
en su totalidad por medio del conjunto de varios sub-sistemas. Esta tarea no es un
procedimiento trivial puesto que es necesario tener en cuenta varias consideraciones, por
ejemplo, la disponibilidad de informacio´n, el acople dina´mico en el sistema, la regulari-
dad en cuanto a la cantidad de variables en cada sub-sistema, entre otras. Por lo tanto,
esta disertacio´n doctoral tambie´n desarrolla una discusio´n alrededor del problema de
particionado para sistemas de gran escala y respecto al rol que este procedimiento de
particionado juega en el disen˜o de controladores distribuidos basados en optimizacio´n.
Finalmente, se presentan estrategias de particionado dina´mico junto con controladores
basados en juegos poblacionales.
Algunas aplicaciones en ingenier´ıa son usadas para ilustrar y probar los controladores
disen˜ados por medio de las contribuciones novedosas basadas en teor´ıa de juegos, estas
son, la red de agua potable de Barcelona, mu´ltiples reactores, sistema compuesto por
varios veh´ıculos ae´reos no tripulados y un sistema de distribucio´n de agua.
Palabras clave: juegos poblacionales, juegos de densidad, equilibrio de Nash, jue-
gos cooperativos, ı´ndice de poder de Shapley, particionado, control distribuido, control
predictivo, sintonizacio´n dina´mica, sistemas de gran escala.
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Resum
Aquesta tesi doctoral consisteix principalment en l’estudi del paper que exerceix
la teoria de jocs evolutiva en el disseny de controladors distribu¨ıts basats en optim-
itzacio´. Diversos enfocaments de la teoria de jocs han estat usats en mu´ltiples camps de
l’enginyeria, per exemple, en sistemes de drenatge urba`, per a l’assignacio´ d’amples de
banda, en xarxes sense fils, a ciber-seguretat, en jocs de congestio´, turbines eo`liques, con-
trol de temperatura, entre altres. D’altra banda, una classe espec´ıfica de jocs, coneguts
com jocs poblacionals, s’han fet servir principalment en el disseny de controladors en-
carregats de determinar l’apropiada assignacio´ de recursos. Aquesta classe de jocs e´s
apropiada per a problemes de distribucio´ dina`mica de recursos ate`s que, en el context
de jocs poblacionals, aquestos poden ser usats per a maximitzar una funcio´ potencial
mentre es satisfa` una restriccio´ acoblada.
Primer, aquesta tesi doctoral presenta com l’enfocament cla`ssic dels jocs poblacionals
poden contribuir i complementar en el disseny de controladors basats en optimitzacio´.
Posteriorment, aquesta dissertacio´ concentra la seva atencio´ en com les caracter´ıstiques
dels jocs poblacionals poden ser aprofitades i esteses per donar solucio´ a problemes
d’optimitzacio´ de forma distribu¨ıda. Addicionalment, els jocs amb depende`ncia de den-
sitat so´n estudiats amb la finalitat de considerar mu´ltiples restriccions mentre es pre-
serven les caracter´ıstiques no centralitzades dels requeriments d’informacio´. Finalment,
s’estableix una estreta relacio´ entre les possibles interaccions dels agents en una poblacio´
i les restriccions d’intercanvi d’informacio´ entre diversos controladors locals. Tambe´, es
desenvolupa una discussio´ sobre els jocs cooperatius i l’´ındex de poder conegut com el
valor de Shapley. Aquest ı´ndex de poder ha estat usat per l’apropiada assignacio´ de ben-
eficis per a un jugador en funcio´ de les seves contribucions a totes les possibles coalicions
que poden formar-se. Encara que aquest ı´ndex de poder e´s de gran utilitat en el context
de l’enginyeria, ja que involucra nocions de just´ıcia i/o relleva`ncia, la principal dificultat
per implementar el valor de Shapley en aplicacions d’enginyeria esta` associat als alts
costos computacionals per trobar-lo. En consequ¨e`ncia, aquesta dissertacio´ doctoral es-
tudia el valor de Shapley per tal d’oferir una alternativa per calcular aquest ı´ndex de
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poder reduint els costos computacionals i fins i tot contemplant estructures distribu¨ıdes
de comunicacio´.
Els enfocaments de la teoria de jocs estudiats so´n apropiats per al modelatge d’agents
racionals involucrats en una interaccio´ estrate`gica amb restriccions, seguint regles locals
i prenent decisions locals per assolir un objectiu global. Realitzant una analogia, els con-
troladors distribu¨ıts basats en optimitzacio´ estan compostos per controladors locals que
calculen accions o`ptimes basats en informacio´ local (considerant interaccions restringides
amb altres controladors locals) per tal d’assolir un objectiu global. Addicional a aquesta
analogia, les caracter´ıstiques que relacionen l’equilibri de Nash amb les condicions de
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker en un problema d’optimitzacio´ amb restriccions so´n aprofitades
per al disseny de controladors basats en optimitzacio´, me´s espec´ıficament, per al disseny
de controladors predictius.
D’altra banda, el disseny de controladors no centralitzats esta` directament relacionat
amb la particio´ d’un sistema, e´s a dir, cal representar el sistema en la seva totalitat per
mitja` del conjunt de diversos sub-sistemes. Aquesta tasca no e´s un proce´s trivial, ja que
cal tenir en compte diverses consideracions, per exemple, la disponibilitat d’informacio´,
l’acoblament dina`mic en el sistema, i la regularitat pel que fa a la quantitat de variables
en cada sub-sistema, entre d’altres. Per tant, aquesta dissertacio´ doctoral tambe´ desen-
volupa una discussio´ al voltant del problema de particio´ per a sistemes de gran escala
i respecte al paper que aquest procediment de particio´ juga en el disseny de contro-
ladors distribu¨ıts basats en optimitzacio´. Finalment, es presenten estrate`gies de particio´
dina`mic juntament amb controladors basats en jocs poblacionals.
Algunes aplicacions en enginyeria so´n usades per illustrar i provar els controladors
dissenyats per mitja` de les contribucions noves basades en teoria de jocs, aquestes so´n:
la xarxa d’aigua potable de Barcelona, mu´ltiples reactors, sistema compost per diversos
vehicles aeris no tripulats i un sistema de distribucio´ d’aigua.
Paraules clau: jocs poblacionals, jocs de densitat, equilibri de Nash, jocs coop-
eratius, ı´ndex de poder de Shapley, particionat, control distribu¨ıt, control predictiu,
sintonitzacio´ dina`mica, sistemes de gran escala.
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Preliminaries
1

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Large-scale systems have gotten special importance into the engineering field. Last years
have witnessed the rise of large-scale systems in parallel with the growth of industry and
cities. For instance, the continuous evolution of industrial processes and the necessity
of enhancing them have caused the appearance of quite complex systems involving a
large number of variables. Similarly, the growth of cities has caused the rise of large-
scale systems in charge of supplying the population with resources it needs and that can
normally be modeled as a network, e.g., traffic, energy, and water systems. Together
with the large-scale systems, the necessity to determine appropriate ways to control and
make them perform in a desired manner has also appeared. Finally, both physical and
operational constraints should be taken into account, which motivate the use of model
predictive control (MPC) since it has been demonstrated to be one of the most used
optimization-based control technique that can manage all the required considerations
[77], [125]. Therefore, the design of controllers for large-scale systems deals with new
challenges. First, the fact that large-scale systems are generally located throughout
large geographical areas makes the recollection of measurements and their transmission
difficult. In this regard, the communication network required for a centralized control
approach might have high associated economical costs, and a large number of links in the
communication network is associated to low reliability. Furthermore, the computation of
a large amount of data directly implies a high computational burden to manage, process
and use them in order to make decisions over the system functioning.
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A plausible solution to mitigate the aforementioned issues associated to the control
of large-scale systems consists in dividing this type of systems into smaller sub-systems
that can be controlled by independent local controllers. From this perspective, local con-
trollers can be associated to local decision makers that use only a portion of information
about the whole system, i.e., they only capture information from a sub-system. Never-
theless, the task of identifying the appropriate set of sub-systems avoiding the existence
of strong dynamical coupling is not a trivial problem and, in many cases, the control
requirements and/or the physical and operational constraints do not allow the statement
of independent problems that could be solved by smaller independent controllers. As
an alternative, distributed approaches have been used, which consist in designing local
controllers able to share information among them, i.e., local decision makers that may
interact to each other.
The latter analogy incites to look at the distributed control scheme as a scenario
where there are several decision makers using limited information and interacting with
each other, which motivates the consideration of game theory as a suitable and pow-
erful tool in the study and design of distributed controllers. In addition, one of the
most important concepts in the context of game theory is the Nash equilibrium, which
describes a situation where no decision maker has incentives to unilaterally change its
current decisions. Furthermore, it has been shown that, under certain conditions, there
is a close relationship between the Nash equilibrium and the extreme point of a function
considering constraints, in other words, there is a relationship between the Nash equilib-
rium and the solution of a constrained optimization problem. This fact also motivates
the purpose of studying the design of distributed optimization-based controllers by using
game theoretical approaches.
Instead of designing predictive and game-theory-based controllers as two different
control strategies, the motivation in this doctoral thesis is to determine the role of
some game-theoretical approaches in the design of optimization-based controllers. In
this regard, predictive controllers are designed and studied by exploring two different
perspectives. First, these optimization-based controllers are designed partially by using
game-theoretical ideas, i.e., considering game theory as a complement to enhance some
features of the optimization-based controllers. Secondly, the predictive controllers are
completely designed from a game-theoretical perspective.
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This doctoral dissertation presents some strategies to complement the design of
predictive controllers by means of game-theoretical approaches. As an example, how
learning based on population games can be used for the dynamical assignment of pri-
oritization weights for multi-objective cost functions in order to improve the predictive
control performance. On the other hand, this thesis addresses the whole design of
optimization-based controllers based on game theory. For instance, how to take advan-
tage of the population games features in order to compute control inputs in a distributed
manner for engineering problems involving resource allocation. Moreover, the proposed
methodologies are implemented in real large-scale case studies to assess the closed-loop
performance and their effectiveness by making comparisons with results obtained from
centralized control techniques.
1.2 Research Questions
This dissertation is devoted to the design of distributed optimization-based controllers
by using game theoretical approaches. The main research goal of this thesis is motivated
by the following key research questions:
(Q1) Which kind of constrained optimization-based controllers can be designed by using
the classical population dynamics and what are the information requirements?
(Q2) How to develop a dynamical tuning methodology for MPC controllers with low
computational burden?
(Q3) How to reduce the amount of required information in the evolution of population
dynamics?
(Q4) How can the population-games approach be used in the design of distributed
optimization-based controllers?
(Q5) How can more coupled constraints be considered with the population-games ap-
proach in order to make them suitable for a larger variety of problems in the design
of distributed optimization-based controllers?
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(Q6) How can the computational burden associated to the computation of the Shapley
power index be reduced and how it can be found under a distributed information
structure?
(Q7) How can the partitioning of large-scale systems be performed in a distributed man-
ner and how it helps in the design of distributed optimization-based controllers?
(Q8) How can the partitioning of a large-scale system be performed dynamically and
how can the population-games approach be used in the design of partitioned
optimization-based distributed controllers?
Each one of the aforementioned research questions are addressed throughout this
thesis. Question (Q1) consists in identifying the possible control problems that can
be solved by using the classical population dynamics considering their information re-
quirements. Therefore, the answer of question (Q1) allows to determine some research
opportunities. Moreover, answers to questions (Q2)-(Q8) are the contributions of this
doctoral thesis.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis is divided into four parts, i.e.,
I) Preliminaries,
II) The role of games in the design of controllers,
III) Large-scale systems partitioning in control, and
IV) Concluding remarks.
The road map of this dissertation is presented in Figure 1.1, which illustrates the
connections among chapters suggesting the reader about their appropriate order. The
contents of Chapters 2 - 10 are summarized as follows:
6
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Chapter 2: Literature review and background
This chapter presents a general literature review covering all the topics discussed
in this dissertation. In addition, this chapter introduces the background, preliminary
concepts associated to population games and define all the key research questions. This
chapter answers the key research question (Q1) and it is inspired by the following pub-
lications:
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, N. Quijano and C. Ocampo-Martinez. Constrained distributed
optimization: A population dynamics approach. Automatica, 69(2016): 101-116,
2016.
• N. Quijano, C. Ocampo-Martinez, J. Barreiro-Gomez, G. Obando, A. Pantoja,
and E. Mojica-Nava. The role of population games and evolutionary dynamics in
distributed control systems. IEEE Control Systems Magazine, 37(1): 70-97, 2017.
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, N. Quijano and C. Ocampo-Martinez. Distributed control
of drinking water networks using population dynamics: Barcelona case study, In
Proceedings of the 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2014,
Los Angeles, USA, pp. 3216-3221.
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, N. Quijano and C. Ocampo-Martinez. Constrained distributed
optimization based on population dynamics, In Proceedings of the 53rd IEEE Con-
ference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2014, Los Angeles, USA, pp. 4260-4265.
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, G. Obando, G. Rian˜o-Bricen˜o, N. Quijano and C. Ocampo-
Martinez. Decentralized control for urban drainage systems via population dy-
namics: Bogota case study, In Proceedings of the European Control Conference
(ECC), 2015, Linz, Austria, pp. 2426-2431.
Chapter 3: Dynamical Tuning for Multi-objective MPC Controllers
This chapter treats the tuning of the weighting parameters of a multi-objective MPC
controller. Normally, the weighting parameters are determined either off-line or by a
trial-and-error procedure according to the desired performance of the closed-loop sys-
tem. However, when the system is affected by disturbances, the appropriate weighting
parameters might vary along the time. In this chapter, it is proposed to use a game
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theoretical approach in order to adjust in an on-line and dynamical manner the prior-
itization weights depending on the current operational conditions of the system. This
chapter answers the key research question (Q2) and it is based on the following publi-
cations:
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, and N. Quijano. Dynamical Tuning
for MPC Using Population Games: A Water Supply Network Application. ISA
Transactions (to appear), 2017.
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez and N. Quijano. Evolutionary-game-
based dynamical tuning for multi-objective model predictive control. In S. Olaru,
A. Grancharova, F. Lobo Pereira (editors), in Model-Based Optimization and Con-
trol, chapter 6. Springer Verlag, 2016.
Chapter 4: Distributed Predictive Control Using Population Games
This chapter studies the classical population dynamics presented in Chapter 1 in or-
der to consider strategy-constrained interactions within the population game1. As it is
presented in Chapter 1, population dynamics can solve a specific constrained optimiza-
tion problem (see Problem (2.13)). Additionally, it has been seen that the evolution
of the portion of agents depends on the fitness functions of the whole population (see
the sum in (2.14), (2.15), (2.16), and (2.17)). This chapter proposes the distributed
population dynamics showing a general methodology in order to generate multiple dis-
tributed dynamics from different revision protocols, which describe the result and timing
about how agents make decisions. Therefore, it is shown how the optimization prob-
lem in (2.13) can be solved in a distributed manner even though it contains a coupled
constraint. Finally, the novel distributed population dynamics are implemented in the
design of a DMPC controller with coupled constraint on the control inputs. This chap-
ter, which answers the key research question (Q3) and partially answers the key research
question (Q4), is based on the following publications:
1
The contributions regarding the distributed population dynamics presented in this chapter have
been made and published in [9] with Germa´n Obando when he was a PhD student at Universidad de los
Andes.
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• J. Barreiro-Gomez, G. Obando and N. Quijano. Distributed population dynamics:
Optimization and control applications. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics: Systems 47(2): 304-314, 2017.
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, G. Obando, C. Ocampo-Martinez and N. Quijano. Population-
games-based Distributed MPC for Problems Involving Resource Allocation. Sub-
mitted to IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, G. Obando, C. Ocampo-Martinez and N. Quijano. Making
non-centralized a model predictive control scheme by using distributed Smith dy-
namics, In Proceeding of the 5th IFAC Conference on Nonlinear Model Predictive
Control (NMPC), 2015, Seville, Spain, Vol 48:23 of IFAC-PapersOnLine, pp. 501-
506, 2015.
Chapter 5: Distributed Formation Control Using Population Games
This chapter shows a formation application of the distributed population dynamics
presented in Chapter 4 taking advantage of their properties. It is shown that the stability
properties of the equilibrium point of the distributed population dynamics are preserved
no matter how the strategy-constrained interactions in the population vary along the
time. This fact makes the population-dynamics approach suitable for the formation
control when communication limitations are considered. This chapter partially answers
the key research question (Q4) and it is based on the following publications:
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, I. Mas, C. Ocampo-Martinez, R. Sanchez-Pen˜a, and N. Qui-
jano. Distributed formation control for UAVs using population games: Compara-
tive discussion with clustering approaches. Submitted, 2017.
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, I. Mas, C. Ocampo-Martinez, R. Sa´nchez Pen˜a and N. Qui-
jano. Distributed formation control of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles over
time-varying graphs using population games, In Proceedings of the 55th IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2016, Las Vegas, USA, pp. 5245-
5250.
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Chapter 6: Distributed Predictive Control Using Density-dependent Pop-
ulation Games
This chapter deals with the issue of considering multiple coupled constraints using
population games. To this end, this chapter introduces the density-dependent population
dynamics by considering a reproduction rate within the evolution of the portion of agents.
Moreover, it is shown how to generate the distributed density-dependent population
dynamics and how they can be used in the solution of constrained optimization problems.
Furthermore, a DMPC controller is designed based on density games. This chapter
answers the key research question (Q5) and it is based on the following publication:
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, N. Quijano and C. Ocampo-Martinez. Distributed MPC with
time-varying communication network: A density-dependent population games ap-
proach, In Proceedings of the IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control
(CDC), 2016, Las Vegas, USA, pp. 6068-6073.
Chapter 7: Power Index in Control
This chapter studies the computation of the Shapley power index and its role in
an engineering application regarding the assignment of economical costs for multiple
players. One of the main drawbacks associated to the Shapley value is the combinatorial
explosion related to its computation. This chapter proposes an alternative manner to
compute the Shapley value for a specific characteristic function in order to reduce the
computational burden, i.e., from hours to seconds. This reduction in the computational
task allows control designers to implement the power index in real-time applications.
This chapter answers the key research question (Q6) and it is based on the following
publications:
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, N. Quijano and J. M. Maestre. Non-
centralized Control for Flow-based Distribution Networks: A Game-theoretical
Insight. Submitted to the Journal of the Franklin Institute, 2016.
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, J. M. Maestre and N. Quijano. Multi-
objective model-free control based on population dynamics and cooperative games,
In Proceedings of the 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2015,
Osaka, Japan, pp. 5296-5301.
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Chapter 8: Partitioning Algorithm for Large-scale Systems – Sequential
DMPC Design
This chapter studies the partitioning of large-scale systems as a powerful tool in
the design of distributed optimization-based controllers. This chapter proposes a dis-
tributed partitioning algorithm that considers four different objectives and that uses an
information-sharing graph. Moreover, it is shown how this partitioning methodology
helps in the design of a sequential DMPC controller and it is designed and implemented
for a large-scale case study. This chapter answers the key research question (Q7) and it
is based on the following publication:
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, and N. Quijano. Partitioning for Large-
scale Systems: A Sequential DMPC Design. To appear in the Proceedings of the
IFAC World Congress, 2017.
Chapter 9: Dynamical Partitioning and DMPC
This chapter discusses the dynamical partitioning of a large-scale system along the
time. Therefore, it is needed to develop a practical control technique that could cope
with such partitioning nature. To this end, it is proposed to use the density-dependent
population-games approach introduced in Chapter 6 in combination with the partitioning
algorithm introduced in Chapter 8. This chapter answers the key research question (Q8)
and it is based on the following publication:
• J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, and N. Quijano. Distributed Dynamical
Partitioning and Control for Large-scale Systems: Density-dependent Population
Games Approach. Automatica, 2017 (to be Submitted).
Chapter 10: Contributions and Concluding Remarks
This chapter draws the concluding remarks of this dissertation and proposes some
open research questions as future work. The key research questions presented in Section
1.2 are also addressed in this chapter.
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1.4 Other Publications
Some related publications directly associated to the research presented in this doctoral
dissertation are outlined below.
1. G. Rian˜o-Bricen˜o, J. Barreiro-Gomez, A. Ramirez-Jaime, N. Quijano and C. Ocampo-
Martinez. MatSWMM - An open-source toolbox for designing real-time control of
urban drainage systems. Environmental Modelling & Software, 83: 143-154, 2016.
2. L. Garc´ıa, J. Barreiro-Gomez, E. Escobar, D. Te´llez, N. Quijano and C. Ocampo-
Martinez. Modeling and real-time control of urban drainage systems: A review.
Advances in Water Resources, 85: 120-132, 2015.
3. G. Obando, J. Barreiro-Gomez and N. Quijano. A class of population dynam-
ics for reaching epsilon-equilibria: Engineering applications, In Proceedings of the
American Control Conference (ACC), 2016, Boston, USA, pp. 4713-4718.
4. J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, F. Bianchi and N. Quijano. Model-free
control for wind farms using a gradient estimation-based algorithm, In Proceedings
of the European Control Conference (ECC), 2015, Linz, Austria, pp. 1516-1521.
5. G. Rian˜o-Bricen˜o, A. Ramirez-Jaime, J. Barreiro-Gomez, N. Quijano and C. Ocampo-
Martinez. Co-simulation for the design of controllers in urban drainage systems, In
Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE Colombian Conference on Automatic Control, 2015,
Manizales, Colombia, pp. 1-6.
6. J. Barreiro-Gomez, N. Quijano and C. Ocampo-Martinez. Distributed resource
management by using population dynamics: Wastewater treatment application,
In Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE Colombian Conference on Automatic Control,
2015, Manizales, Colombia, pp. 1-6.
7. L.A. Garc´ıa, E. Escobar, J. Barreiro-Gomez, N. Quijano, C. Ocampo-Martinez and
D. Te´llez. On the modeling and real-time control of urban drainage systems: A
survey, In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Hydroinformatics,
2014, New York City, USA.
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8. J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, and N. Quijano. On the Communica-
tion Discussion of Two Distributed Population-game Approaches for Optimization
Purposes. To appear in the Proceedings of the IFAC World Congress, 2017.
9. J. Barreiro-Gomez, G. Rian˜o-Bricen˜o, C. Ocampo-Martinez and N. Quijano. Data-
driven Evolutionary-game-based Control for Drinking Water Networks. Real-time
Monitoring and Operational Control of Drinking Water Systems. Springer, 2017.
10. W. Ananduta, J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, and N. Quijano. On
the Mitigation of Communication Issues in Distributed Model Predictive Control
Strategies, Submitted to Proceedings of the 56th IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control (CDC), 2017, Melbourne, Australia.
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Literature Review and
Background
This chapter presents a literature review related to the main topics treated in this doc-
toral dissertation. First, a review of model predictive control (MPC) is made focusing on
non-centralized schemes, i.e., the architectures for decentralized and distributed MPC
controllers. Therefore, some relevant works related to both decentralized and distributed
MPC controllers are discussed. Afterwards, a literature review for the tuning issue of the
parameters of the MPC controller is introduced. Secondly, the partitioning of large-scale
systems is revised, being an essential aspect in the design of non-centralized controllers
considering dynamical coupling, information requirements, among others. As a third
topic, a review of game-theoretical approaches applied to engineering problems is shown,
presenting their versatility in the design of optimization-based controllers. Finally, pre-
liminary concepts regarding population games, which are used throughout the thesis,
are presented and some of their relevant features are pointed out.
2.1 Model Predictive Control
Model predictive control (MPC) is one of the most used control strategies in industrial
applications because of its versatility to deal with multiple design requirements. The
MPC controller is an optimization-based technique that computes an optimal control se-
quence that minimizes a cost function subject to physical and/or operational constraints
at each time instant over a simulation horizon. The latter mentioned feature of the MPC
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controllers is one of its main advantages with respect to other control strategies.
2.1.1 MPC Strategy Description
Even though there exist some mathematical formulations for MPC controllers in contin-
uous time [152], it is more usual to design these kinds of predictive controllers in discrete
time [77], [80], [104], [125], and by using a state-space model of the system. Therefore,
consider a system whose discrete-time model is given by
xk+1 = v(xk,uk,dk), (2.1)
where k ∈ Z≥0 denotes the discrete time. The vectors x ∈ X ⊆ Rnx , u ∈ U ⊆ Rnx ,
and d ∈ Rnd correspond to the system states, control inputs and disturbances, respec-
tively. Moreover, the sets X , and U define the feasible sets according to physical and/or
operational constraints for the system states and control inputs. Hence, the function
v : Rnx × Rnu → Rnx is an arbitrary system state function. Let
uˆk ,
(
uk|k,uk+1|k, ...,uk+Hp−1|k
)
be a feasible control input sequence over a fixed-time prediction horizon denoted by
Hp ∈ Z>0. Moreover, let
xˆk ,
(
xk+1|k,xk+2|k, ...,xk+Hp|k
)
be the system state sequence that is generated when applying the control input sequence
uˆk to the system (2.1). Moreover, the predictive control approach consists in the solution
of an open-loop optimization problem of the following general form:
minimize
uk|k,...,uk+Hp−1|k
J(xk,uk) = J
f
(
xk+Hp|k
)
+
Hp−1∑
j=0
J `
(
xk+j|k,uk+j|k
)
, (2.2a)
subject to
xk+1+j|k = v(xk+j|k,uk+j|k,dk+j|k), ∀j ∈ [0, Hp] ∩ Z≥0, (2.2b)
xk+j|k ∈ X , ∀j ∈ [0, Hp] ∩ Z≥0, (2.2c)
uk+j|k ∈ U , ∀j ∈ [0, Hp − 1] ∩ Z≥0, (2.2d)
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where the function J ` : Rnx × Rnu → R allows to determine the cost throughout the
prediction horizon Hp, whereas the function J
f : Rnx → R represents the terminal cost.
These functions in (2.2a) should be appropriately selected in order to guarantee the
stability of the closed-loop system as it is discussed in [125], [32].
Assuming that the optimization problem in (2.2) is feasible, there is an optimal
control input sequence given by
uˆ?k ,
(
u?k|k,u
?
k+1|k, ...,u
?
k+Hp−1|k
)
. (2.3)
Finally, notice that the receding horizon philosophy only allows to set the first optimal
control input from the optimal sequence (2.3) to the system (2.1), i.e., the final control
input that is applied to the system is given by
u?MPC,k = u
?
k|k. (2.4)
The procedure is repeated at the next iteration, computing a new optimal control
sequence and a new final control input. The Algorithm 1 presents the summary of the
procedure to compute the MPC law (2.4).
Algorithm 1 General procedure for the computation of the MPC law
1: Hs ← simulation length
2: Hp ← prediction horizon
3: k ← initial time
4: xk ← x0 ∈ Rnx initial condition for the states
5: for k = 1 : Hs do
6: uˆ?k ,
(
u?k|k,u
?
k+1|k, ...,u
?
k+Hp−1|k
)
← solve the optimization problem in (2.2)
7: u?MPC,k = u
?
k|k
8: xk+1 = v(xk,u
?
MPC,k,dk)
9: k = k + 1
10: end for
2.1.2 Non-centralized MPC Schemes
Even though the MPC controller has been broadly studied by many authors, e.g., [77],
[108], [125], there is still a significant interest in studying the design of MPC controllers
using non-centralized structures. When coping with the control of a large-scale system,
there would be a large number of decision variables and constraints that makes difficult
17
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to guarantee the computation of a suitable control input for a given set of performance
goals within the established sampling time. Under this scenario, a possible solution is
to divide the original problem into smaller and computationally lighter sub-problems,
which could be separately solved by using local hardware.
For instance, one of the problems discussed throughout this thesis is related to the
appropriate allocation of a limited resource. This kind of problem is appealing since the
non-centralized control design should consider a coupled constraint (associated to the
resource amount) involving all the control inputs. For a large-scale system composed
of several sub-systems, it is common to have a constraint related to the total energy
resource available for the control inputs, i.e., in real applications, the total energy (re-
source) demanded by the controllers has an upper bound since the employed resources
(e.g., inflows, voltages, forces) are limited. Traditional MPC schemes are capable to over-
come this problem by adding that consideration into the set of constraints. Nonetheless,
this solution requires the availability of information about the whole system, which im-
plies a centralized control structure that commonly suffers from computational burden
issues. Therefore, non-centralized control methods are an alternative. Moreover, differ-
ent from the design of non-centralized MPC controllers considering a limited resource,
i.e., only one coupled constraint in the control inputs, another control problem treated
in this dissertation is the design of distributed MPC (DMPC) controllers involving mul-
tiple coupled constraints. In this case, the non-centralized design becomes even more
challenging since the availability of information should be guaranteed in order to satisfy
all the system constraints.
The increasing appearance of complex large-scale systems, e.g., water distribution
systems, smart grids, or traffic systems, have motivated the study of non-centralized
MPC controllers since some of these systems are not suitable to be controlled with
a centralized approach. This fact is motivated by two aforementioned aspects, i.e.,
communication issues (infrastructure) to collect and transmit data associated to the
system states, and computational issues regarding the calculation of control inputs.
The problem of obtaining non-centralized control formulations has become a relevant
research topic. The process of making controllers non-centralized is normally addressed
by dividing the whole system into m different sub-systems and the whole controller into
18
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Sub-sys m
LMPC 2
. . .
LMPC 1
LMPC m
Sub-sys 1
Sub-sys 2
Sub-sys m
LMPC 2
. . .
LMPC 1
LMPC m
Sub-sys 1
Sub-sys 2
Sub-sys m
LMPC 2
LMPC 1
LMPC m
Sub-sys 1
Sub-sys 2
Sub-sys m
LMPC 2
LMPC 1
LMPC m
Sub-sys 1
Sub-sys 2
(a)
(c)
(b)
(d)
Figure 2.1: Different non-centralized architectures for MPC controllers: (a) general
composition for non-centralized architectures, (b) decentralized arhitecture, (c) parallel
distributed architecture, and (d) sequential distributed architecture. Dashed arrows
connecting different sub-systems represent that the dynamical coupling might exist or
not, e.g., it is possible that two sub-systems are decoupled.
several local smaller controllers as presented in Figure 2.1(a). In [28], [32], [98], [136],
and more recently in [87], a wide discussion related to non-centralized MPC is developed.
Furthermore, there are several classifications within the non-centralized MPC con-
trollers depending on their architecture and on how different local controllers share
information with one another [136]. One of the non-centralized configurations corre-
sponds to decentralized MPC controllers, presented in Figure 2.1(b), where the arrows
connecting sub-systems represent the possible dynamical coupling among them. Dashed
lines shows that the dynamical coupled might exist or not among sub-systems, e.g., it is
possible that two sub-systems are not dynamically coupled. In the decentralized MPC
architecture [20], there is a set of local MPC controllers (each one in charge of the control
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of a sub-system), which do not exchange information to one another. Therefore, in order
to implement this control architecture, it is usually assumed that the dynamical cou-
pling among sub-systems is weak. This control configuration has been studied by many
authors, e.g., a decentralized MPC algorithm is proposed in [3] for linear large-scale sys-
tems and considering constraints over the control inputs. This work proposes to obtain
approximated models of sub-systems that represent the global behavior of the system.
Another work that considers a linear system structure is presented in [129], where a
plug-and-play decentralized MPC controller is proposed. Local controllers only use in-
formation from a sub-system and its neighbors, and prior to plug a new sub-system into
(or unplug it from) the whole system, it is verified whether or not the modification might
affect the closed-loop stability conditions. Stability in this non-centralized architecture
has been further analyzed using different methods, e.g., [81] and [122]. Regarding appli-
cations, a decentralized MPC controller is designed in [41] for an air conditioning system,
and in [143] distributed generators in islanded mode are controlled by a decentralized
MPC controller.
Limitations of the decentralized control configurations have been studied in [37].
Therefore, the performance of the closed-loop system can be enhanced by considering
that local MPC controllers can exchange information. Then, these local controllers
should be coordinated to obtain a final control input [126]. This modification adding
available information among controllers leads to the DMPC architecture as presented in
Figures 2.1(c) and 2.1(d). Moreover, DMPC architectures have different sub-categories
depending on the manner in which the local MPC controllers share information and also
depending on the control objectives they consider. Regarding communication configura-
tions, DMPC controllers are known as parallel when all local controllers communicate si-
multaneously (see Figure 2.1(c)), and they are known as sequential when local controllers
exchange information in a sequential manner (see Figure 2.1(d)). A comparison among
different DMPC schemes is developed in [99]. With respect to the control objectives,
DMPC controllers can be cooperative or non-cooperative1, i.e., in the non-cooperative
DMPC, each controller has its own control objectives, and in the cooperative DMPC,
there are common control objectives.
1
The concepts of cooperative and non-cooperative DMPC controllers are omitted due to the fact that
it can create confusion with respect to the cooperative and non-cooperative games, which are discussed
throughout this doctoral dissertation.
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Some authors propose the decomposition of the overall control problem into smaller
decoupled problems and the coordination of those individual components in a centralized
way [33]. The decomposition of a particular non-linear system for the design of an MPC
controller with coupled objectives and constraints is discussed using estimations in [40],
and the case in which there are dynamically decoupled sub-systems with coupled objec-
tives and/or constraints is studied in [32]. A methodology of decomposition for a system
is also presented in [5], where centralized and distributed approaches are compared in
coupled electricity and gas networks. The work presented in [45] considers cooperation
approach for DMPC controllers for any finite number of sub-systems. Other distributed
strategies propose to share information among different sub-systems at different stages.
For instance, in [128], a linear system composed of decoupled sub-systems is controlled
by using sequential information sharing. Furthermore, the idea to exchange information
among local controllers is also exploited in [43]. Moreover, in [68], the worst case is
used in order to ensure the appropriate performance of the closed-loop system, and an
accelerated gradient method by using dual decomposition is proposed in [53] in order
to design DMPC controllers with faster convergence rates with respect to previously
presented duality-based distributed optimization algorithms.
2.1.3 Tuning for MPC Controllers
Consider a multi-objective MPC controller in which the cost function of the optimization
problem is composed of n different control objectives, i.e., let the cost function in (2.2a)
be as follows:
minimize
uk|k,...,uk+Hp−1|k
J(xk,uk) = J
f
(
xk+Hp|k
)
+
n∑
i=1
Hp−1∑
j=0
γi J
`
i
(
xk+j|k,uk+j|k
)
, (2.5)
where the sub-index i is used to differentiate among n cost functions. Moreover, the pa-
rameter γi ∈ R≥0, for all i = 1, . . . , n, is a weight that allows to determine a prioritization
of the objectives.
Notice that the consideration of multiple control objectives in an MPC controller
implies to determine several design parameters, i.e., in (2.5), it is necessary to determine
the terminal cost Jf , and to assign values for the prediction horizon Hp, and for the
weights γi, for all i = 1, . . . , n. The task of finding the appropriate values and conditions
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for the aforementioned parameters is known as the MPC tuning problem. In many cases,
the tuning procedure is determined intuitively depending on the engineering application,
or the adequate weights are found by a trial-and-error procedure. Furthermore, applica-
tions of large-scale nature, the consideration of a large number of constraints and/or the
need of including several control objectives make even more complex to determine the
appropriate values for the MPC tuning weights. Therefore, the necessity of developing
self-tuning methodologies has arisen. Additionally, when having time-varying parame-
ters, disturbances and/or nominal conditions within the system, the appropriate tuning
may also vary along the time.
The tuning problem has been discussed by many authors and by using different
approaches. A general review about different on-line and off-line tuning approaches
for MPC controllers is presented in [50]. An alternative to determine the appropriate
tuning of MPC controllers is by matching the MPC performance with the performance
of a pre-established controller. For instance, in [27] the tuning of an MPC controller
is computed based on a matching to a desired reference controller, then weights are
adjusted in order to obtain a behavior close to the performance of the mentioned reference
controller. Afterwards, an extension of this approach has been reported in [147]. In
[139], the matching to a linear controller is also used to determine the values of the
MPC parameters for multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) systems. Authors in [112]
present a tuning methodology for the weights of an MPC controller in the frequency
domain using also control matching. In [156], an automatic tuning strategy is proposed
consisting of a controller and a state observer. In [2], a tuning strategy is studied with an
optimization algorithm that uses an approximation between both a closed-loop predicted
output and the parameters that can be adjusted in the MPC controller. Finally, in [137]
an optimal tuning of MPC policies using a stochastic approach is presented.
Other perspectives to solve the problem without the use of a reference model have
emerged. For instance, in [146] it is proposed to compute several points of the Pareto
front associated to the cost function in a multi-objective MPC controller. Then, a pre-
established management point allows to determine the desired value within the Pareto
front from which the appropriate tuning weights are determined. In [162], the system
output is controlled to maintain it within a region instead of achieving a reference point.
Therefore, weights are selected to penalize the output error with respect to a zone for
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a crude distillation unit. Besides, heuristic directions have also been used to determine
the appropriate tuning in an MPC controller as in [159]. Moreover, in [150] and [57]
the authors use neural networks and fuzzy-based decision making to establish a tuning
of an MPC controller, illustrating examples for a mixing tank and for water networks,
respectively. Further methods have been explored in the tuning task. In [157], a two-step
off-set free tuning procedure is proposed. At first stage, the setup of a nominal MPC
loop is made, and then the second step is in charge of adapting the external reference. In
[149], a systematic tuning procedure is presented by using multi-objective optimization
methods; in [61], a robust tuning problem for a two-degree-of-freedom MPC is presented
for single-input-single-output (SISO) system; and authors in [93] have presented a self-
tuning of the terminal cost in an economic MPC controller.
2.2 Large-scale System Partitioning
Large-scale systems are commonly associated to the control of a large number of states
by manipulating also several control inputs. In this regard, controllers must merge a lot
of data and process them in order to compute the appropriate control inputs and obtain
a desired performance for the closed-loop system. Another relevant aspect that should
be considered is that large-scale systems are usually extended geographically throughout
big areas, e.g., flow-based distribution systems, for which long communication links to
transport measurements and control signals are required, and that might cause additional
communication issues and imply economical costs.
The partitioning of large-scale systems appears as a plausible solution in order to
reduce the complexity of the control design, the costs associated to the communication
issues and also to reduce the computational complexity. However, the partitioning task
is quite challenging due to the existing dynamical coupling among elements within the
system, imposed coupled constraints, and objective-achievement warranties, among oth-
ers.
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2.2.1 Partitioning Problem
Consider a large-scale system of the form as in (2.1). Moreover, let the system be
composed of different sub-systems. Therefore, let the set S˜ = {1, . . . ,m} represent the
m sub-systems, where the model representing each sub-system i ∈ S˜ is given by
xi,k+1 = vi(xi,k,ui,k,di,k) +
∑
j∈S˜
v˜j(xj,k,uj,k,dj,k), ∀ i ∈ S˜, (2.6)
where v˜j represents the existing dynamical coupling between the i
th sub-system and
sub-systems j ∈ S˜\{i}. Hence, assume that the system in (2.6) is controlled by an MPC
strategy with an associated optimization problem as presented in (2.2). The large-scale
partitioning consists in determine the appropriate sub-systems S˜ such that the MPC
controller can be performed in a distributed fashion. There are some general cases that
may occur.
• The first case corresponds to a decomposition of the system according to its dy-
namical coupling. Notice that this partitioning approach can only be applied to
specific system models, e.g., having the condition that the ith sub-system has only
interaction with other sub-systems in its neighborhood denoted by N˜i ⊂ S˜. Hence,
the dynamical model of the ith sub-system is given by
xi,k+1 = vi(xi,k,ui,k,di,k) +
∑
j∈{N˜i∪{i}}
v˜j(xj,k,uj,k,dj,k), ∀ i ∈ S˜. (2.7)
Therefore, the decomposition of the system is obtained from its model, i.e., the
model imposes conditions over the partitioning. However, the main challenge is to
determine a partitioning procedure that could be applied to any large-scale system
such that the impact of v˜j in (2.6) and (2.7) is minimized or eliminated.
• As a second case, suppose that v˜i = 0, for all i ∈ S˜. Therefore, it follows that the
dynamical model of the ith sub-system is given by
xi,k+1 = vi(xi,k,ui,k,di,k), ∀ i ∈ S˜. (2.8)
The system in (2.8) shows that all the sub-systems are dynamically decoupled.
Nevertheless, notice that it does not mean that the design of a non-centralized con-
troller is not longer challenging. The main reason is that, even though there is not
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dynamical coupling among sub-systems, it is possible to have coupled constraints
in the optimization problem (2.2). A common coupled constraint in engineering
problems, related to a resource allocation, is the one involving all the control inputs
ui,k, for all i ∈ S˜.
Finally, it is important to highlight that it is also possible to deal with systems that
have a combination of both cases, i.e., systems with dynamical decoupled and coupled
sub-systems, and control requirements involving decoupled and coupled constraints in
the respective optimization problem.
2.2.2 Some Partitioning Approaches
Most of the partition methods consider a graph representation, i.e., algorithms consider
graphs associated to the dynamics of the system (2.1). For instance, a graph-theoretical
approach for the decomposition of large-scale systems into a set of interconnected sub-
systems is proposed in [138]. However, notice that a partitioning procedure using infor-
mation about the dynamical model of the system cannot take into account other types
of coupling, e.g., constraints involving variables from different sub-systems. Therefore,
it is plausible the development of partitioning methodologies that can consider different
types of coupling, e.g., dynamical coupling, and coupled constraints among sub-systems.
The partitioning problem has gotten increasing importance in the automatic control
community as systems become challenging, and as the requirements and desired closed-
loop performance become more strict. Many partitioning proposals focus on specific
dynamical systems, or on a particular control strategy. Regarding particular types of
systems, the problem of the thermal control for buildings is studied by performing a par-
tition into clusters for decentralized control design in [29]. In [72], a partitioning method
is proposed based on capacitor reactive power domains for the control of electric power
distribution systems, and in [97], power distribution networks are split into different ar-
eas by using a systematic approach in order to control the voltage profile. On the other
hand, a method to find an optimal decomposition structure of distributed predictive
controllers is presented in [161] by using genetic algorithms. Moreover, the partitioning
approach presented in [106] is devoted for the design of decentralized predictive con-
trollers. However, the partitioning methodology is quite general, i.e., the partitioning
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can be implemented prior to defining the control strategy to apply. Other general parti-
tioning methodologies are presented in [42], where a harmony search algorithm is used,
and in [67], where the partitioning is obtained by merging different sub-systems of an
initial grouping. Finally, the work presented in [102] discusses a method to determine
how information should be shared and the appropriate manner to use it for decentral-
ized, distributed and hierarchical control schemes. There is still a significant interest in
the development of general partitioning procedures and methodologies.
As conclusion, the partitioning problem for large-scale systems constitutes a rele-
vant alternative in the design of non-centralized controllers, allowing the identification
of multiple sub-systems in an appropriate manner as it has been presented in Section 2.1
(see Figure 2.1). Furthermore, it is important to point out that the partitioning can be
addressed in two different ways. The first alternative consists in determining a partition-
ing based on the dynamical coupling of the whole system, whereas the other possible
approach take into account information coupling considering not only the dynamical
representation of the system, but also taking into account all the coupled constraints
involved in the control design.
2.3 Game Theory
Game theory, which has two different main approaches known as non-cooperative and
cooperative, has been applied to many different fields, e.g., economics [62], biology [60],
[101], linguistics [65], wireless communication [30], among others. In the last years, game
theory has gotten special importance for the design of optimization-based controllers [52],
and learning and decision-making algorithms [84]. A general view about the relationship
between game theory and distributed control is presented in [82], [121]. It is shown that
game theory is quite suitable to achieve global objectives by setting local rules, especially
when the engineering problems can be stated as multi-agent systems. Both cooperative
and non-cooperative game approaches have been widely used in the design of controllers
depending on their control objectives. In some cases, it is more suitable to work with
a cooperative perspective when agents can collaborate among them, whereas there are
other situations in which it is more appropriate to state the problem as a competition.
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2.3.1 Non-cooperative Game Approach
Within the first main branch of game theory, known as the non-cooperative approach,
there are other classifications for games depending on how players and strategies are
considered, i.e., matricial games, differential games, continuous games, and dynamic
games. For instance, in matricial games, players select strategies once and simultaneously
from a finite set of possibilities, whereas in continuous games, players can select from
an infinite number of strategies [19], [88]. In contrast, under the framework of dynamic
games, it is assumed that players that make decisions, are involved in a learning process
letting them modify actions based on previous decisions.
Game theory has been implemented for the control of different types of systems.
In [6], an overview of the utilization of game theory in signal processing applications
is presented. The use of game theory in smart grids can be found in [131] and [155].
The work in [115] shows how game theory and decision theory have been applied to
multi-agent systems. Finally, a summary of several engineering applications using game
theory is presented in [132].
Furthermore, within dynamic games, evolutionary-game theory allows to model the
evolution of agents when they interact strategically in a population [134], [158]. This
branch has been significantly enriched by the concept of evolutionary-stable strategy
(ESS) obtained from assigning stability conditions to a Nash equilibrium [86]. The Nash
equilibrium represents a situation in which no player can improve its benefits unilaterally,
i.e., there are no players with incentives to change strategy [96]. The result in [86] has
been quite used in biology since the concept describes many behaviors found in nature.
Afterwards, the evolutionary-stable strategy has been used under a dynamic behavior
together with the introduction of the replicator dynamics in [144]. The dynamic-games
approach has become a quite useful tool in the design of distributed controllers as it has
been presented in [121], and it has been implemented in several fields, e.g., the control
of drinking water networks in [15] and [17], in the control of wastewater treatment plant
in [16], drainage wastewater systems in [10], [47], and [48], dynamical on-line tuning of
predictive controllers in [13], bandwidth allocation in [119], wireless networks in [145],
combinatorial optimization in [22], resource allocation problems in [117] and [123], cyber
security in [1], congestion games in [133], hierarchical frequency control for microgrids
in [90], dispatch problem with multiple generators in [113], wind turbines control in
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[11], [74], and [83], temperature control in [103], constrained extremum seeking in [120],
formation in multi-agent systems in [7], among others.
In the evolution process of the population, each agent makes rational decisions in
order to pursue an improvement over its benefits until reaching a scenario where it is
not possible to obtain an enhancement by unilaterally making a decision (this situation
is given by a Nash equilibrium). Besides, evolutionary-game theory allows to design
systems that guarantee convergence to a Nash equilibrium. Additionally, there is a
close relationship between the Nash equilibrium with a maximum point in a concave
constrained optimization problem due to the fact that, under certain conditions, the Nash
equilibrium satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) first-order conditions [134], making
evolutionary-game theory a powerful tool to address optimization-based control design.
The solution of games can be obtained employing local information. Therefore, if a
game framework is applied to address an engineering problem, distributed methodologies
emerge. Consequently, the game-theoretical approach becomes a suitable alternative to
design distributed controllers.
Population games describe the dynamical process that a population experiences when
there is a strategic interaction among the agents that comprise the population [63], [134],
[158]. The agents involved in this dynamical process evolve to an equilibrium according
to a revision protocol, which establishes the individual decision rules that agents apply
to choose the best strategies (i.e., those strategies earning higher payoffs). Population
dynamics properties (e.g., passivity [10], [46], [116], [123]) can be exploited to design
solutions for a variety of engineering problems. When using population dynamics for
solving learning, control, and optimization problems, some elements of the problem are
associated with strategies that agents in the population can adopt, and other elements
are associated with masses of agents playing each strategy. This analogy has a direct
implication in the information required to implement a solution based on a population
dynamics algorithm, since the existing algorithms assume that the population is well-
mixed [134], [158] (i.e., any pair of agents playing any pair of strategies can interact with
each other). A consequence of the well-mixed population assumption is that the elements
of the problem are allowed to interact each other without any constraint (i.e., following a
full–information structure). Therefore, classic population dynamics are restricted to be
implemented in problems characterized by a centralized information scheme. However,
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the number of problems that require distributed solutions has increased dramatically in
the last few years. In this regard, some approaches have been proposed to model the
interaction constraints in a population. For instance, authors in [21] and [4] deal with
normal-form games and propose a graph-based interaction model, where each node in
the graph represents an individual that repetitively plays a symmetric game with its
neighbors. However, this approach is not suitable to be applied in the population game
framework since, in this type of games, it is preferable to avoid the individuation of
players [134]. On the other hand, other approaches aim to apply learning algorithms
that are capable to deal with information constraints [24], [51]. Similarly, the authors
in [114] modify the well known replicator dynamics model to relax the full-information
dependency. They propose a distributed replicator equation in which the evolution
of each strategy is only governed by the neighboring strategies (according to a given
topology).
In addition, one of the main properties of the population games approach is that
the evolution of the variables, under population dynamics, evolve inside an invariant
set. Under most of the fundamental population dynamics, it is also guaranteed the
individual positiveness of each variable. In this regard, population dynamics are able
to satisfy a unique coupled constraint. And as it has been mentioned before, dynamics
evolve converging to a maximum point of a potential function [134]. The aforementioned
features are preserved in a distributed manner by using the distributed version of the
population dynamics, which have the same properties as their classical counterpart, i.e.,
invariance of the simplex set and asymptotic convergence to the equilibrium point [9].
Therefore, distributed population dynamics become a powerful tool to solve constrained
optimization problems in a distributed manner, i.e., considering population-interaction
constraints (non-complete graphs). Consequently, distributed population dynamics can
also be used for the design of distributed optimization-based controllers [121].
The invariance property of the simplex set that represents a coupled constraint and
positiveness of variables, and the fact that distributed population dynamics evolve in
a non-centralized manner, can be exploited to solve resource allocation problems under
non-centralized information-sharing structures. Nevertheless, the necessity to include
more constraints, different from the one associated to the simplex set, has gotten special
importance to be addressed with population games. For instance in [17], a population
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dynamics approach, able to solve optimization problems considering multiple constraints,
is presented. The authors propose to divide the optimization problems into several
smaller sub-problems, and dynamics over each sub-problem feasible region are added
in order to achieve an agreement that solves the non-divided optimization problem,
allowing also the population size vary along the time.
From a biological perspective, allowing variations of the population size illustrates a
special situation in which death and birth, or reproduction rates, are considered as in
[36], [100]. Density games have been studied to model a population with reproductive
rates. Nevertheless, these dynamics have not been neither deduced from a version of the
general dynamics known as mean dynamics, and by imposing different rules on revision
protocols, nor proposed in a distributed information-sharing fashion. This is because
the density-dependent dynamics have been mainly studied in a different context (i.e.,
biology sciences [36], [100]) from the context where the mean dynamics have been mainly
applied (e.g., economics [134] and optimization-based control engineering [9]). Besides,
the equilibrium points in this type of dynamics have not been related to the solution
of constrained optimization problems. Regarding control design, in [123] the dynamics
with density dependence presented in [36] have been used for control purposes. Nonethe-
less, distributed density-dependent population dynamics have not been introduced as a
potential tool for centralized/distributed control design.
2.3.2 Cooperative Game Approach
The other main branch of game theory is the cooperative game approach [110], [140].
Cooperative game (or coalitional game) theory studies the conditions and payoff rules
for groups of players that form coalitions. Indices of power are alternative manners to
solve a game, which are characterized for satisfying a certain system of axioms. Some of
these power indices are, among others, the Shapley value, the Banzhaf-Coleman index,
or the dictatorial index [111].
A typical solution of a cooperative game is given by the Shapley value [140], which
is a power index that assigns a fair payoff to each player according to its contribution.
Similarly as the non-cooperative games, the cooperative approach has been implemented
in different fields, e.g., in politics [111], and economics [118]. Likewise, cooperative games
have also been implemented in the engineering context.
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Cooperative game theory has been used for example in [78], where a control scheme
considering different network topologies is presented. In this and other related works
such as [94], the links that compose the network topology are transformed into players
of a game and the payoff given by the Shapley value is used as a mean to determine the
relevance of the players. Other works that mainly use the Shapley value are [54], and
[70]. In [54] the Shapley value as a distribution rule is used to guarantee the existence of
a Nash equilibrium in any game. In [70] an evolutionary coalitional approach is proposed
so that entities can decide in an autonomous manner whether it is profitable or not to
make a coalition.
Finally, it is worth to mention that the cooperative-game approach has gotten sig-
nificant importance in the design of controllers. However, one of the main issues when
adopting the cooperative approach consists in the high computational burden to compute
a solution [38].
2.3.3 Population Games Concepts
Consider a population composed of a large and finite number of rational agents1 [134],
[135]. These agents select a strategy from the set of n available strategies given by
S = {1, . . . , n}. The scalar pi ∈ R≥0 corresponds to the amount of agents, which are
selecting the strategy i ∈ S. The population mass is given by pi ∈ R>0, then the amount
of agents should satisfy that pi ≤ pi, for all i ∈ S. Therefore, the vector p ∈ Rn≥0
represents the population state or the distribution of agents throughout the strategies,
i.e., p = [p1 . . . pn]
>. Moreover, the set of possible population states is given by a
simplex set denoted by
∆ =
{
p ∈ Rn≥0 :
∑
i∈S
pi = pi
}
, (2.9)
and the interior of the simplex set in (2.9) is defined as follows:
int∆ =
{
p ∈ Rn>0 :
∑
i∈S
pi = pi
}
. (2.10)
1
It is assumed that agents are rational in the sense that they are able to make decisions in order to
improve their benefits based on current information, i.e., no agent would make a decision that implies a
decrement in its current benefits.
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Table 2.1: Some revision protocols and their corresponding switch rate.
Revision protocol Switch rate
Pairwise proportional imitation∗ %ij(f ,p) = pj [fj − fi]+
Imitation driven by dissatisfaction∗∗ %ij(f ,p) = pj(K − fi)
Pairwise comparison %ij(f ,p) = [fj − fi]+
Modified pairwise proportional imitation %ij(f ,p) =
[fj−fi]+
npi
Logit choice %ij(f ,p) =
e
(η
−1
fj)∑
k∈S e
(η
−1
fk)
∗ Notation [·]+ = max(0, ·) for the Pairwise proportional imitation protocol.
∗∗K is a large constant in imitation driven by dissatisfaction to guarantee that %ij ≥ 0.
Agents make decisions to select among the different strategies pursuing to increment
their benefits. The benefits are determined by a fitness function whose mapping is fi :
∆→ R. Depending on the population state, the function fi takes a population state and
returns a real value corresponding to the benefit that the proportion of agents pi receives
for selecting the strategy i ∈ S. The vector of fitness functions for the entire population
is denoted by f(p), whose mapping is given by f : ∆→ Rn. Function f takes a population
state and returns a vector of utilities for the population, i.e., f = [f1 . . . fn]
>.
In the population, it is assumed that agents are able to migrate from a strategy
i ∈ S to a strategy j ∈ S following a conditional switch rate denoted by %ij(f(p),p)
that defines the timing and result about how agents make decisions seeking to increment
their benefits. The revision protocol function, which determines the conditional switch
rates, is presented in Definition 2.1.
Definition 2.1. (Adapted from [134]) The revision protocol function is given by a map-
ping % : Rn × Rn≥0 → Rn×n≥0 that describes the timing and the results of the agents’
decisions in the strategic interaction. Function % takes values corresponding to the pop-
ulation state and its respective benefits, and returns a non-negative matrix representing
decisions of agents about switching strategies. ♦
Some of the revision protocols are presented in Table 2.1. According to [134], the
evolution process for the portion of agents within a strategic interaction in a large and
finite population, considering the way in which agents make decisions, are described by
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the general dynamics called the mean dynamics, i.e.,
p˙i =
∑
j∈S
pj%ji(f(p),p)− pi
∑
j∈S
%ij(f(p),p), ∀i ∈ S. (2.11)
The dynamics in (2.11) represent the evolution of the proportion of agents pi, for all
i ∈ S, as a function of a specific revision protocol %. Consequently, the six fundamental
population dynamics are generated from (2.11) by setting different revision protocols.
This thesis refers mainly to some specific classes of games such as stable games and
full-potential games. These two types of games are presented in Definitions 2.2 and 2.3,
respectively.
Definition 2.2. (Adapted from [134]) The population game f : ∆→ Rn is a stable game
if it satisfies the following condition:
(p− q)> (f(p)− f(q)) ≤ 0, ∀ p,q ∈ ∆. (2.12)
Alternatively, the condition in (2.12) may be expressed by using the Jacobian matrix
of f(p), i.e., Df(p). If f is continuously differentiable, then f is stable if and only
if z>Df(p)z ≤ 0, for all z ∈ T∆, and p ∈ ∆, where T∆ is the tangent space of the
simplex ∆, defined by T∆ =
{
z ∈ Rn : ∑i∈S zi = 0}. Therefore Df(p)  0 is a sufficient
condition. ♦
There is a close relationship between stable games and a class of population games
known as full-potential games defined next.
Definition 2.3. (Adapted from [134]) If there exists a continuously differentiable func-
tion V : Rn≥0 → R, known as potential function, such that f(p) = ∇V (p), for all
p ∈ Rn≥0, then f is a full-potential game. More explicitly, if ∂V∂pi (p) = fi(p), for all i ∈ S,
and p ∈ Rn≥0. ♦
Notice that, according to Definitions 2.2 and 2.3, if the potential function V (p)
for the full-potential game f is strictly concave, then f is a stable game. Figure 2.2
presents a convex potential function V (p) with p ∈ R3≥0, whereas Figure 2.3 presents a
concave potential function V (p) that generates a stable game f(p). Moreover, consider
the following constrained optimization problem:
maximize
p
V (p), (2.13a)∑
i∈S
pi = pi, (2.13b)
pi ≥ 0. (2.13c)
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Figure 2.2: Convex potential function and its projection over the simplex.
Figure 2.3: Concave potential function and its projection over the simplex.
The optimization problem in (2.13) can be solved by using population dynamics by
seeking the Nash equilibrium as it has been presented in [134] through the next theorem.
Theorem 2.1. If f is a full-potential game with full-potential function V , then the Nash
equilibria satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Proof. This proof is presented in [134].
The Nash equilibrium is a solution in population games since it implies that each
rational agent of the population is selecting the best possible strategy against a given
34
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Background
population state. Formally, the set of Nash equilibria of a population game is introduced
in Definition 2.4.
Definition 2.4. A population state p? ∈ ∆ is a Nash equilibrium if each used strat-
egy entails the maximum benefit for the proportion of agents that chooses it. Given a
population game f , let
NE(f) =
{
p?i > 0⇒ fi(p?) ≥ fj(p?), ∀i, j ∈ S
}
be the set of Nash equilibria. ♦
The six fundamental population dynamics are the replicator, Smith, projection,
Brown-Von Neumman-Nash (BNN), Logit choice and best response dynamics. Next,
the deduction of some population dynamics are obtained from the mean dynamics, con-
sidering the population mass pi = 1, and using some revision protocols [134].
Classical Replicator Dynamics Consider the pairwise proportional imitation revi-
sion protocol (see Table 2.1) [134]. Therefore, replacing %ij(f(p),p) in (2.11) yields
p˙i = pi
fi(p)−∑
j∈S
pjfj(p)
 , ∀ i ∈ S. (2.14)
The dynamics presented in (2.14) are the classical replicator dynamics, which have
been introduced in [144]. It is worthwhile to point out that the imitation driven by
dissatisfaction revision protocol also generates the classical replicator dynamics.
Classical Smith Dynamics Consider the pairwise comparison revision protocol (see
Table 2.1) [134]. Therefore, replacing %ij(f(p),p) in (2.11) immediately yields
p˙i =
∑
j∈S
pj
[
fip)− fj(p)
]
+
− pi
∑
j∈S
[
fj(p)− fi(p)
]
+
, ∀ i ∈ S. (2.15)
Dynamics in (2.15) are the Smith dynamics, which have been introduced in [141].
Classical Projection Dynamics Consider the modified pairwise proportional imita-
tion revision protocol (see Table 2.1). Therefore, replacing %ij(f(p),p) in (2.11)
yields
p˙i = fi(p)−
1
n
∑
j∈S
fj(p), ∀ i ∈ S. (2.16)
The dynamics presented in (2.16) classical projection dynamics [73].
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Classical Logit Choice Dynamics Following the same procedure, the Logit choice
dynamics are generated from the mean dynamics and by using the Logit choice
revision protocol (see Table 2.1) [134], i.e.,
p˙i =
e(η
−1
fi(p))∑n
k=1 e
(η
−1
fk(p))
− pi, ∀ i ∈ S, (2.17)
where η is a noise level [44].
2.4 Summary
This chapter has presented a general literature review regarding MPC controllers under
both decentralized and distributed schemes, and about the tuning issue associated to the
design parameters for this type of controllers. Moreover, a review of game theory applied
to engineering problems has been presented showing it is a useful tool in the design
of optimization-based controllers. Over the end of the review, the system partitioning
problem has been discussed, which is an essential aspect for the design of non-centralized
controllers. Finally, the preliminary concepts of the classical population games, which
are used throughout this thesis, have been presented. For instance, Chapter 3 uses the
classical population dynamics for the dynamical tuning of the weighting parameters in
the optimization problem behind an MPC controller.
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Chapter 3
Dynamical Tuning for
Multi-objective MPC Controllers
This chapter presents a novel methodology for the on-line dynamical tuning of a multi-
objective MPC controller based on evolutionary game theory. The contributions pre-
sented in this chapter have been published in [13] and [14]. The method consists of
a normalization of the cost function associated to the optimization problem that the
MPC controller solves to determine the optimal control inputs at each time instant,
and a population game that fixes the appropriate set of prioritization weights according
to a desired region over the Pareto front known as management region. Furthermore,
the method establishes a convex sum, i.e., the sum of all weights should be equal to
one [55]. The population game is solved by using a discrete version of the projection
dynamics, which converge to a Nash equilibrium. It is shown that the projection dynam-
ics satisfies the constraint given by the weighted sum, and the stability analysis of the
Nash equilibrium under the discrete projection dynamics is formally presented. Some
of the previous works mentioned in Chapter 1 related to the tuning problem require
either a reference controller or an observer, e.g., [27],[139], and [156]. Differently, the
proposed method in this chapter, based on population games, does not require a refer-
ence controller. Moreover, other tuning strategies need to compute several points along
the Pareto front in order to select an appropriate prioritization for the local objectives,
which implies a high computational burden, e.g., [146]. As an advantage, the proposed
method does not require to generate multiple points within the Pareto front associated
to the multi-objective cost function in an MPC controller. Furthermore, most of the
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tuning techniques are static and performed off-line as part of a design procedure. Never-
theless, the proposed tuning methodology can continuously adjust the prioritization of
the control objectives to maintain the system operating within the desired management
region. In order to illustrate the enhancement over the performance of an MPC con-
troller using the dynamical population-games-based tuning, the proposed methodology
is applied to a large-scale Water Supply Network (WSN). The results are analyzed and
compared with respect to a multi-objective MPC controller with static tuning.
3.1 Multi-objective MPC
Consider a system whose dynamics are represented by the following discrete-time state-
space model:
xk+1 = Adxk + Bduk + Bldk, (3.1)
where k ∈ Z≥0 denotes the discrete time step. The vector x ∈ Rnx denotes the system
states, u ∈ Rnu denotes the vector of control inputs, and d ∈ Rnd corresponds to the
vector of disturbances affecting the system that may be obtained by using a forecasting
algorithm as in [58],[153], and [154], and which is assumed to be known throughout this
thesis. The system matrices Ad, Bd, and Bl are of suitable dimensions. System states
and control inputs are constrained because of physical and/or desired operational limits.
These constraints are established by defining the following feasible sets:
X , {x ∈ Rnx : Gx ≤ g} , (3.2a)
U , {u ∈ Rnu : Hu ≤ h} , (3.2b)
where G,g,H, and h are matrices and vectors of suitable dimensions to represent the
constraints for the system states and control inputs, respectively. Let uˆk be a sequence
of feasible control inputs within a pre-establish prediction horizon denoted by Hp ∈ Z>0.
Similarly, let xˆk be the sequence of feasible system states when applying the control input
sequence uˆk to the system in (3.1). Finally, let dˆk be the forecasting of the disturbances.
Hence,
uˆk ,
(
uk|k,uk+1|k, ...,uk+Hp−1|k
)
, (3.3a)
xˆk ,
(
xk+1|k,xk+2|k, ...,xk+Hp|k
)
, (3.3b)
dˆk ,
(
dk|k,dk+1|k, ...,dk+Hp−1|k
)
. (3.3c)
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Consider that the system (3.1) is controlled by a multi-objective MPC controller
with n ≥ 2 control objectives. The optimization problem behind the MPC controller is
stated as follows:
minimize
uˆk
J (xk,dk, uˆk) =
n∑
i=1
γiJi(xk,dk, uˆk), (3.4a)
subject to
xk+j+1|k = Adxk+j|k + Bduk+j|k + Bldk+j|k, j ∈ [0, Hp − 1] ∩ Z≥0, (3.4b)
uk+j|k ∈ U , j ∈ [0, Hp − 1] ∩ Z≥0, (3.4c)
xk+j|k ∈ X , j ∈ [1, Hp] ∩ Z≥0, (3.4d)
where xk|k ∈ Rnx is the current measured system state, and γi ∈ R≥0, with i = 1, . . . , n,
are the n prioritization weights in the cost function J(xk,u) satisfying that
∑n
i=1 γi = 1.
Assuming that the optimization problem (3.4) is feasible, its solution is an optimal
control input sequence denoted by uˆ?k, i.e.,
uˆ?k ,
(
u?k|k,u
?
k+1|k, ...,u
?
k+Hp−1|k
)
.
Therefore, it follows that the controller applies the first control input from the optimal
sequence, which is given by u?k , u?k|k. Then, after having applied the optimal control
input to the system (3.1), a new vector state is measured and the procedure is repeated
in order to determine the optimal control sequence from which the optimal control input
u?k+1 is obtained.
In order to perform the dynamical tuning of the prioritization weights for the pre-
viously introduced MPC controller, a discrete-time population-game approach is used.
Therefore, one of the classical population dynamics are presented in the following section.
3.2 Classical Projection Dynamics
The projection dynamics are one of the six fundamental population dynamics [9], [121],
[134], which have been introduced in [95]. These dynamics have been presented in Section
2.3.3, which are given by the following differential equation:
p˙i = fi(p)−
1
n
n∑
j=1
fj(p), ∀i ∈ S, (3.5)
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where S = {1, . . . , n} is the set of strategies in the population. Then, according to (3.5),
the proportion of agents pi grows as the fitness function fi(p) is greater than the mean
of fitness functions 1n
∑n
j=1 fj(p), and decreases otherwise. Alternatively, the projection
dynamics in (3.5) can be re-written as follows:
p˙i =
1
n
n∑
j=1
fi(p)−
1
n
n∑
j=1
fj(p), ∀i ∈ S,
p˙i =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(
fi(p)− fj(p)
)
, ∀i ∈ S,
p˙ =
1
n
L f(p),
where L corresponds to the Laplacian matrix of a complete graph [89]. The equilibrium
point of the projection dynamics (3.5) is achieved when fi(p
?) = 1n
∑n
j=1 fj(p
?), for all
i ∈ S. This fact implies that at the equilibrium of (3.5), fi(p?) = fj(p?), for all i, j ∈ S,
and therefore p? ∈ ∆ is a Nash equilibrium according to Definition 2.4, i.e., p? ∈ NE(f).
For the population-games-based dynamical tuning for multi-objective MPC con-
trollers, it is proposed to use the discrete version of the projection dynamics, which
is obtained by using the Euler approximation for a sampling time τ ∈ R>0, i.e.,
p˙i ≈
(
pi,k+1 − pi,k
)
τ
.
Then,
pi,k+1 = τ
fi(pk)− 1n
n∑
j=1
fj(pk)
+ pi,k, ∀i ∈ S.
Notice that the projection dynamics can be re-written in a compacted manner as
follows:
pk+1 = τ
(
In −
1
n
1n1
>
n
)
f(pk) + pk,
=
τ
n
L f(pk) + pk. (3.6)
The equilibrium of (3.6) is the same as the equilibrium of (3.5). Then, the equilibrium
of (3.6) implies that fi(p
?) = fj(p
?), for all i, j ∈ S. Prior making the stability analysis
of the equilibrium point p? ∈ ∆, it is shown in Proposition 3.1 that the set of population
states ∆ is invariant under the discrete projection dynamics (3.6).
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Proposition 3.1. The simplex ∆ is an invariant set under the discrete projection dy-
namics (3.6), i.e., let p0 be the initial condition of the population state, if p0 ∈ ∆, then
pk ∈ ∆, for all k ∈ Z≥0.
Proof. It is desired to prove that 1>npk+1 = 1
>
npk. Then
1
>
npk+1 = τ1
>
n
(
In −
1
n
1n1
>
n
)
f(pk) + 1
>
npk,
= τ1>n
(
f(pk)−
1
n
1n1
>
n f(pk)
)
+ 1>npk,
= τ
(
1
>
n f(pk)−
1
n
1
>
n1n1
>
n f(pk)
)
+ 1>npk.
Since 1n1
>
n1n = 1, it is obtained that
1
>
npk+1 = τ
(
1
>
n f(pk)− 1>n f(pk)
)
+ 1>npk.
Finally, 1>npk+1 = 1
>
npk, which completes the proof.
The equilibrium point p? ∈ NE(f) is asymptotically stable under the discrete projec-
tion dynamics (3.6) by selecting appropriately the sampling time τ as stated in Propo-
sition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2. Let f be a potential and stable game with potential function V (p),
then the equilibrium point p? ∈ ∆ is asymptotically stable under the discrete projection
dynamics (3.6) if the sampling time τ is selected such that the matrix Ξ(τ) = Ψ +
τ
2 Ψ
>Df(p)Ψ is positive definite, where Ψ =
(
In − 1n1n1>n
)
= 1nL.
Proof. Since f(p) = ∇V (p), and f is a stable game, then V (p) is a concave function.
Consider the following Lyapunov function candidate:
Ek =
V (p?)− V (pk)
τ
,
where Ek > 0, for all p 6= p?, and Ek = 0 for p = p?. It is necessary to show that
∆E = Ek+1 − Ek ≤ 0, i.e.,
∆E =
V (p?)− V (pk+1)− V (p?) + V (pk)
τ
,
=
−V (pk+1) + V (pk)
τ
.
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As in [160], the Taylor expression of V (p) at p yields
V (pk+1) = V (pk) + [∇V (pk)]>∆pk +
1
2
[∆p]>∇2V (zk)∆pk,
where ∆pk = pk+1 − pk, and zk is a value between pk, and pk+1. It follows that
∆E = −1
τ
[∇V (pk)]>∆pk −
1
2τ
[∆p]>∇2V (zk)∆pk. (3.7)
Then, replacing from (3.6) the term ∆p in (3.7) yields
∆E = −[∇V (pk)]>Ψ∇V (p)−
τ
2
[∇V (p)]>Ψ>∇2V (zk)Ψ∇V (p),
= −[∇V (pk)]>
(
Ψ +
τ
2
Ψ>Df(zk) Ψ
)
∇V (p).
In conclusion, the equilibrium point p? ∈ ∆ is asymptotically stable if Ξ(τ) =
Ψ + τ2 Ψ
>Df(zk) Ψ is positive definite. In addition, notice that there exists a τ ∈ R>0
such that Ξ  0. To verify this fact, ∆E is expressed in terms of the Laplacian L, i.e.,
∆E = − 1
n
[∇V (pk)]>L∇V (p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆E
1
− τ
2n2
[∇V (pk)]>L>Df(zk)L∇V (p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆E
2
,
where the term ∆E1 ≤ 0 since it is a quadratic form and L is positive definite [89],
and ∆E2 ≥ 0 since it is a quadratic form and Df is negative semidefinite according to
Definition 2.2. Therefore, there exists a sufficiently small τ ∈ R>0 such that |∆E1| ≥
|∆E2|.
Proposition 3.2 requires that the game f was full potential. Nevertheless, the discrete
projection dynamics (3.6) can also be implemented for other types of games. Therefore,
Proposition 3.3 presents the stability proof for a game that does not require that the
game was full potential, but still stable. Afterwards, it is shown that both results are
equivalent for full-potential games.
Proposition 3.3. Let f be a stable game, then there exists a sampling time τ ∈ R>0
such that the equilibrium point p? ∈ ∆ is asymptotically stable under the discrete projec-
tion dynamics (3.6). The sampling time τ is selected such that |2 (pk − p?)> f(pk)| >
|τ f(pk)>Ψ>Ψf(pk)| is satisfied.
Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function Ek =
1
τ
∑n
i=1
(
pi,k − p?i
)2
, where Ek > 0 for all
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p 6= p?, and Ek = 0 for p = p?. It is necessary to show that ∆E = Ek+1 −Ek ≤ 0, i.e.,
∆E =
1
τ
n∑
i=1
{
p2i,k+1 − 2pi,k+1p?i + p∗2i − p2i,k + 2pi,kp?i − p∗2i
}
,
=
1
τ
n∑
i=1
{
−2pi,k+1p?i + 2pi,kp?i + p2i,k+1 − p2i,k
}
,
=
1
τ
n∑
i=1
{−2pi,k+1p?i + 2pi,kp?i}+ 1τ
n∑
i=1
{
p2i,k+1 − p2i,k
}
,
= −1
τ
n∑
i=1
2p?i
(
pi,k+1 − pi,k
)
+
1
τ
n∑
i=1
(
pi,k+1 − pi,k
)2
+
1
τ
n∑
i=1
2pi,k
(
pi,k+1 − pi,k
)
,
=
1
τ
n∑
i=1
2
(
pi,k − p?i
) (
pi,k+1 − pi,k
)
+
1
τ
n∑
i=1
(
pi,k+1 − pi,k
)2
.
Replacing the projection dynamics, it follows that
∆E = 2(pk − p?)>Ψf(pk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆E
1
+ τ f(pk)
>Ψ>Ψf(pk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆E
2
.
The first term ∆E1 is re-written as follows:
∆E1 = 2(pk − p?)>
(
In −
1
n
1n1
>
n
)
f(pk)
= 2(pk − p?)>f(pk)−
2
n
(pk − p?)>1n1>n f(pk)
= 2(pk − p?)>f(pk)−
2
n
(
p>k 1n − p∗>1n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
1
>
n f(pk)
= 2(pk − p?)>f(pk),
then it is concluded that ∆E1 ≤ 0 since f is stable. On the other hand, ∆E2 =
τ
n
2 f(pk)
>L>L f(pk), and it is concluded that ∆E
2 ≥ 0. Finally, there exists a sampling
time τ ∈ R>0 such that |∆E1| ≥ |∆E2|.
Finding the Sampling Time: A Potential-game Example
Consider the coordination game given by the following potential function:
V (p) = −p
2
1
2
− p22 −
3p23
2
,
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of proportion of agents for the coordination game under the dis-
crete projection dynamics for four different values of τ . Stable with: (a) τ = 0.1 < 0.776,
(b) τ = 0.5 < 0.776, (c) τ = 0.6 < 0.776, and marginally stable with (d) τ = 0.776.
then, Df(p) = diag([−1 − 2 − 3]). According to Proposition 3.2, the condition for
asymptotic stability of the equilibrium point p? ∈ ∆ is given by
Ξ(τ) =
 23 − τ2 τ6 − 13 τ3 − 13τ
6 − 13 23 − 2τ3 τ2 − 13
τ
3 − 13 τ2 − 13 23 − 5τ6
 .
The conditions over τ to make Ξ(τ) positive definite are:
2
3
− 1
2
τ > 0, and,
11
36
τ2 − 2
3
τ +
1
3
> 0.
It follows that Ξ(τ) is positive definite for any τ < 0.776 s, which is the condition to
have asymptotic stability of the equilibrium point p? ∈ ∆ under the discrete projection
dynamics (3.6). Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the proportion of agents p ∈ ∆ for
the coordination game under the discrete projection dynamics using different sampling
times. It can be seen that the system is marginally stable when τ = 0.776 s, validating
the condition over τ to have asymptotic stability. Considering Proposition 3.3, it is also
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possible to find the conditions over the sampling time τ by solving the following problem:
minimize
τ∈R>0, p∈∆
τ,
subject to 0 ≤ 2(p− p?)>f(p) + τ
n2
f(p)>L>Lf(p),
it is the minimum τ such that stability condition is not satisfied with a p ∈ ∆. When
solving this optimization problem with f(p) = diag([-1 -2 -3])p, it is found that
τc = 0.7762 is the critical sampling time with p = [0.5941 0.4058 0]
>. This example
shows the equivalence between the conditions for τ in Propositions 3.2 and 3.3.
3.3 Proposed Dynamical Tuning Methodology
The proposed dynamical tuning methodology based on population games consists of two
different stages. First, it is necessary to normalize the multi-objective cost function, and
then the discrete projection dynamics assign permanently the appropriate weights pi for
each one of the control objectives Ji(xk,u), for all i ∈ S. These two main steps of the
dynamical tuning methodology are explained next.
3.3.1 Normalization
The cost function (3.4a) has several control objectives, which might depend on different
parameters, e.g., one objective depending on the system states in contrast with another
objective in function of the control inputs. Furthermore, several objectives (even if
they involve the same variables) might have different order of magnitude. Therefore, it
is necessary to perform a normalization procedure in order to make a fair comparison
among all the control objectives.
Let x?i ,u
?
i be the optimal solution of the optimization problem (3.4) considering only
the function Ji(xk,u), i.e., the solution of (3.4) with weights γi = 1, and γj = 0, for all
j ∈ S\{i}. Then, the Utopia point, denoted by Jutopia =
[
Jutopia1 . . . J
utopia
n
]>
, is
computed as [71]
Jutopia =
[
J1(x
?
1,u
?
1) J2(x
?
2,u
?
2) · · · Jn(x?n,u?n)
]>
. (3.8)
On the other hand, the ith Nadir value is computed as [71]
Jnadiri = max
(
Ji(x
?
1,u
?
1), Ji(x
?
2,u
?
2), · · · , Ji(x?n,u?n)
)
, (3.9)
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Figure 3.2: General scheme of the proposed dynamical tuning based on population
games.
where the Nadir point Jnadir is given by
Jnadir =
[
Jnadir1 J
nadir
2 · · · Jnadirn
]>
. (3.10)
Finally, the normalized multi-objective cost function denoted by J˜(xk,u) has the form
J˜(xk,u) =
n∑
i=1
J˜i(xk,u),
where each normalized objective is given by
J˜i(xk,u) =
Ji(xk,u)− Jutopiai
Jnadiri − Jutopiai
.
Having normalized the cost function J(xk,u), then the established weights assign a
prioritization without being affected by the order of magnitude of each objective. This
procedure is illustrated in Figure 3.2, receiving information from the cost function (that
is affected by the forecast of disturbances), prediction model, and constraints.
3.3.2 Dynamical Weighting Procedure
Once the cost function has been normalized, it is considered that the prioritization
weights at each control objective Ji(xk,u) are given by a time-varying parameter pi,k,
for all i ∈ S. Hence, the normalized optimization problem behind the MPC controller
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is formulated as follows:
minimize
uˆk
n∑
i=1
pi,kJ˜i(x0, uˆk), (3.11a)
subject to:
xk+j+1|k = Adxk+j|k + Bduk+j|k + Bldk+j|k, j ∈ [0, Hp − 1] ∩ Z≥0, (3.11b)
uk+j|k ∈ U , j ∈ [0, Hp − 1] ∩ Z≥0, (3.11c)
xk+j|k ∈ X , j ∈ [1, Hp] ∩ Z≥0, (3.11d)
where pk =
[
p1,k · · · pn,k
]>
, satisfying the constraint
∑n
i=1 pi,k = 1. The unitary
value at the constraint of the weights sum is associated to the population mass that
defines the simplex set ∆ in the population game. Notice that weights are able to vary
dynamically since the disturbances in the system (3.1) might also vary along the time.
To overcome this issue, the discrete projection dynamics (3.6) are implemented. The
fitness functions fi(pi,k), for all i ∈ S, are chosen to be dependent of the current value
of each control objective J˜i(xˆ
?
k, uˆ
?
k) representing each strategy, i.e.,
fi(pi,k) = wiJ˜i(xˆ
?
k, uˆ
?
k), (3.12)
where wi, for all i ∈ S, assigns a prioritization that defines a management region in the
Pareto front as has been presented in [13]. Besides, these terms wi, for all i ∈ S, do
not appear in the optimization problem of the MPC, and should not be confused with
the weights of the cost function (3.11a) in the MPC controller, which are denoted by pi,
for all i ∈ S. Furthermore, notice that the potential function V (p) is unknown for this
game. The function V (p) would represent the Pareto front in function of the all possible
assigned prioritization (see Remark 3.1).
The differences between the management region and the static weights in the multi-
objective optimization problem are discussed. To do so, consider a simple and general
optimization problem given by
minimize
z
J(z) = p1J1(z) + p2J2(z), (3.13a)
subject to
Hz ≤ h + c, (3.13b)
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where z ∈ Rn is the decision variable, and H ∈ Rl×n is a constant matrix with suitable di-
mension. The values p1, p2 ∈ R≥0 establish a static prioritization for the objectives J1(z)
and J2(z), respectively. The vector h ∈ Rl is a constant component in the constraint,
whereas the vector c ∈ Rl is a time-varying component. For instance, the time-varying
value of the vector c ∈ Rl may be associated to a disturbance d ∈ Rl involved in a
constraint in the optimization problem of an MPC controller.
First, suppose that c = c1 in (3.13b), and let c1 ∈ Rl be a vector of arbitrary entries.
For this case, suppose that the obtained Pareto front is the one presented in Figure 3.3a),
and its normalized Pareto front is the one presented in Figure 3.3b). This figure shows
an example in which the management region is given by w1 = w2 = 0.5, and shows the
solution for the optimization problem when static weights in the multi-objective functions
are assigned as p1 = p2 = 0.5 to objectives J1(z), and J2(z), respectively. Notice the
difference between the selection of the management region and the assignment of the
weights in the cost function.
Now, suppose that c in (3.13b) varies, e.g., c = c2, where the entries of c1, and c2
are near values, i.e., c1 − c2 ≈ 0. In this case, the Pareto front varies. Suppose that the
new Pareto front is the one obtained in Figure 3.3c), with its corresponding normalized
front presented in Figure 3.3d). When making this modification over c, the solution
of the optimization problem for the weights p1 = p2 = 0.5 changes dramatically over
the Pareto front (this fact illustrates the effect when the disturbances, denoted by d,
vary in the optimization problem (3.11)). However, notice that the management region
is still defined as a region where the objective functions have a equitable value for the
particular case w1 = w2 = 0.5.
When the management region is defined, the dynamical tuning strategy is in charge
of finding the proper weights p˜1, and p˜2 in the normalized cost function, such that the
solution lies inside the management region. This philosophy is different from the static
tuning strategy where the weights are determined previously. The process to assign
dynamically the tuning weights is performed by using the population dynamics.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.3: Comparison between the management region and the optimization prioritiz-
ing weights.
Assumption 3.1. The fitness function fi(pi) is a strictly decreasing function with re-
spect to pi. It is expected that the value of the objective J˜i(xˆ
?
k, uˆ
?
k) decreases as bigger
weight pi,k is assigned to it when solving the corresponding optimization problem. ♦
Remark 3.1. Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 have shown that there exists a sampling time
τ ∈ R>0 such that the equilibrium point p? ∈ ∆ is asymptotically stable under the
discrete projection dynamics. Moreover, in order to find the critical τc, it is necessary
either to compute the Jacobian Df(p) or to know the equilibrium point p? ∈ ∆. For
the dynamical tuning application, none of these data are available since there is not a
function describing the Pareto front depending on the assigned prioritization in the cost
function (3.11(a)), and the equilibrium point might vary along the time because of the
time-varying disturbance affecting the system. However, there exists a sufficiently small
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τ to guarantee stability according to Proposition 3.3 since the game f is stable. For the
tuning application, a sampling time τ = 0.15 < τc has been selected. ♦
The dynamical adjustment of the weights is presented in Figure 3.2. The fitness
functions are determined by using information from the normalized cost function and the
weights that determine the management region. Thus, the discrete projection dynamics
compute the appropriate prioritization of the normalized cost function in the MPC
controller. A detailed procedure to implement the population-games-based dynamical
tuning for multi-objective MPC is presented in Algorithm 2. Notice that it is necessary
to compute the normalization at each iteration since the disturbances vary along the
time.
Algorithm 2 Dynamical tuning based on population games for multi-objective MPC.
1: Hs ← simulation length
2: Hp ← prediction horizon
3: n ← number of objectives
4: k ← initial time
5: xk ← x0 ∈ Rnx initial condition for the states
6: pk ← p ∈ Rn≥0 initial condition for the proportion
7: for k = 1 : Hs do
8: for i = 1 : n do
9: u?i ← arg min
uˆ
Ji(x,u) with constraints
10: Jutopiai ← Ji(x?i ,u?i )
11: end for
12: for j = 1 : n do
13: Jnadirj ← max
(
Jj(x
?
1,u
?
1), · · · , Jj(x?n,u?n)
)
14: end for
15: xˆ?k, uˆ
?
k ← arg min
uˆ
n∑
i=1
pi,kJ˜i(x,u) with constraints
16: u?k ← u?k|k ∈ Rnu optimal control input
17: for i = 1 : n do
18: fi(pi) , fi(pi,k) ← wiJ˜i(xˆ?k, uˆ?k)
19: end for
20: pk+1 = τ
(
In − 1n1n1>n
)
f(pk) + pk
21: xk+1 = Adxk + Bduˆ
?
k + Bldk
22: end for
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3.3.3 Case Study: Barcelona Water Supply Network
This section introduces the Barcelona water supply network (BWSN) (see [107] for fur-
ther details regarding this case study) and the design of a multi-objective MPC controller.
In order to illustrate the performance of the aforementioned multi-objective MPC con-
troller with a dynamical tuning based on population games, the proposed on-line tuning
methodology is implemented in a large-scale water supply network. Furthermore, the
performance of the MPC controller with dynamical tuning is compared to the perfor-
mance obtained by using a conventional static tuning. Figure 3.4 shows a representative
portion of the BWSN that is composed of 17 tanks, 26 pumps, 35 valves, nine water
sources, 25 water demands, and 11 mass-balance nodes. The dynamical model of the
system is given by the following expressions:
xk+1 = Adxk + Bduk + Bldk, (3.14a)
0 = Euuk + Eddk, (3.14b)
where x ∈ Rnx is the vector of nx = 17 system states corresponding to the tank volumes,
u ∈ Rnu is the vector of nu = 61 control inputs, and d ∈ Rnd is the vector of nd = 25
time-varying water demands. The water demands are considered to be disturbances to
the system, which have a periodicity of 24 hours with a mean value, and a nominal
amplitude [153]. The constraints given by the 11 mass-balance nodes are described by
(3.14b), i.e., the constraint represents the static water balance for all the nodes in the
WSN. Matrices Ad, Bd, Bl, Eu, and Ed are obtained according to the control-oriented
modeling described in [105].
3.3.4 Management Criteria
The MPC controller is designed considering a cost function with multiple objectives.
These objectives for the BWSN are established by a management criteria considering
the following three aspects:
• Economic operation, i.e., J1(uk) ,
∣∣∣(α1 +α2,k)> uk∣∣∣, where α1 represents the
time-invariant costs associated to the water resource, and α2,k represents the time-
varying electricity costs associated to the operation of valves and pumps.
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Figure 3.5: Behavior of the trend of the normalized functions J˜i(xˆ
?
k, uˆ
?
k), for all i = 1, 2, 3.
All these functions are decreasing, and in particular, J˜2 and J˜3 decrease with a very small
slope.
• Smoothness operation, i.e, J2(uk) , ‖∆uk‖2, where ∆uk = uk − uk−1.
• Safety operation, i.e., considering the constraint xk ≥ xs − ςk, for all k, with
xs ∈ Rnx being the vector of safety volumes for all the tanks, and ςk ∈ Rnx≥0. The
third objective is given by J3(ςk) , ‖ςk‖2.
It is important to clarify that the prioritization of objectives, which is determined by
the company in charge of the management of the network, is already known. In fact,
the prioritization of these aforementioned objectives is commonly used in the design of
controllers using a static tuning [58], [107]. In this particular case study, and according to
the company in charge of the system, the most important objective is the minimization
of the economical costs, i.e., J1(uk). The second most important objective is the one
related to the safety volumes, i.e., J3(ςk). Finally, the less important control objective is
related to the smooth operation, i.e., J2(uk). This prioritization order of the objectives
in the cost function should be satisfied in case of both static and dynamical tuning.
Figure 3.5 shows the trend of the normalized functions J˜i(xˆ
?
k, uˆ
?
k), for all i = 1, 2, 3.
It can be seen that these functions are decreasing with respect to the weight pi. This
is because it is expected to get a smaller value from the minimization problem as more
prioritization is assigned (see Assumption 3.1).
3.3.5 Scenarios
In order to illustrate the enhancement of the control performance when adopting the
population-games-based dynamical tuning methodology, the performance obtained with
the dynamical tuning is compared to the performance when static weights are established
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.6: Demand profile for: (a) Scenario 1 and (b) Scenario 2. Disturbances
d12, d18, d20 and d24 correspond to the water demands in the case study presented in
Figure 3.4.
to the objectives in the cost function. Besides, two different scenarios are proposed. In
general, the water demand profiles have a periodic behavior (daily), with a constant
mean value, and with a regular amplitude. Nevertheless, the event in which the peri-
odic demand changes unexpectedly along the time is considered, i.e., when the demand
varies its mean value and its regular amplitude. The purpose is to assess the automatic
adjustment of the weights when conditions over the system suffer a modification along
the time, improving the performance with respect to an MPC with static tuning.
The performance when the demand suffers a decrement, and when demand has a
sudden increment are analyzed. These two possible scenarios are presented in Figure
3.6 where four arbitrarily chosen demands are shown (all the 25 demand profiles for the
case study have similar behavior), i.e.,
Scenario 1: decrement of the mean value of the demand profiles (see Figure 3.6(a)).
Scenario 2: increment of the mean value of the demand profiles (see Figure 3.6(b)).
The decrement and increment of the mean value of the disturbances is made arbi-
trarily at the end of the fourth day of simulation.
Notice that when implementing an off-line static tuning strategy, the control de-
signer should assign the desired prioritization weights γ1, ..., γn to the controller. On the
other hand, when adopting the dynamical tuning strategy, the control designer assigns
the desired prioritization throughout the weights w1, ..., wn. Consequently, in order to
make a fair comparison, weights γ1, ..., γn in the cost function of problem (3.4) for the
static tuning case and the weights in the management region w1, ..., wn in (3.12) for the
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dynamical tuning case are selected to be the same, i.e., wi = γi, for all i ∈ S.
3.3.6 Results and Discussion
The performance of the controllers is evaluated by using an economical Key Performance
Index (KPI) associated to costs denoted by KPIEcost, and C considering the total number
of simulation days (in this case eight days), i.e.,
KPIEcosts(day) =
24+24(day−1)∑
k=1+24(day−1)
(
α1 +α2,k
)>
uk, (3.15)
where k ∈ Z≥0 in given in hours, and
C =
8∑
day=1
KPIEcosts(day). (3.16)
Furthermore, a sub-index is used to distinguish between the results with static tun-
ing, and with the proposed dynamical tuning, i.e., CS and CD, respectively. For each
scenario, six different cases corresponding to six management regions are tested, which
are outlined as follows:
• Tuning case 1: [w1 w2 w3]> = [0.8 0.05 0.15]>,
• Tuning case 2: [w1 w2 w3]> = [0.7 0.1 0.2]>,
• Tuning case 3: [w1 w2 w3]> = [0.6 0.15 0.25]>,
• Tuning case 4: [w1 w2 w3]> = [0.5 0.2 0.3]>,
• Tuning case 5: [w1 w2 w3]> = [0.4 0.25 0.35]>,
• Tuning case 6: [w1 w2 w3]> = [0.35 0.3 0.35]>,
where [w1 w2 w3]
> = [γ1 γ2 γ3]
>. Notice that all the proposed tuning cases satisfy
the prioritization order presented in Section 3.3.4, i.e., w1 > w3 > w2.
Table 3.1 presents the comparison between the economic results obtained with a
multi-objective MPC using a static and dynamical population-games-based tuning, and
for the two different scenarios. Also, Table 3.1 shows the reduction of costs when adopt-
ing the proposed dynamical tuning, i.e., CS − CD. It can be seen that, for all the
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Table 3.1: Economic results for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 in the case study. Notice that
for the comparison of data the management region corresponds to the prioritization of
the MPC controller with static tuning, i.e., [w1 w2 w3]
> = [γ1 γ2 γ3]
>.
Tuning Dynamical tuning Static tuning Reduction of costs Percentage reduction
case costs CD (e.u.) costs CS (e.u.) CS − CD (e.u.) 100(CS − CD)/CS [%]
S
c
e
n
a
ri
o
1 1 281475.4393 295465.0021 13989.5627 4.73
2 282296.0113 295114.7771 12818.7657 4.34
3 283592.6568 300172.7427 16580.0858 5.52
4 289484.6672 312124.2979 22639.6307 7.25
5 291048.2900 328267.0268 37218.7368 11.33
6 291874.0282 341964.3402 50090.3120 14.64
S
c
e
n
a
ri
o
2 1 251003.7369 266079.8919 15076.1550 5.66
2 252147.3533 265056.5038 12909.1505 4.87
3 255457.0784 270722.0341 15264.9556 5.63
4 259626.8908 282454.0561 22827.1652 8.08
5 261713.5740 300459.4927 38745.9187 12.89
6 263114.2332 313364.1354 50249.9022 16.03
(a) (b)
Figure 3.7: Reduction of costs in eight days for the six different tuning cases. (a) Scenario
1, and (b) Scenario 2.
tested management regions, and for both scenarios, a reduction of costs is obtained
when implementing a dynamical tuning with respect to the costs with a standard static
tuning. Figure 3.7 presents a summary of the reduction of costs for both scenarios
and all the tested combination of weights for the control objectives. Cost reductions
from 13989.56 to 50090.31 e.u., and from 15076.15 to 50249.90 e.u., are obtained for
the first and second scenario in eight days, respectively. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the
evolution of system states, control inputs, and dynamic prioritization weights for the
first and second scenario with management regions given by w = [0.4 0.25 0.35]>,
w = [0.6 0.15 0.25]>, and w = [0.8 0.05 0.15]>.
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The performance exhibits an oscillatory behavior for the adjustment of weights be-
cause of the disturbances in the system. In fact, it can be seen that the periodicity
of the oscillation in the weights adjustment corresponds to the diary periodicity of the
demands (see Figure 3.6). In addition, it can be seen in Figures 3.8 and 3.9 that the
dynamical tuning suffers an abrupt change at the end of the fourth day adjusting weights
appropriately. This fact occurs since, at that point, the decrement or increment of the
mean value for the demand profiles is applied.
3.4 Summary
A novel dynamical tuning methodology for the prioritization weights in multi-objective
MPC controllers has been presented in this chapter. The dynamical tuning method-
ology requires to normalize the cost function of the optimization problem behind the
MPC controller. Therefore, a population game is solved with a discrete version of the
projection dynamics, which update the appropriate tuning by using information about
the current value of the normalized control objectives. The proposed dynamical tuning
does not require to generate multiple points of the Pareto front, which implies that it
is not computationally costly with respect to other reported on-line approaches. The
proposed tuning has been established to be a weighting sum, for which it is required that
the sum of all the weights is equal one. It has been shown that the discrete version of the
projection dynamics satisfies this constraint throughout the evolution of their variables.
Furthermore, the stability analysis of the Nash equilibrium under the discrete projection
dynamics has been made, and it is guaranteed if the control objectives decrease as more
priority is assigned to them (Assumption 3.1).
Finally, the dynamical tuning methodology is implemented to a large-scale water
supply network. Results have shown a reduction of costs when adopting the proposed
population-games-based dynamical tuning. The reduction of costs is achieved for all
the six tested tuning cases, and for two different scenarios for demand abrupt changes
(one scenario considering a decrement of demand, and another considering an increment
of demand). It is worth to point out that these achieved cost reductions have been
presented for a period of eight days, and that these reductions are maintained along
the time. Therefore, the proposed dynamical tuning strategy, according to the results
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obtained during a week, would represent a bigger reduction of costs in a larger period
of time, e.g., a month or a year.
In this chapter, a game theoretical approach has been used to complement an MPC
controller. In this regard, game theory helps to enhance the performance of the con-
troller. Similarly, next chapter discusses a different manner in which game theory can
collaborate in the design of optimization-based controllers. More specifically, it is ex-
plored how a game-theoretical approach can be used for the design of DMPC controllers.
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Distributed Predictive Control
Using Population Games
In Chapter 3, the role of the population games in the dynamical tuning for MPC con-
trollers has been presented. This chapter presents a different role of population games
consisting in the design of DMPC controllers involving resource allocation problems.
The contribution of this chapter is the design of a general method that permits the
deduction of several distributed population dynamics, which has been published in [9]
and that allows the design of distributed controllers, e.g., an engineering application with
a DMPC controller using this distributed population-dynamics approach is presented in
[8]. The core of the proposed method is the use of the mean dynamics [134] by including
strategy-constrained interactions, extending the results in [114] where the distributed
version of one of the six fundamental population dynamics has been presented using a
different deduction. For the classical population dynamics approach, the evolution of the
proportion of agents depends on the whole population state, i.e., agents can interact with
the whole population; however, when adding strategy-constraint interactions, agents can
only interact with a portion of the whole population. To illustrate the proposed method-
ology, a distributed version of the fundamental population dynamics is presented (those
obtained by applying classic revision protocols), i.e., the distributed replicator dynamics,
the distributed Smith dynamics, the distributed logit dynamics, and the distributed pro-
jection dynamics. It is worth noting that the deduction presented in this chapter can be
used to generate other distributed dynamics from alternative revision protocols. Besides,
it is shown that a population without strategy-constrained interactions obeys a structure
63
Chapter 4. Distributed Predictive Control Using Population Games
given by a complete graph, whereas a population considering strategy-constrained inter-
actions has many different possible structures that are generally given by non-complete
graphs. In this sense, the proposed approach is versatile to be implemented in a large
variety of problems with different information structures. Moreover, the distributed
population dynamics exhibit similar stability and invariance properties as their classic
counterpart. Finally, the application of the deduced distributed population dynamics in
optimization problems, classic games, and controllers design is highlighted.
Afterwards an application of the distributed population games to design non-centrali-
zed controllers is presented. The formalization of a distributed scheme for a tradi-
tional constrained MPC to manage medium/large-scale systems comprised by several
sub-systems is discussed. First, the design of a local MPC controller per sub-system
that is in charge of managing the desired local variables is proposed. Then, outputs
from all controllers are optimally coordinated without the need of a centralized configu-
ration. Different from classical dual decomposition and alternative direction method of
multipliers (ADMM), the proposed DMPC scheme based on population dynamics does
not require a central coordinator associated to the Lagrange multipliers when managing
a coupled constraint involving all the decision variables. Regarding the population dy-
namics stage in the proposed scheme, under some mild assumptions, it is shown that the
solution computed by using the proposed method asymptotically converges to the opti-
mal solution, while all constraints are satisfied. Besides, the stability of the closed-loop
system with the DMPC is ensured by proving that there exists an equivalence between
the proposed distributed scheme and a centralized MPC controller (CMPC).
4.1 General Dynamics on Graphs
The dynamics describing a population behavior depend on the population with strategy-
constrained interactions. In this regard, current literature assumes that the population
under consideration is well–mixed, i.e., if any portion of the entire population is taken,
this contains all the strategies with the same probability. Figure 4.1(a) illustrates this
fact by showing a population composed by a large and finite number of agents involved
in a game. Each element in the figure represents an agent, and the shape of the element
(circle, square, or triangle) denotes the strategy that the agent has adopted. In pop-
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.1: (a) Well–mixed population, i.e., population without strategy-constrained
interactions. (b) Population with strategy-constrained interactions (taken from [9]).
ulation games, all agents have the same probability to receive a revision opportunity.
The agent receiving the revision opportunity randomly chooses another agent from its
neighbors and can change its own strategy by the neighbor’s strategy depending on the
selected revision protocol. Since the population is well–mixed and there are no strategy-
constrained interactions, the probability that the selected opponent is playing any of the
available strategies is the same.
On the other hand, there could be a population considering strategy-constrained
interactions as the one shown in Figure 4.1(b). For this population, all agents have the
same probability to receive an opportunity to make a revision. However, the probability
that the opponent is playing a particular strategy is not equal (e.g., if the strategy
played by the agent receiving the revision opportunity is square, then there is the same
probability to select an opponent playing strategy triangle or square, but the probability
to select an opponent playing strategy circle is zero since the population structure does
not allow it). Interactions among agents playing different strategies can be represented
by a graph G = (S, E ,A). The set of nodes S is associated with the available strategies
and the set of links E is related to the encounter probability between strategies, i.e., there
exists a link between two strategies if their encounter probability is different from zero.
Hence, the elements of the corresponding adjacency matrix A = [aij ] are as follows: aij =
1 denotes that strategies i and j can encounter each other, while aij = 0 denotes that
the population strategy-constrained interactions make impossible a matching between
strategies i and j. According to this convention, the scenarios associated with well–mixed
populations and populations with strategy-constrained interactions can be represented
by two kinds of graphs. The well–mixed population case is always represented by a
complete graph, whereas a population considering strategy-constrained interactions is
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1
2 3
1 2 3
(a) (b)
Figure 4.2: Graph representation of: (a) population without strategy-constrained inter-
actions in Figure 4.1(a), and (b) population with strategy-constrained interactions in
Figure 4.1(b) (taken from [9]).
represented by a graph with a specific topology depending on the particular population
structure (see Figure 4.2). In this chapter, it is assumed that the encounter probability
between strategies i and j is the same as the one of strategies j and i, i.e., the graph G
is undirected.
Distributed Mean Dynamics
Taking into account the previously discussed considerations, the evolutionary process
of a population with strategy-constrained interactions involved in a strategic game is
formally described. Suppose that the population is composed by M agents, and each of
them receives a revision opportunity that is given by an exponential distribution with
rate R. Hence, during a time dt, the revision opportunity received by each agent is
given by Rdt. Since it is assumed that the mass of the population is equal to one, the
scalar pi is equal to the portion of agents playing the i
th strategy, and Mpi is the total
number of agents playing strategy i ∈ S. Consequently, the expected number of revision
opportunities received by agents playing the ith strategy is approximatelyMpiRdt during
dt (notice that pi may vary during dt; however, this variation is negligible if dt is small).
Agents playing i ∈ S switch to strategy j ∈ S with a probability that depends on the
revision protocol, the probability distribution of receiving a revision opportunity, and
the encounter probability between strategies i and j (given by the population structure,
which is represented by the graph G), i.e., aij%ij(f(p),p)/R. Finally, the expected
number of agents switching from strategy i ∈ S to strategy j ∈ S during time dt is
Mpiaij%ij(f(p),p)dt.
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Now, considering all possible strategies in the population, the expected number of
agents switching to strategy i ∈ S is given by
M
∑
j∈S
pjaji%ji(f(p),p)dt,
and the expected number of agents playing strategy i ∈ S changing to other strategies
is given by
Mpi
∑
j∈S
aij%ij(f(p),p)dt.
Therefore, the variation of the proportion of agents playing the ith strategy is deduced
by a mass balance as follows:
p˙i =
∑
j∈S
pjaji%ji(f(p),p)− pi
∑
j∈S
aij%ij(f(p),p), ∀ i ∈ S.
This equation corresponds to the distributed mean dynamics, or mean dynamics
for populations with strategy-constrained interactions. Since G is undirected then the
elements in the adjacency matrix satisfy that aij = aji ∈ {0, 1} and aij = 0 if j /∈ Ni,
notice that the distributed mean dynamics can be rewritten as follows:
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
pj%ji(f(p),p)− pi
∑
j∈Ni
%ij(f(p),p), ∀ i ∈ S. (4.1)
For complete graphs, i.e., for well-mixed-populations or populations without strategy-
constrained interactions, it is obtained that Ni = S, getting the classic Mean Dynamics
[134].
4.2 Distributed Population Dynamics
Distributed mean dynamics allow the inference of population dynamics involving popu-
lations with strategy-constrained interactions comprised of agents that are programmed
with a specific revision protocol. This section shows the deduction of different distributed
population dynamics by using (4.1). The deduced dynamics are named after the classic
population dynamics, which are generated by using the corresponding revision protocol.
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Distributed Replicator Dynamics (DRD)
The distributed replicator dynamics are obtained from the distributed mean dynamics
using the pairwise proportional imitation protocol (Table 2.1), as follows:
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
pjpi
[
fi(p)− fj(p)
]
+
− pi
∑
j∈Ni
pj
[
fj(p)− fi(p)
]
+
,
=
∑
j∈Ni
pjpi(fi(p)− fj(p)), ∀ i ∈ S.
Finally, the distributed replicator dynamics are given by
p˙i = pi
fi(p) ∑
j∈Ni
pj −
∑
j∈Ni
pjfj(p)
 , ∀ i ∈ S. (4.2)
Distributed Smith Dynamics (DSD)
In this case, the pairwise comparison protocol is used (see Table 2.1). Substituting this
revision protocol in (4.1), it follows:
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
pj
[
fi(p)− fj(p)
]
+
− pi
∑
j∈Ni
[
fj(p)− fi(p)
]
+
, ∀ i ∈ S. (4.3)
Notice that (4.3) can be written as
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
1
2
(
(1− νij)pi + (1 + νij)pj
) [
fi(p)− fj(p)
]
, ∀ i ∈ S,
where νij = sgn(fi(p)− fj(p)).
Distributed Logit Dynamics (DLD)
The deduction of the distributed logit dynamics is based on the logit choice protocol
(Table 2.1). However, notice that this protocol requires full information since the sum
at the denominator is taken over all the strategies. In order to satisfy the information
constraint given by the graph G, the protocol is modified as follows:
%ij(f(p),p) = e
η
−1
fj(p), η > 0.
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Distributed logit dynamics are obtained by replacing the above protocol in the dis-
tributed mean dynamics, i.e.,
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
pje
η
−1
fi(p) − pi
∑
j∈Ni
eη
−1
fj(p), ∀ i ∈ S. (4.4)
Distributed Projection Dynamics (DPD)
The projection dynamics use the modified pairwise comparison protocol based on the
pairwise comparison presented in Table 2.1, i.e.,
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
pj
[
fi(p)− fj(p)
]
+
pj
− pi
∑
j∈Ni
[
fj(p)− fi(p)
]
+
pi
, ∀ i ∈ S,
=
∑
j∈Ni
(
fi(p)− fj(p)
)
, ∀ i ∈ S.
Thus, the distributed projection dynamics are given by
p˙i = |Ni|fi(p)−
∑
j∈Ni
fj(p), ∀ i ∈ S, (4.5)
where |Ni| denotes the cardinality of the set Ni, i.e., the number of neighbors of the ith
node.
4.2.1 Invariant Set Analysis
The population mass does not vary over time. Hence, all possible states generated during
the evolution of the population should belong to the simplex ∆ given in (2.9). This
section shows that the simplex ∆ is an invariant set under the distributed population
dynamics deduced in the previous section.
Theorem 4.1. The simplex ∆ is an invariant set under: the distributed replicator
dynamics (4.2), the distributed Smith dynamics (4.3), and the distributed logit dynamics
(4.4).
Proof. According to (2.9), ∆ has two conditions, i.e.,
i)
∑
i∈S pi = 1 (mass conservation), and
ii) pi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ S (non-negativeness).
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First, the fact that DRD, DSD, and DLD satisfy condition i) is proven. Notice that
this is equivalent to show that
∑
i∈S p˙i = 0 under the distributed mean dynamics (4.1).
These dynamics can be written by using the adjacency matrix A of the graph G as
follows:
p˙i =
∑
j∈S
aij%ji(f(p),p)pj −
∑
j∈S
aij%ij(f(p),p)pi, ∀ i ∈ S.
Hence, ∑
i∈V
p˙i =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈V
aij%ji(f(p),p)pj −
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
aij%ij(f(p),p)pi.
Since G is undirected (i.e., aij = aji), then∑
i∈S
p˙i =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
aji%ji(f(p),p)pj −
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
aji%ji(f(p),p)pj
= 0.
Second, it is proven that each dynamic satisfies condition ii):
• DRD: Non-negativeness of each pi is satisfied given the fact that p˙i = 0 if pi = 0
under distributed replicator dynamics. Thus, if pi(0) ≥ 0, then pi(t) ≥ 0 for all
t ≥ 0.
• DSD: According to (4.3), notice that when pi = 0 for any i ∈ S, then p˙i ≥ 0.
Hence, the non-negativeness of pi is satisfied under distributed Smith dynamics.
• DLD: Notice that p˙i ≥ 0 when pi = 0 under distributed Logit dynamics (4.4).
Therefore, if p(0) ∈ ∆, then pi(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Proposition 4.1. The set ∆′ =
{
p ∈ Rn : ∑i∈S pi = 1} is invariant under the dis-
tributed projection dynamics (4.5).
Proof. The distributed projection dynamics can be written by using the adjacency ma-
trix A of the graph G as follows:
p˙i =
∑
j∈S
aijfi(p)−
∑
j∈S
aijfj(p), ∀ i ∈ S.
Therefore, ∑
i∈S
p˙i =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
aijfi(p)−
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
aijfj(p).
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Since aij = aji because G is undirected, it follows that∑
i∈S
p˙i =
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
ajifi(p)−
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
aijfj(p)
=0,
which completes the proof.
Remark 4.1. It should be noticed that the distributed projection dynamics satisfy one
of the conditions of the original simplex ∆, i.e.,
∑
i∈S pi = 1 (mass conservation).
However, the non-negativeness of pi is not guaranteed. This fact also occurs in the
classic projection dynamics. ♦
Remark 4.2. Notice that Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 4.1 do not impose any conditions
over the interaction graph G. Thus, the studied distributed population dynamics exhibit
simplex invariance under any population structure. ♦
4.2.2 Stability Analysis
Classic population dynamics usually converge to Nash equilibria since they correspond
to the expected outcome of games played by rational individuals (i.e., individuals that
are trying to maximize their profit). According to the set of Nash equilibria presented
in Definition 2.4, in a Nash equilibrium all players perceive the same profit.
This section provides sufficient conditions to guarantee that a Nash equilibrium p? ∈
NE(f) of the population game f is asymptotically stable under the distributed population
dynamics derived in Section 4.2. These conditions, which are related to the connectivity
of the interaction graph and the characteristics of the Nash equilibrium, are summarized
in the following assumptions.
Assumption 4.1. The graph G that describes the population structure is connected.
Assumption 4.2. The Nash equilibrium p? ∈ NE(f) belongs to the interior of the
simplex ∆, i.e., p? ∈ int∆ as defined in (2.10).
The results on convergence of the distributed population dynamics to a Nash equi-
librium are provided below.
Theorem 4.2. Let f be a full-potential game with strictly-concave potential function
V (p), and let p? ∈ NE(f). If Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 hold, then p? is asymptotically
stable under the distributed replicator dynamics (4.2) and the distributed Smith dynamics
(4.3).
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Proof. Since p? ∈ NE(f) and p? ∈ int∆, it is concluded that fi(p?) = fj(p?), for all
i, j ∈ S. Moreover, notice that p? = arg maxp∈∆ V (p) (applying the Karush–Kuhn–
Tucker conditions). Additionally, since V (p) is strictly concave, it is possible to take
E(p) = V (p?)− V (p) (4.6)
as a Lyapunov function candidate. The derivative of E(p) along the trajectories of DRD
(4.2) and DSD (4.3) is given by
E˙(p) = −(∇V (p))>p˙
= −f>p˙
= −f>L(p)f ,
where L(p) =
[
l
(p)
ij
]
is a matrix whose entries l
(p)
ij are for DRD as follows:
l
(p)
ij =

−aijpipj , if i 6= j∑
k∈S,k 6=i
aikpipk, if i = j,
and for DSD as follows:
l
(p)
ij =

−aij
2
(
(1− φij)pi + (1 + φij)pj
)
, if i 6= j,
∑
k∈S,k 6=i
aik
2
(
(1− φik)pi + (1 + φik)pk
)
, if i = j.
Notice that L(p) is the Laplacian of the undirected graph given by the tuple G(p) =
(S, E ,A(p)), where A(p) = [a(p)ij ] is the adjacency matrix whose entries are defined as
follows:
a
(p)
ij =

aijpipj , for DRD,
aij
2
(
(1− φij)pi + (1 + φij)pj
)
, for DSD.
These entries are nonnegative since p ∈ ∆. Thus, L(p) ≥ 0 and E˙(p) ≤ 0. Therefore,
p? is stable under DRD and DSD.
Considering that p? ∈ int∆ is stable, a set B around p? can be defined such that if
p(0) ∈ B, then p(t) ∈ int∆, for all t ≥ 0 (it is possible to show that B = int∆ for DRD).
Thus, if p(0) ∈ B, the null space of L(p) is equal to span{1n} since G(p) is connected.
It is concluded that G(p) is connected since:
• G(p) and G have the same topology in B, i.e., if p ∈ B, a(p)ij = 0 only if aij = 0,
• G is connected by assumption
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In this case, E˙(p) = 0 if and only if fi = fj , for all i, j ∈ S, i.e., E˙(p) = 0 only in p?.
Therefore, p? is asymptotically stable.
Remark 4.3. Theorem 4.2 requires that, in steady state, all strategies are played by the
individuals involved in the game. Indeed, when any proportion of individuals is extinct at
equilibrium (i.e., p?i = 0 for some i ∈ S), then convergence of the distributed replicator
equation and the distributed Smith dynamics to the Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed.
However, the same arguments used in [114] can be employed to relax the convergence
conditions. In fact, if subtracting from the original graph any set of nodes associated
to extinct strategies does not produce disconnected subgraphs, then convergence to Nash
equilibria is provable even if Nash equilibria do not belong to the interior of ∆. This
relaxed assumption often holds in well-connected graphs1. ♦
Remark 4.4. Notice that Theorem 4.2 is only applicable to full-potential games. How-
ever, this class of games arises in a large number of applications including resource
allocation problems and congestion games [134]. ♦
Once the stability analysis for the DRD and the DSD have been presented, the
stability of the equilibrium p? ∈ NE(f) for the DPD is presented in Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.3. Let f be a continuously differentiable stable game, let p? ∈ NE(f), and
let p˙ be the distributed projection dynamics (4.5). If Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 hold, then
p? is asymptotically stable.
Proof. Consider the pairwise comparison protocol %ij = [fj(p) − fi(p)]+, and define
%ij = ϕ(fj(p)− fi(p)), where ϕ(·) = [·]+ (where max(0, ·) = [·]+ as in Table 2.1). Then,
consider the Lyapunov function candidate:
V (p) =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
aij
∫ fj(p)−fi(p)
0
ϕ(s)ds.
Since ϕ : R → R≥0 is increasing on [0,+∞) and G is connected, then the function
V (p) > 0, for all p 6= p?. Additionally, V (p?) = 0 since fj(p?) = fi(p?), for all i, j ∈ S.
Moreover, notice that
∂V (p)
∂p`
=
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
aij
(
∂fj(p)
∂p`
− ∂fi(p)
∂p`
)
ϕ(fj(p)− fi(p))
=
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
aijϕ(fj(p)− fi(p))
∂fj(p)
∂p`
−
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
ajiϕ(fi(p)− fj(p))
∂fj(p)
∂p`
.
1
A graph is considered to be well connected if the connectivity of the graph does not depend on few
nodes, e.g., a path graph is not well connected since the removal of any node involving two edges would
disconnect the graph (connectivity relies on n − 2 nodes), whereas a complete graph is considered well
connected since the removal of a node does not imply the disconnection of the graph (connectivity does
not depend on any node).
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Taking into account that aij = aji, it yields
∂V (p)
∂p`
=
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
aji(fj(p)− fi(p))
∂fj(p)
∂p`
=
∑
j∈S
∂fj(p)
∂p`
∑
i∈Nj
(fj(p)− fi(p)).
According to (4.5), notice that
∑
i∈Nj
(fj(p)− fi(p)) = p˙j , where p˙j is the jth element of
the distributed projection dynamics p˙. Hence,
∂V (p)
∂p`
=
∑
j∈S
p˙j
∂fj(p)
∂p`
. (4.7)
Therefore, the time derivative of the Lyapunov function is
V˙ (p) = (∇V (p))> p˙
= p˙>Df(p)p˙,
where p˙>Df(p)p˙ ≤ 0 since f is stable.
Remark 4.5. As was stated in the proof of Theorem 4.2, the fact that a Nash equi-
librium p? belongs to int∆ implies that all the fitness functions reach the same value,
i.e., fi(p
?) = fj(p
?), for all i, j ∈ S. Therefore, the results given in Theorems 4.2 and
4.3 are related to the contributions reported in the literature on consensus in multi-agent
networks (e.g., see [91], [109], [127])1. An essential difference is that Theorems 4.2 and
4.3 show a direct relationship between game-theoretic properties and Lyapunov stability
of a population game under distributed dynamics. ♦
The connectivity condition of the graph G in Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 is sufficient for
Nash equilibrium stability. Regarding this fact, it is interesting to study if this condition
is also necessary. The following proposition gives insights on this issue.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that the population game f has a unique Nash equilibrium,
which is in the interior of the simplex ∆, i.e., p? ∈ int∆. Let p˙ be the distributed mean
dynamics (4.1). If p(t) asymptotically converges to p?, for all p(0) ∈ int∆, then the
graph G is connected.
Proof. The proof is developed showing the contrapositive. Assume that G is non-
connected. The graph G can be expressed as the union of r ≥ 2 connected compo-
nents (maximal connected sub-graphs) denoted by G` = (S`, E`), where ` = 1, . . . , r,
1
In the consensus problem, it is desired to achieve the agreement among different variables, e.g.,
p
?
i = p
?
j , for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, objective that can be achieved taking advantage of the convergence
result when p
? ∈ int∆, i.e., fi(p?) = fj(p?) under the population-game framework.
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i.e., G = ⋃r`=1 G`. Using the arguments in the proof of Theorem 4.1, it can be con-
cluded that, under the distributed mean dynamics,
∑
i∈S` pi(t) =
∑
i∈S` pi(0), for all
` = 1, . . . , r, and for all t ≥ 0. Take two connected components G1 and G2 of the graph
G. Furthermore, take the following initial condition:
pi(0) =

p?i +
ε
|S1| if i ∈ S
1,
p?i − ε|S2| if i ∈ S
2,
p?i otherwise,
where i ∈ S, and ε > 0. Notice that, for small values of ε, p(0) ∈ int∆ since p? ∈ int∆.
Under this initial condition, it is not possible that p(t) converges to the unique Nash
equilibrium p? since
∑
i∈S1 pi(t) =
∑
i∈S1 pi(0) >
∑
i∈S1 p
?
i , for all t ≥ 0.
Therefore, connectivity of G is required to guarantee convergence to the Nash equi-
librium from any initial condition inside the simplex ∆. However, this condition might
not be necessary if the initial conditions p(0) are constrained satisfying an extra condi-
tion as it is explained next. For instance, suppose that the graph G in the population
game is non-connected. Moreover, G is composed of r connected components (maximal
connected sub-graphs) denoted by G` = (V`, E`), where ` = 1, . . . , r, i.e., G = ⋃r`=1 G`.
Then, it can be shown (following the same reasoning as in proof of Proposition 4.2)
that the equilibrium point p? ∈ int∆ is asymptotically stable if ∑
i∈S` p
?
i =
∑
i∈S` pi(0),
for all ` = 1, . . . , r. Consequently, in this case, the connectivity condition of G is not
necessary.
4.2.3 Solving Distributed Constrained Optimization Problems
First, the following distributed optimization problem is proposed as an illustrative ex-
ample
maximize V (p) := −p>p + b>p, (4.8a)
subject to
50∑
i=1
pi = 1, (4.8b)
pi > 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , 50, (4.8c)
where p ∈ R50≥0 is the vector of decision variables, and b ∈ R50 is a constant vector
of constants, whose entries are given by bi =
2i
1275 , i.e., b =
1
1275 [2 4 ... 100]
>.
Each decision variable is managed by a node in a network. Furthermore, information
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constraints given by the graph shown in Figure 4.3 are imposed. This graph is obtained
by following the Erdo¨s–Re´nyi model (which is the simplest model of several kind of social
and biological networks [23]) with edge generation probability equal to 0.01. Besides, a
path connecting all nodes is added to guarantee that the generated graph is connected.
The information constraint implies that the ith node only has information about the
state of its neighbors.
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Figure 4.3: Non–complete graph for a distributed optimization illustrative example
(taken from [9]).
In order to solve the problem in (4.8), a full-potential game f(p) =
[
∂V
∂p1
. . . ∂V∂p50
]>
is defined (i.e., the fitness functions correspond to the marginal utilities) and the dis-
tributed population dynamics derived in Section 4.2 are applied. Notice that all nodes
satisfy the information constraints (this fact is not possible by using the classic pop-
ulation dynamics). Results are shown in Figure 4.4 considering an initial condition
pi(0) =
1
50 , for all i = 1, . . . , 50. The first and fourth row of Figure 4.4 show that
p(t) satisfies the problem constraints for all time, i.e., pi(t) remains non-negative, for
all i = 1, . . . , 50; and
∑50
i=1 pi(t) = 1. Furthermore, the third row of Figure 4.4 shows
that all distributed dynamics increase the objective function V (p). However, only DRD,
DSD, and DPD reach the optimum value (which are depicted in dashed-red line). Ac-
cording to the second row of Figure 4.4, DRD, DSD, and DPD equalize the values of
fitness functions in steady state, i.e., these dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium.
This behavior is consistent with the results stated in Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 since V (p)
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p
f(
p
)
V
(p
)
time [s] time [s] time [s] time [s]
Smith Replicator Projection Logit (η = 0.005)
Figure 4.4: Evolution of states, fitness functions and full-potential function under differ-
ent distributed population dynamics (taken from [9]): states (1st row), fitness functions
(2nd row), objective function (3rd row).
corresponds to a strictly concave potential function, i.e., f is a full-potential and stable
game. Moreover, convergence time varies from one dynamic to another. DLD show the
fastest time response while the convergence of DRD is the slowest.
4.3 DMPC Design
In this section, a DMPC controller is designed by using the distributed population
dynamics presented in Section 4.2 (in this regard, the distributed population dynamics
collaborate in the design of the DMPC taking advantage of their distributed features and
stability properties). Due to the fact that there are already many existing approaches
in the design of this type of controllers, some differences are pointed out with respect to
some methods found in the literature.
DMPC has been extensively studied in recent years (see [79] for a comprehensive
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review). Two main groups of DMPC techniques are distinguished: those that require a
centralized coordinator (e.g., ADMM based techniques [25]), and those that are fully dis-
tributed. The proposed approach in this chapter falls in the second group, which is more
suitable for applying in problems involving low-bandwidth communications. Among fully
distributed methods, there are a variety of approaches. One of the most employed is the
one based on distributed ADMM (D-ADMM), which is a version of the ADMM technique
that eliminates the need of a centralized coordinator. This approach was first proposed
in [92] and it is possible to find several extensions in the literature (e.g., [34]). Although
D-ADMM-based techniques are flexible and efficient, they require more complex com-
munications for solving the problem addressed in this section than the communications
needed by the proposed approach with population games. This advantage of the method
proposed in this section comes from the fact that each node in D-ADMM handles a set
of manipulated variables while in the proposed approach introduced in this chapter, each
node handles only a single variable. Therefore, the computational operations required
by each node are also simplified. Other methods based on cooperative control have also
been proposed in the literature to address DMPC problems, e.g., [142]. Cooperative-
control-based methods deal with dynamically-coupled plants. However, they generally
do not consider coupled constraints on control inputs as is the case of the formulation
developed in this section. Some extensions of cooperative DMPC capable to deal with
coupled constraints have been reported. However, they either require that each agent
has complete information of the constraints [45] or need a centralized agent at some step
of the algorithm [148]. Regarding the plug-and-play features in non-centralized MPC
controllers, the main challenge consists in reducing the amount of required modifications
over the design when plugging in or unplugging sub-systems from the whole system. For
instance, in [129], when sub-systems are added or removed, the distributed plug-and-
play solution requires to redesign a certain number of controllers. Additionally, in this
chapter it is assumed that sub-systems get plugged in and unplugged in an off-line man-
ner. In [130], before the modification is made by plugging in or unplugging sub-systems,
the feasibility should be verified. Moreover, when a new sub-system i is connected to
a sub-system j, then the jth controller should be redesigned. Likewise, the plug-and-
play feature presented in [163] implies the modification of local control laws when it is
desired to plug in or unplug sub-systems. Also, it is assumed that the modification is
notified previously to the corresponding neighborhood by a request message. Differently,
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G
G˜
Figure 4.5: Example of three sub-systems m = 3, where u1 ∈ R3, u2 ∈ R2, and u3 ∈ R5,
i.e., nu,1 = 3, nu,2 = 2, and nu,3 = 5. Then, n =
∑m
j=1 nu,j = 10.
the advantage of the plug-and-play feature of the proposed method in this chapter is
that it does not require to modify any of the existing local controllers. In addition, the
plug-and-play can be performed in an on-line manner.
4.3.1 Control Problem Statement
Consider a large-scale system composed by m controllable sub-systems that are con-
nected by a communication network. The topology of the communication network is
given by an undirected and connected graph denoted by G˜ = (S˜, E˜ , A˜). Let S˜ be the set
of nodes that represents the m sub-systems, E˜ = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ S˜} the set of links rep-
resenting the available communication and/or information sharing among sub-systems,
A˜ is the adjacency matrix, and N˜i = {j : (i, j) ∈ E˜} is the set of neighbors of the node
i ∈ S˜. Notice that in general, the graph G 6= G˜, since G˜ defines the graph representing
the system structure of m sub-systems, whereas G represents the graph topology for all
the control inputs within the system (see for example Figure 4.5).
Each controllable sub-system has a linear time-invariant discrete dynamics given by
xi,k+1 = Ad,ixi,k + Bd,iui,k, (4.9)
where k ∈ Z≥0 denotes the discrete time step, i ∈ S˜ = {1, ...,m} is the sub-system index,
xi ∈ Rnx,i denotes the system states vector, ui ∈ Rnu,i denotes the control inputs vector
of the ith sub-system, and matrices Ad,i ∈ Rnx,i×nx,i and Bd,i ∈ Rnx,i×nu,i have constant
elements. The optimization problem behind the MPC controller, denoted by PMPC, can
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be stated as follows:
minimize
ui,k|k,...,ui,k+Hp−1|k, ∀i=1,...,m
Jk =
m∑
i=1
Jfi (xi,k+Hp|k)+
Hp−1∑
j=0
J `i
(
xi,k+j|k,ui,k+j|k
) ,
(4.10a)
subject to
xi,k+1+j|k = Ad,ixi,k+j|k + Bd,iui,k+j|k, ∀i ∈ S˜, j ∈ [0, Hp] ∩ Z≥0, (4.10b)
xi,k+j|k ∈ Xi, ∀i ∈ S˜, j ∈ [0, Hp] ∩ Z≥0, (4.10c)
ui,k+j|k ∈ Ui, ∀i ∈ S˜, j ∈ [0, Hp − 1] ∩ Z≥0 (4.10d)
m∑
i=1
1
>
nu,i
ui,k+j|k ≤ pi, ∀j ∈ [0, Hp − 1] ∩ Z≥0 (4.10e)
The sets Xi , {xi ∈ Rnx,i : xi ≤ xi ≤ x¯i}, and Ui , {ui ∈ Rnu,i : ui ≤ ui ≤ u¯i}.
Moreover, vectors xi and x¯i determine the minimum and maximum state bounds of
the ith sub-system, respectively, and ui and u¯i determine the minimum and maximum
control input bounds, respectively. The value of pi ∈ R>0 determines the total available
resource as an energy constraint for the whole system. The cost function Jk in (4.10)
penalizes the state error and the magnitude of the control inputs for all sub-systems
over the prediction horizon Hp ∈ Z>0. The cost function at time instant k to minimize
in the optimization problem behind the MPC controller is denoted by Jk. Moreover the
cost function throughout the prediction horizon for the ith sub-system is denoted by J `i ,
whereas the terminal cost corresponding to the ith sub-system is denoted by Jfi . The
terms in the cost function Jk of the optimization problem (4.10) are of the following
form [64][76]:
J `i
(
xi,k,ui,k, ri,k
)
= ‖xi,k − ri,k‖2Qi + ‖ui,k‖
2
Ri
,
Jfi (xi) =
{
Jci (xi) , if xi ∈ X fi ,
pici , if xi /∈ X fi ,
(4.11)
where Qi ∈ Rnx,i×nx,i is a positive semi-definite weighting matrix related to the system
states, and Ri ∈ Rnu,i×nu,i is a positive definite weighting matrix related to the control
inputs. Vector ri,k is the reference for the i
th sub-system. The function Jci is continuous
and Jci (xi) ≥ 0, for all xi ∈ Xi, and the set X fi = {xi ∈ Xi : Jci (xi) ≤ pici }. Moreover,
the steady state of the system is given by xsi ∈ X fi . Consequently, Jfi is also continuous.
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For instance, one selection may be Jci (xk) = ‖xi,k − ri,k‖2Vi , where Vi ∈ R
nx,i×nx,i is
a positive semi-definite weighting matrix related to the state error at the prediction
horizon.
Notice that if constraints depending on the reference signals are added to the opti-
mization problem in (4.10), then the terminal cost in (4.11) can be changed, and some
claims about the steady state xsi can be made. There are two possible options in order
to incorporate these type of constraints:
• Consider the function Jci (xk) = ‖xi,k − ri,k‖2Vi , and a terminal constraint given
by ‖xi,k+Hp|k − ri,k+Hp|k‖
2
Vi
≤ pici . In this case, if the problem (4.10) is feasible,
then ‖xsi−ri,k+Hp|k‖
2
Vi
≤ pici and the terminal cost is Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp|k
)
= ‖xi,k+Hp|k−
ri,k+Hp|k‖
2
Vi
, which corresponds to an MPC controller with terminal-set constraint.
• Considering the function Jci (xk) = ‖xi,k − ri,k‖2Vi and a terminal constraint given
by ‖xi,k+Hp|k − ri,k+Hp|k‖
2
Vi
= 0, then if the problem (4.10) is feasible, it follows
that xsi = ri,k+Hp|k, which corresponds to an MPC controller with terminal-point
constraint.
The control sequence along Hp is denoted as in (3.3a)
uˆk ,
(
uk|k,uk+1|k, ....,uk+Hp−1|k
)
,
and if the optimization problem is feasible, there exists an optimal control sequence
uˆ?k ,
(
u?k|k,u
?
k+1|k, ....,u
?
k+Hp−1|k
)
that minimizes the cost Jk and that generates an optimal trajectory as in (3.3b)
xˆk ,
(
xk+1|k,xk+2|k, ....,xk+Hp|k
)
.
The optimal control input that is applied to the system is denoted by uMPC,k = u
?
k|k.
Prior to presenting the stability analysis of the population-games-based DMPC con-
troller, some assumptions are considered in order to define the framework of the proposed
scheme. Therefore, it is assume that there exist values for Jfi : Xi → R, and pici such
that assumptions are hold. First, consider the basic stability assumption stated in [125].
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Assumption 4.3. For each state vector xi,k ∈ X fi , there exists a control input ui ∈ Ui
such that xi,k+1 ∈ X fi under the system (4.9), i.e,
minimize
ui,k ∈Ui
{
Jfi
(
xi,k+1
)
+ J `i
(
xi,k,ui,k
)
: xi,k+1 ∈ X fi
}
≤ Jfi
(
xi,k
)
, (4.12)
where (4.12) holds for all xi,k ∈ X fi . ♦
Besides, according to [125] Assumption 4.3 implies the invariance of the set X fi in
Assumption 4.4.
Assumption 4.4. The set X fi is control invariant for the system (4.9). Consequently,
if xi,k ∈ X fi , then xi,k+1 ∈ X fi . ♦
Assumption 4.5. It is assumed that, in case there is not enough resource to achieve the
established set-points, the system in (4.9) admits a steady state with the model (4.10b)
and constraints (4.10c)-(4.10e). ♦
Notice that if Ad,i in (4.9) does not have eigenvalues at unity, then any control input
ui,k ∈ U admits a steady state. However, Assumption 4.5 is stated since if Ad,i has an
unitary eigenvalue then the system (4.9) and constraints (4.10c)-(4.10e) might not admit
a steady state [124].
Furthermore, due to the fact that the optimization problem (4.10) defines a limited
resource problem, it is possible that a sub-system reaches a steady-state value different
from the desired reference such that the constraint (4.10e) is active. It is shown that,
under this situation, X fi is an invariant set according to Remark 4.6.
Remark 4.6. For the CMPC controller with limited available resource pi ∈ R>0, suppose
that a sub-system reaches a steady state at a time instant k ∈ Z≥0 denoted by xsi,k. Notice
that, if the steady state is achieved at the time instant k ∈ Z≥0, then xi,k+j = xsi using
the control law ui,k+j = u
?
i,k, for all j ∈ Z≥0. ♦
4.3.2 Topologies and Proposed Non-centralized MPC Control Design
The CMPC topology is composed by an MPC controller that collects the information
from all the sub-systems and then sends the corresponding control inputs according
to the solution of the optimization problem (4.10). In contrast, the topology for the
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DMPC controller with population dynamics implies a local MPC controller per sub-
system. Each local controller needs to solve a partial problem and then coordinates its
control signal by means of the DSD1 considering the constraint (4.10e).
If the constraint (4.10e) is omitted, then the optimization problem (4.10) can be
decoupled since dynamics of the sub-systems are decoupled as well as constraints (4.10b),
(4.10c), and (4.10d). Consequently, a local MPC controller for the ith sub-system is
designed by considering an optimization problem denoted by PLMPC as follows:
minimize
ui,k|k,...,ui,k+Hp−1|k
Ji,k = J
f
i
(
xi,k+Hp|k
)
+
Hp−1∑
j=0
J `i
(
xi,k+j|k,ui,k+j|k
)
, (4.13)
subject to (4.10b), (4.10c), and (4.10d). At time instant k, these local MPC controllers
compute the optimal sequences uˆ?i,k for all sub-systems i ∈ S˜, from which u?i,k is obtained.
In order to deal with the constraint (4.10e), a distributed full-potential game with DSD
is proposed taking advantage of the optimization problem form in (2.13) and Theorem
2.1. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, it is considered from now on that
each sub-system has only one control input, i.e., nu,i = 1, for all i ∈ S˜, then the optimal
control input computed by the local MPC controller of the sub-system i ∈ S˜ at time
instant k is denoted by u?i,k. The non-centralized scheme is shown in Figure 4.6. Since
(4.10e) is not an equality constraint, it is necessary to add a slack variable, denoted by
pn+1, to the game. This slack variable is treated as a new node added to the graph and
can be connected to any other arbitrary node. Additionally, its fitness function is chosen
as fn+1 = 0. The slack variable allows the controller to use less than the total available
resource when it is convenient.
Notice that the solution of the LMPC with nu,i = 1 for all i ∈ S˜, denoted as u?i,k,
is an input to the DSD, which computes in a distributed way the final optimal control
input p?i applied to the associated sub-system. Furthermore, the local MPC controller
supplies the bounds umini,k , u
max
i,k ∈ R for the corresponding control signal, such that the
problem (4.13) is feasible.
For an arbitrary number of control inputs, the bound umini,k ∈ Rnu,i is found with local
information by solving the optimization problem (4.13) with weights Qi = 0nx,i×nx,i
1
DSD have been selected to illustrate the methodology. However, any of the distributed population
dynamics can be used.
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Figure 4.6: Non-centralized MPC with distributed population dynamics scheme to solve
the problem in (4.10) (taken from [8]).
and Ri = Inu,i ; and the bound u
max
i,k ∈ Rnu,i is similarly found with Qi = Inx,i and
Ri = 0nu,i×nu,i . Both problems are solved subject to (4.10b), (4.10c), and (4.10d).
Remark 4.7. Generally, the bounds ui and u¯i in (4.10d) are different from u
min
i,k and
umaxi,k , respectively. The values ui and u¯i determine the physical constraints for the control
inputs, whereas umini,k and u
max
i,k determine the bounds of control inputs that guarantee
feasibility of the optimization problem (4.13). ♦
A strictly-concave full-potential function is proposed for the distributed population
dynamics. This function corresponds to the objective function of Problem (2.13), which
is denoted by PDSD. For simplicity in the notation, the discrete-time sub-index for the
control input u?i , and for bounds u
min
i and u
max
i , is omitted. The full-potential function
is written as follows [9]:
V (p) = −
n∑
i=1
wi(u
?
i − pi)2, (4.14)
where wi assigns a weighting factor to each control input, e.g., if wi = |xi − ri|/ri, for
all i ∈ S, then more priority is assigned to those sub-systems with higher percentage
error. Notice that this selection for wi requires that ri > 0, for all i ∈ S, and alternative
potential functions V (p) can be used satisfying that their maximum are obtained when
u?i = pi. Consequently, the fitness functions for the game are given by f(p) = ∇V (p),
i.e., fi(pi) = 2wi(u
?
i − pi). Note that this methodology does not require full information
of all control inputs and/or all states of sub-systems since:
i) the graph G representing the information interaction among sub-systems and all
control inputs is a non-complete graph, and
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ii) the proposed fitness functions are decoupled, i.e., fi depends only on information
of the ith sub-system.
In order to satisfy the feasible region of the optimization problem (4.10), the DSD are
modified as follows:
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
(
pj − uminj
) [
fi(p)− fj(p)
]
+
−
(
pi − umini
) ∑
j∈Ni
[
fj(p)− fi(p)
]
+
, ∀i ∈ S.
(4.15)
Remark 4.8. It is known that umini ≤ u?i ≤ umaxi . There are two possible cases:
i) when there is enough resource in the system, p?i = u
?
i and the final control input
belongs to the feasible region, and
ii) when there is not enough resource in the system, then p?i < u
?
i and the term pi−umini
in (4.15) guarantees that the evolution of pi will never be under the value of u
min
i ,
due to the fact that
∑
j∈Ni
(
pj − uminj
) [
fi(p)− fj(p)
]
+
≥ 0 in (4.15).
In conclusion, the final control input p?i belongs to the feasible region of the optimization
problem in (4.10). space ♦
Each sub-system has a local MPC controller in which the optimization problem (4.13)
is solved every k ∈ Z≥0, then there is a set of n controllers generating an optimal control
input u?i,k for all i ∈ S. This optimal control input (with respect to (4.13)) provides a
fitness function fi(pi) to the DSD that compute, in a distributed way, the final control
input p?i satisfying the constraint (4.10e), and the same procedure can be applied for the
whole optimal sequence of control inputs.
Remark 4.9. In order to initialize the DSD, the initial conditions at each iteration
should belong to the feasible region supplied also by the local MPC controller. To estab-
lish this initial condition, an algorithm for solving the associated constraint satisfaction
problem (CSP) should be implemented [39]. Moreover, notice that due to the fact that not
all sub-systems can communicate with each other, the CSP algorithm should be performed
in a distributed manner. ♦
Figure 4.7 shows the flow diagram of the proposed population-games-based DMPC
with DSD. The DSD require u?i , for all i ∈ S, to set the fitness functions in the game.
The DSD also require the limits [umini , u
max
i ], for all i ∈ S, in order to guarantee that the
vector of final control inputs p? belongs to the feasible regions, i.e., umini ≤ p?i ≤ umaxi ,
for all i ∈ S. Moreover, the CSP must be solved in a distributed way since there is not
full information in the distributed configuration.
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LOCAL
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Figure 4.7: Flow diagram of the proposed methodology with nu,i = 1, for all sub-systems
(taken from [8]).
4.3.3 Plug-and-play Property
One of the advantages of the distributed control design with population dynamics is the
reduction of information dependence. Furthermore, there is another relevant advantage
associated to the proposed scheme. The methodology consists in dividing the original
problem into different sub-problems whose solutions are coordinated to obtain a final
control input. In this regard, each control problem associated to each sub-system is
independent from the others.
Now, suppose that a new sub-system is added to the initial problem (4.10), i.e., that
the number of sub-systems is now n + 1, and then only sum upper limits involved in
(4.10a) and (4.10e) should be modified in the MPC optimization problem. Notice that for
this new optimization problem, the decoupled set of optimization problems is the same
as in (4.13), including the optimization problem associated to the sub-system n+ 1, and
the bounds uminn+1 and u
max
n+1 can be found without requiring information from the other
sub-systems. Finally, a new node is added to the graph G and the CSP computes a
feasible initial condition for the DSD.
Consequently, the proposed control scheme shows the plug-and-play feature since it
is not necessary to modify previously already designed parts of the MPC controller in
order to add a new sub-system to the problem.
Remark 4.10. The same analysis may be performed for the removal of sub-systems
to the problem, but it should be taken into account that the graph G cannot become
disconnected after this modification. ♦
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4.3.4 Control Convergence Cases
Once the methodology has been presented, this subsection is dedicated to analyze two
possible cases that might occur when computing the optimal control input in a dis-
tributed way with the proposed methodology. Notice that the adjacency matrix A(p)
of the graph G(p) depends on the proportion of agents in the population game. Con-
sequently, when a constraint within the population-dynamics optimization problem is
active, i.e., pi = u
min
i or pi = u
max
i , this might cause the disconnection of the graph
(an element within the adjacency matrix A(p) becomes null). However, this fact also
depends on the topology of the graph G.
Case 1: u?i > u
min
i , for all i ∈ S. It is known that the optimal point p? ∈ int∆,
the graph G(p) is connected for all t since u? is an interior point of U , and Theorem 4.2
holds.
Case 2: u?i = u
min
i , for some i ∈ S. The optimal control input u? is at the edge of
U , i.e., there is an active constraint. Consequently, the node associated to that decision
variable disappears and G(p) might get disconnected depending on its topology. Then,
each problem in each sub-complete graph G′ ⊂ G(p) converges to an optimal solution,
and the global problem is solved getting a sub-optimal solution. However, an appropriate
design of redundant links might solve this issue.
4.3.5 Constraint Satisfaction Problem
As stated in Theorem 4.1, an important feature of the DSD given in (4.15) is that
they guarantee constraint satisfaction along the time provided that the initial condition
belongs to the feasible region of the considered problem. Therefore, a feasible initial
condition should be found in order to initialize the DSD, i.e., p(0) must satisfy the
following constraints:
umini ≤ pi(0) ≤ umaxi , (feasibility of the local MPC controller), (4.16a)
pn+1(0) ≥ 0, (positivity of the slack variable), (4.16b)
n+1∑
i=1
pi(0) = pi, (resource constraint). (4.16c)
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The above requirements are not trivial since a distributed framework in which each node
of the network only has partial information of the whole problem is considered. This
section describes a method (inspired by the algorithm proposed in [49], where the node
counting has been presented, among several other applications that do not include the
CSP) that solves the CSP characterized by the constraints (4.16) in a distributed way.
The CSP is solved before applying the DSD.
First of all, consider the information available at each node: i) the ith node knows
its local bounds, i.e., umini and u
max
i ; ii) it is assumed that the slack node knows the
available resource pi; and iii) nodes can share information by using the communication
network that is given by the connected graph G. Assuming that there exists a vector
p(0) that satisfies the constraints in (4.16), a possible choice for p(0) is given as follows:
pi(0) = u
min
i , ∀i ∈ S,
pn+1(0) = pi − ξ, (4.17)
where ξ =
∑
i∈S u
min
i . Notice that this solution can be computed directly by using only
local information except for ξ. Therefore, the idea is that the (n + 1)th node obtains ξ
by means of a distributed algorithm. In order to do so, ξ is rewritten as the product of
the total number of nodes by the average of the minimum boundaries of nodes, i.e.,
ξ =
∑
i∈S
umini , (4.18)
= (n+ 1) mean(umin1 , . . . , u
min
n , 0),
where mean(·) denotes the arithmetic mean. Now, the original problem is divided into
two sub-problems: i) find the average of the lower bounds of nodes; and ii) find the total
number of nodes. Notice that each problem needs a distributed solution.
Finding the Average of the Lower Bounds of Nodes
The main idea is that the information of nodes about lower bounds propagates through
the network. For this purpose, an auxiliary variable ξmini ∈ R per node is defined, where
the sub-index i denotes that the variable is associated with the ith node. These variables
are initialized with the corresponding node lower bound as follows: ξmini (0) = u
min
i , ∀i ∈
S, and ξminn+1(0) = 0. Notice that the arithmetic mean of the lower bounds of nodes is
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equal to the arithmetic mean of the initial conditions of the auxiliary variables defined
above, i.e.,
mean(umin1 , . . . , u
min
n , 0) = mean(ξ
min
1 (0), . . . , ξ
min
n+1(0)).
In order to calculate this quantity in a distributed way, a standard average consensus
algorithm as
ξ˙mini =
∑
j∈Ni
(
ξminj − ξmini
)
, (4.19)
can be applied [109]. According to [109], if the communication network is described by
a connected graph, then ξmini
?
= mean(ξmin1 (0), . . . , ξ
min
n+1(0)), for all i = 1, . . . , n + 1,
where ξmini
?
is the steady-state value of ξmini . Thus, ξ
min
i
?
= mean(umin1 , . . . , u
min
n , 0).
This implies that the (n + 1)th node is capable to obtain the required value by using
only local information.
Finding the Total Number of Nodes
The second problem is to locally compute the total number of nodes. In order to do
so, a similar procedure as in the previous problem is followed. Define another auxiliary
variable per node. Let ξci be the variable associated to the i
th node. These new auxiliary
variables are initialized as follows: ξci (0) = 0, for all i ∈ S, and ξcn+1(0) = 1. The
above initialization values are important since their average is related to the required
information, i.e., mean(ξc1(0), . . . , ξ
c
n+1(0)) = (n+ 1)
−1. Thus, the same algorithm as in
(4.19) can be applied to compute the needed quantity in a distributed way, i.e.,
ξ˙ci =
∑
j∈Ni
(
ξcj − ξci
)
. (4.20)
Again, ξci
?
= mean(ξc1(0), . . . , ξ
c
n+1(0)) = (n + 1)
−1, for all i = 1, . . . , n + 1, in steady-
state. Therefore, the (n+ 1)th node can get the required quantity by taking (ξc ?n+1)
−1.
Summarizing, the steady-state solutions of (4.19)-(4.20) are used to compute ξ in
(4.18), i.e., ξ = ξmini
?
/ξci
?
, and then this result is replaced in (4.17) in order to obtain
the required initial feasible point for the DSD. Notice that this procedure is performed
using only local information.
89
Chapter 4. Distributed Predictive Control Using Population Games
4.4 Stability Analysis of Population-games-based DMPC
After having presented the proposed population-games-based DMPC controller, which
is composed of three different main stages, i.e., m local MPC controllers, a distributed
CSP, and a full-potential game with DSD, it is necessary to develop the stability analysis
for the proposed approach. The stability analysis of the population-games-based DMPC
is presented in Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.4. The system (4.9) is stabilized by the proposed population-games-based
DMPC controller with invariant region of attraction XAi =
{
xi ∈ Xi : Jci (x?i,k+Hp) ≤ pi
c
i
}
,
for all the sub-systems i = 1, ...,m, and considering that
1. xi,0 ∈ Xi, for all the sub-systems i = 1, ...,m, and
2. Assumptions 4.3 and 4.4 hold for all the sub-systems i = 1, ...,m.
Furthermore, given a centralized MPC with parameters Qi, Ri, Vi, and references
ri, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, there is an equivalent population-games-based DMPC with pa-
rameters Qˆi,k = ψiQi, Rˆi,k = ψiRi, Vˆi,k = ψiVi, where ψi > 0 and [w1 . . . wnu,i ]
>
i =
B>d,iQˆi,kBd,i + Rˆi,k, for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof. This proof is divided into two parts. First, it is shown that there exists a CMPC
whose solution is equivalent to the solution obtained with the proposed DMPC. Then,
the equivalence allows to derive stability conditions of the closed-loop system controlled
using the population-games-based DMPC.
First part: It is shown that there exists a relation between the prioritization of the MPC
controller in the cost function (4.10a), i.e., values of Qi, Vi, and Ri, with i = 1, ...,m,
and the prioritization of the DSD in the potential function, i.e., wi, with i = 1, ..., n,
where n =
∑m
j=1 nu,j (one weight wi for each control input since ui ∈ Rnu,i) such that
the optimal control input u? obtained from the solution of the centralized optimization
problem PMPC is the same as the optimal control input p
? obtained from the multi-stage
distributed strategy through the optimization problems PLMPC and PDSD. For simplicity
and without loss of generality, a constant reference for each sub-system is considered,
i.e., ri,k = ri, for all k.
Consider the vectors Xi,k =
[
x>i,k+1|k x
>
i,k+2|k . . . x
>
i,k+Hp|k
]> ∈ Rnx,iHp , and
Ui,k =
[
u>i,k|k u
>
i,k+1|k . . . u
>
i,k+Hp−1|k
]> ∈ Rnu,iHp . Then, the prediction model
can be written as Xi,k = Ψixi,k|k + ΘiUi,k, and constraints of the form xi ≤ xi ≤ x¯i,
and ui ≤ ui ≤ u¯i, may be compacted as ΞiUi,k ≤ ξi,k. In order to determine the cost
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function in its matricial form, consider Φi = [r
>
i . . . r
>
i ]
>, i.e.,
Jk =
m∑
i=1
Ji,k,
Ji,k =
(
Xi,k −Φi
)>
Q˜i
(
Xi,k −Φi
)
+ U>i,kR˜iUi,k.
Defining Ei,k = Φi−Ψixi,k|k, Gi,k = 2Θ>i Q˜iEi,k, and Hi = Θ>i Q˜iΘi + R˜i, the cost
function is written as1
Ji,k = U
>
i,kHiUi,k −U>i,kGi,k + E>i,kQ˜iEi,k.
Besides, consider the expression
1
>
nu,i
0
. . .
0 1>nu,i

︸ ︷︷ ︸
αi
Ui,k =

1
>
nu,i
ui,k|k
...
1
>
nu,i
ui,k+Hp−1|k
 .
1) The optimization problem PMPC behind the MPC controller is stated as follows:
minimize
Ui,k
Jk =
m∑
i=1
{
U>i,kHiUi,k −U>i,kGi,k + E>i,kQ˜iEi,k
}
, (4.21a)
subject to
ΞiUi,k ≤ ξi,k, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m, (4.21b)
m∑
j=1
αjUj,k ≤ 1[Hp]pi. (4.21c)
For the optimization problem in (4.21), the following Lagrangian function is defined:
J¯k =
m∑
i=1
{
Ji,k + µ
>
i,k
[
ΞiUi,k − ξi,k
]}
+ ε>k
 m∑
j=1
αjUj,k − 1[Hp]pi
 ,
where µi, and ε are associated to the Lagrange multipliers. Then, the corresponding
KKT conditions for each sub-system are written as follows:
2HiU
?
i,k −Gi,k + µ>i,kΞi + ε>k αi = 0, (4.22a)
1
Notice that Ei,k is a constant known value at each iteration since Φi and Ψi are constant and the
current system state xi,k|k is also known for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Therefore, Gi,k is also constant at each
iteration.
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ΞiU
?
i,k ≤ ξi,k, (4.22b)
m∑
j=1
αjU
?
j,k ≤ 1[Hp]pi, (4.22c)
µ>i,k
[
ΞiU
?
i,k − ξi,k
]
= 0, (4.22d)
ε>k
 m∑
j=1
αjU
?
j,k − 1[Hp]pi
 = 0, (4.22e)
µi,k, εk ≥ 0. (4.22f)
2) When the minimization of the costs functions for the sub-systems considers the
coupled constraint, more importance is assigned to those sub-systems with higher errors
and with more prioritization weights. However, when the coupled constraint is neglected,
the prioritization in the multi-objective cost function is lost. In order to take into account
this effect, an auxiliary weight ψi
−1 with ψi > 0 is considered at each decoupled Ji,k
for maintaining the original prioritization throughout the proof. Therefore, the cost
function corresponding to the local MPC controller is given by
Ji,k =
(
Xi,k −Φi
)>
ψ−1i Q˜i
(
Xi,k −Φi
)
+ U>i,kψ
−1
i R˜iUi,k.
Notice that the addition of ψi
−1 does not modify the optimal point of Ji,k. Then, the
optimization problem behind the local MPC controllers PLMPC are stated as follows:
minimize
Uˆi,k
Ji,k = Uˆ
>
i,kHˆiUˆi,k − Uˆ>i,kGˆi,k + E>i,kQ˜iEi,k, (4.23a)
subject to
ΞiUˆi,k ≤ ξi,k, (4.23b)
where Gˆi,k = 2Θ
>
i ψ
−1
i Q˜iEi,k, and Hˆi = Θ
>
i ψ
−1
i Q˜iΘi+ψ
−1
i R˜i (matrices Q˜i, and R˜i are
selected in a way that Θ>i ψ
−1
i Q˜iΘi+ψ
−1
i R˜i > 0 to ensure that Hˆ
−1
i exists [77]). In order
to avoid confusion between the control inputs from the centralized MPC controller and
those from the local MPC controllers, the optimal output of the local MPC controller is
denoted by Uˆ?i . The Lagrangian function is written as follows:
J¯i,k = Ji,k + λ
>
i,k
[
ΞiUˆi,k − ξk
]
,
where λi are associated to the Lagrange multipliers. Then, the corresponding KKT
conditions are written as follows:
2HˆiUˆ
?
i,k − Gˆi,k + λ>i,kΞi = 0, (4.24a)
ΞiUˆ
?
i,k ≤ ξi,k, (4.24b)
λ>i,k
[
ΞiUˆ
?
i,k − ξi,k
]
= 0, (4.24c)
λi(k) ≥ 0. (4.24d)
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3) The variables of the optimization problem in the population dynamics are denoted
by qk. The related problem is solved by using the DSD, i.e., q
?
k is the Nash equilibrium of
the full-potential population game. Consider Pi,k = [q
>
i,k|k q
>
i,k+1|k . . . q
>
i,k+Hp−1|k]
>.
Moreover, due to the fact that the proportion of agents is constrained by umini,k ≤ qi,k ≤
umaxi,k , then the optimization problem given by the population dynamics PDSD is stated
as follows:
minimize
Pi,k
fk =
m∑
i=1
(
Pi,k − Uˆ?i,k
)>
Wi
(
Pi,k − Uˆ?i,k
)
, (4.25a)
subject to
ΞiPi,k ≤ ξi,k, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, (4.25b)
m∑
j=1
αjPj,k ≤ 1[Hp]pi, (4.25c)
where the matrix Wi, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, is non-singular. For the optimization problem
in (4.25), the following Lagrangian function is defined:
f¯k =
m∑
i=1
{(
Pi,k − Uˆ?i,k
)>
Wi
(
Pi,k − Uˆ?i,k
)
+
θ>i,k
[
ΞiPi,k − ξk
]}
+ β>k
 m∑
j=1
αjPj,k − 1[Hp]pi
 ,
where θi, and β are associated to the Lagrange multipliers. Then, the corresponding
KKT conditions, for all sub-systems i = 1, . . . ,m, are written as follows:
2WiP
?
i − 2WiUˆ?i,k + θ>i,kΞi + β>k αi = 0, (4.26a)
ΞiP
?
i,k ≤ ξi,k, (4.26b)
m∑
j=1
αjP
?
j,k ≤ 1[Hp]pi, (4.26c)
θ>i,k
[
ΞiP
?
i,k − ξi,k
]
= 0, (4.26d)
β>k
 m∑
j=1
αjP
?
j,k − 1[Hp]pi
 = 0, (4.26e)
θi,k,βk ≥ 0. (4.26f)
From (4.26a), it is obtained that
Uˆ?i,k = P
?
i +
1
2
W−1i θ
>
i,kΞi +
1
2
W−1i β
>
k αi. (4.27)
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Now, replacing (4.27) in (4.24a), it is obtained
2HˆiP
?
i − Gˆi,k +
(
HˆiW
−1
i θ
>
i,k + λ
>
i,k
)
Ξi + HˆiW
−1
i β
>
k αi = 0.
Notice that if the weights for the local MPC controllers (denoted by Qˆi, Rˆi, and Vˆi) in
the optimization problem are selected to be: Qˆi = ψiQi, Rˆi,k = ψiRi, and Vˆi,k = ψiVi,
for all i = 1, . . . ,m, then Hˆi = Hi, and Gˆi,k = Gi,k. In addition, if Wi is selected to be
Hˆi, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, then it follows that
2HiP
?
i −Gi,k +
(
θi,k + λi,k
)>
Ξi + β
>
k αi = 0,
this condition is the same as (4.22a), and P?i satisfies constraints (4.26b), and (4.26c).
Therefore, the equivalence with the solution of the centralized optimization problem
PMPC is shown. Due to the fact that only the first control input may be applied to the
system, then it yields [w1 . . . wmi ]
>
i = B
>
d,iQˆi,kBd,i + Rˆi,k, for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
Second part: Now, it is considered the optimal cost function of the CMPC controller
as a Lyapunov function and it is proceed as in [64]. The cost is denoted by Jk =∑m
i=1 Ji,k, and the optimal cost is denoted by J
?
k =
∑m
i=1 J
?
i,k. At time instant k,
uˆ?i,k =
(
u?i,k|k, . . . ,u
?
i,k+Hp−1|k
)
is the optimal control sequence for the ith sub-system.
Similarly, the optimal control sequence at time instant k + 1 for the ith sub-system is
given by uˆ?i,k+1 =
(
u?i,k+1|k+1, . . . ,u
?
i,k+Hp|k+1
)
. Furthermore, there are feasible control
sequences given by
uˆi,k =
(
u?i,k|k,u
?
i,k+1|k+1, . . . ,u
?
i,k+Hp−1|k+1
)
, and,
uˆi,k+1 =
(
u?i,k+1|k,u
?
i,k+2|k, . . . ,u
?
i,k+Hp−1|k,uiMPC,k+Hp|k
)
.
The four previously introduced control sequences generate the costs J?k , J
?
k+1, Jk, and
Jk+1, respectively. Then,
J?i,k = J
f
i
(
xi,k+Hp|k
)
+
Hp−1∑
j=0
J`i
(
xi,k+j|k,u
?
i,k+j|k
)
,
J?i,k+1 = J
f
i
(
xi,k+Hp+1|k+1
)
+
Hp∑
j=1
J`i
(
xi,k+j|k+1,u
?
i,k+j|k+1
)
,
Ji,k = J
f
i
(
xi,k+Hp|k+1
)
+ J`i
(
xi,k|k,u
?
i,k|k
)
+
Hp−1∑
j=1
J`i
(
xi,k+j|k+1,u
?
i,k+j|k+1
)
,
Ji,k+1 = J
f
i
(
xi,k+Hp+1|k
)
+
Hp−1∑
j=1
J`i
(
xi,k+j|k,u
?
i,k+j|k
)
+ J`i
(
xi,k+Hp|k,u
?
iMPC,k+Hp|k
)
.
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Notice that J?k ≤ Jk, and J?k+1 ≤ Jk+1. Consequently J?k+1 + J?k ≤ Jk+1 + Jk, and
J?k+1 − Jk ≤ Jk+1 − J?k . The terms in the aforementioned inequality are
J?k+1 − Jk =
m∑
i=1
{
J `i
(
xi,k+Hp|k+1,u
?
i,k+Hp|k+1
)
− J `i
(
xi,k|k,u
?
i,k|k
)
+
Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp+1|k+1
)
− Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp|k+1
)}
,
Jk+1 − J?k =
m∑
i=1
{
J `i
(
xi,k+Hp|k,u
?
iMPC,k+Hp|k
)
− J `i
(
xi,k|k,u
?
i,k|k
)
+Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp+1|k
)
− Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp|k
)}
.
Replacing in the inequality and removing the term J `i
(
xi,k|k,u
?
i,k|k
)
at both sides, it
follows that:
m∑
i=1
{
J `i
(
xi,k+Hp|k+1,u
?
i,k+Hp|k+1
)
+ Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp+1|k+1
)
− Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp|k+1
)}
(4.28)
≤
m∑
i=1
{
J `i
(
xi,k+Hp|k,u
?
iMPC,k+Hp|k
)
+ Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp+1|k
)
− Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp|k
)}
≤ 0, (according to Assumption 4.3).
The following steps of the proof are developed as the analysis presented in [64], i.e.,
suppose first that xi,k+Hp|k+1 = x
s
i , then the optimality implies that xi,k+Hp+1|k+1 = x
s
i
and it is concluded that xi,k+Hp+1|k+1 ∈ X
f
i . The other option occurs when xi,k+Hp|k+1 6=
xsi , in which case, using (4.28) and the fact J
`
i
(
xi,k+Hp|k,u
?
i,k+Hp|k
)
> 0, then
Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp+1|k+1
)
< Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp|k+1
)
, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m.
The only possibility to satisfy the strict inequality, and according to (4.11), is that
Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp+1|k+1
)
= Jci < pi
c
i , and J
f
i
(
xi,k+Hp|k+1
)
= pici , for all i = 1, . . . ,m. This fact
implies that, according to the definition of the set XAi =
{
xi,k ∈ Xi : Jci (xi,k+Hp|k) ≤ pi
c
i
}
,
then xi,k+1|k+1 ∈ XAi . Hence, it is concluded that XAi is an invariant set. In or-
der to prove the stability, it is recalled the fact that J?k+1 ≤ Jk+1, which implies that
J?k+1 − J?k ≤ Jk+1 − J?k , i.e.,
J?i,k+1 − J?i,k ≤
Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp+1|k
)
− Jfi
(
xi,k+Hp|k
)
+ J `i
(
xi,k+Hp|k,u
?
iMPC,k+Hp|k
)
− J `i
(
xi,k|k,u
?
i,k|k
)
,
for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Using Assumption 4.3, it is concluded that
J?k+1 − J?k ≤−
m∑
i=1
J `i
(
xi,k|k,u
?
i,k|k
)
.
95
Chapter 4. Distributed Predictive Control Using Population Games
. . .
1 2 3 10
(a) (b)
Figure 4.8: Communication topology for the CSTRs case study. (a) The smaller possible
connected graph representing a critic situation, and (b) The case when unplugging sub-
systems 1 and 2.
The cost function J?k is a decaying sequence. Hence the system (4.9) controlled by
using a CMPC controller is stable. As a conclusion, according to the first part of the
proof, there exists a CMPC controller whose solution is equal to the solution computed
by the proposed population-games-based DMPC controller. Moreover, since the system
controlled with the equivalent CMPC controller is stable according to the second part
of the proof, then the system controlled with population-games-based DMPC is also
stable.
Corollary 4.1. Given a CMPC with parameters Qi = Qj, Vi = Vj, and Ri = Rj,
for all i, j = 1, . . . ,m, the equivalent population-games-based DMPC is obtained with
the parameters Qˆi,k = ψi,kQi, Rˆi,k = ψi,kRi, Vˆi(k) = ψi,kVi, and [w1 . . . wmi ]
>
i =
B>d,iQˆi,kBd,i + Rˆi,k, with ψi,k = (ri − xi,k|k)>(ri − xi,k|k), for all i = 1, . . . ,m. ♦
4.5 Case Study: Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor
The considered case study is an industrial process that comprises m = 10 continu-
ously stirred tank reactors (CSTR) with constraints over the information interactions
for the DMPC as presented in Figure 4.8(a). The vector of states for each sub-system
is xi = [Ci Ti]
>, where Ci is the concentration, and Ti is the temperature inside the
CSTR, and the control input is given by ui = qi, where qi corresponds to the inflow. This
is a proof-of-concept problem to illustrate the performance of the proposed control ap-
proach. Moreover, the methodology is scalable to any higher dimension, i.e., for systems
composed of any number of sub-systems. The control objective here is to maintain the
concentrations [1 0]x1, [1 0]x2, [1 0]x3, . . . , [1 0]x9, [1 0]x10 as close as possible to
the references r1 = 0.15, r2 = 0.16, r3 = 0.17, . . . , r9 = 0.23, r10 = 0.24 mol/l, respec-
tively. Additionally, the system has a limited total inflow resource for the control inputs
q1, q2, q3, . . . , q10 given by pi = 1500 l/min. The physical constraints for the inflows are
given by the range [ui, u¯i] = [0, 300] (in l/min). It is assumed that there are local con-
trollers guaranteeing that inflows achieve the values determined by the MPC controller,
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i.e., the proposed MPC controllers presented in this chapter compute the references to
local controllers. The discrete-time linear models with a sampling time τ = 0.1 min, for
the first CSTR around the operational point given by C ′1 = 0.0823 mol/l, T
′
1 = 442 K,
and q′1 = 100 mol/l is written as follows:
x1,k+1 =
[
0.33 1.29× 10−5
0.61 2.45× 10−5
]
x1,k +
[
5.49× 10−4
1.95× 10−4
]
u1(k),
y1,k =
[
1 0
0 1
]
x1,k.
All the sub-systems have different model given by Ad,j = Ad,11.01j, Bd,j = Bd,11.01j,
for all j = 2, . . . , 10. On the other hand, the weights for the CMPC controller are given
by Qi = [10000 0; 0 0], and Ri = 1, for all i = 1, . . . , 10.
Five different scenarios are presented, all of them with prediction horizon Hp = 5,
i.e.,
• Scenario 1: CMPC with weights Qi and Ri, and without resource constraint,
i.e.,
∑10
i=1 ui ≤ +∞.
• Scenario 2: CMPC with weights Qi and Ri, and with resource constraint, i.e.,∑10
i=1 ui ≤ 1800.
• Scenario 3: Population-games-based DMPC with weights corresponding to The-
orem 4.4, i.e., Qˆi,k = ψiQi, Rˆi,k = ψiRi, for all i = 1, . . . , 10, with the weights
in the population dynamics as in Theorem 4.4, i.e., wi = B
>
d,iQˆi,kBd,i + Rˆi,k, with
ψi,k = (ri − [1 0]xi,k|k)2, for all i = 1, . . . , 10, and with resource constraint, i.e.,∑10
i=1 ui ≤ 1800.
• Scenario 4: Population-games-based DMPC with local MPC weights Qˆi and
Rˆi as in Scenario 3 with ψi = 100(ri − [1 0]xi,k|k)/ri, and with weights in the
population dynamics as wi = ψi, for all i = 1, . . . , 10, and with resource constraint,
i.e.,
∑10
i=1 ui ≤ 1800.
• Scenario 5: Population-games-based DMPC with local MPC with parameters
as in Scenario 4, and with resource constraint, i.e.,
∑10
i=1 ui ≤ 1800. Moreover,
at the interval of time between 8 min and 12 min, the sub-systems 1 and 2 are
disconnected to illustrate the plug-and-play features of the proposed method (see
Figure 4.8(b)).
97
Chapter 4. Distributed Predictive Control Using Population Games
Figure 4.9: Evolution of system states in [mol/l] for the case study and five different
scenarios.
Results and Discussion
Figure 4.9 shows the evolution of system states (concentrations) for the ten CSTRs,
for all i ∈ S˜, and the five scenarios. As expected, the concentration of each CSTR
reaches its corresponding set-point when the total inflow is unconstrained. If this is not
the case (i.e., when the sum of inflows is limited to a value lower than 1800 l/min),
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Figure 4.10: Evolution of control inputs in [l/min] for the case study and five different
scenarios.
concentrations are below their corresponding set-points since there is not enough feed-
flow rate in the reactor mass balance to increase the concentration up to the desired
value. However, in the latter situation, controllers try to use all the available resource
to keep the controlled variables close to the desired value. Furthermore, for the fifth
scenario, two sub-systems are unplugged from the system and the remaining seven sub-
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Figure 4.11: Sum of control inputs for the five scenarios.
systems have more available resource achieving the required reference. However, once
the two sub-systems are plugged into the system, then the available limited resource is
newly optimally distributed. Figure 4.10 shows the evolution of the control inputs for
the different scenarios. Additionally, the equivalence between the results obtained with
Scenarios 2 and 3 as stated in Theorem 4.4 can be seen. It can be seen that once the
two sub-systems are unplugged from the system, then the resource that they were using
is distributed throughout the other seven sub-systems, and afterwards, when the two
sub-systems are plugged into the system, then the other seven sub-systems share the
resource back again. Figure 4.11 shows the evolution of the total resource, where the
satisfaction of the coupled constraint for all the scenarios is achieved.
Table 4.1 shows the steady-state error for the different scenarios considering the cou-
pled constraint. The equivalence between the CMPC and the population-games-based
DMPC can be seen. Besides, when weights wi, for all i ∈ S˜, are selected to be the
steady-state error for the population-games-based DMPC, then an evenhanded distribu-
tion of the resource is performed achieving a stationary state where all the percentages
of error are the same. Consequently, the general distributed scheme can be tuned to the
population game without modifying the local MPC controllers.
4.6 Summary
This chapter has proposed a novel methodology based on distributed population dy-
namics to make distributed an MPC scheme with a single coupled constraint associated
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Table 4.1: Steady-state error for the four scenarios.
CSTR Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
1 24.3 % 24.2 % 17.6 %
2 22.1 % 22.0 % 17.6 %
3 20.7 % 20.5 % 17.6 %
4 19.2 % 19.2 % 17.6 %
5 18.1 % 18.0 % 17.6 %
6 17.0 % 17.1 % 17.7 %
7 16.0 % 16.0 % 17.5 %
8 15.0 % 15.2 % 17.7 %
9 14.2 % 14.3 % 17.6 %
10 13.5 % 13.7 % 17.7 %
to a limited resource. Results have shown that the methodology satisfies the coupled
constraint in a distributed way. Also, throughout weighting parameters in the potential
function, a dynamical tunning can be performed.
Simulations have shown that choosing the error as a weighting parameter, the same
error is obtained in steady-state for all sub-systems. In order to make the problem
non-centralized, a population games approach has been used. The DSD has been se-
lected to design the DMPC controller. However, the same technique can be extended
to other distributed population dynamics (e.g., distributed projection dynamics, dis-
tributed replicator dynamics, distributed logit choice dynamics, etc). Furthermore, since
this distributed methodology is composed by different local and independent MPC con-
trollers, the addition or removal of sub-systems to/from the entire system does not affect
the local MPC controllers. The new design is obtained by modifying only the number
of strategies in the DSD and guaranteeing communication of the new sub-system with
at least another sub-system within the system.
Finally, it is pointed out that features of the distributed population games can be
used for different control purposes besides the one presented in this chapter. To illustrate
this, the next chapter presents a different control application in which the distributed
population games can be used.
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Chapter 5
Distributed Formation Control
Using Population Games
Chapter 4 has presented an application of the distributed population dynamics to the de-
sign of a DMPC, i.e., as a complement in the design of the predictive controller to make it
non-centralized. Nevertheless, these distribute dynamics have further applications. This
chapter exploits the features of distributed population dynamics presented in Chapter
4 for a multi-agent system formation problem. More specifically, this chapter addresses
the control for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The contributions presented in this
chapter have been partially published in [7]. Additionally to what was discussed in [9],
it is pointed out that the stability analysis developed in [9] is extensible to time-varying
population structures. In this regard, it is suitable to implement the distributed popula-
tion dynamics over engineering problems whose communication network varies along the
time. In order to illustrate the powerful properties of distributed population dynamics,
a distributed formation problem for multi-agent systems under time-varying communi-
cation network is proposed. To this end, it is assumed that each agent has a limited
communication range, implying that each agent only has partial information about the
entire set of agents. Furthermore, it is assumed that at least one follower agent is able
to communicate to the leader agent that operates as a spatial reference for the whole
formation. Additionally, it is shown that an agent can leave or enter the formation with-
out having to modify controllers of the remaining agents. An additional relevant feature
of the proposed distributed control strategy, the formation shape can be reconfigured
dynamically along the time. Finally, simulation results present the behavior of the for-
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mation for two different scenarios. First, the case in which a new agent enters to the
formation is tested. Secondly, the performance of the proposed distributed controller
when the formation is modified along the time is shown.
5.1 UAV Model
The vehicles considered in this chapter are stabilized multicopters. It is assumed that
each multicopter has an onboard controller (autopilot) that is capable of maintaining
the vehicle in a hovering state and accepts generalized torque commands in the four
independent degrees of freedom corresponding to position and yaw. The pose of the ith
UAV is therefore described by ci = [c
x
i c
y
i c
z
i c
φ
i ]
>. The adopted dynamic model of
the internally stabilized ith vehicle can be described as
ui = A¯ic¨i + B¯ic˙i, (5.1)
where A¯i = diag(M˜, M˜ , M˜ , Iz) is the generalized inertia matrix with vehicle mass M˜
and moment of inertia around the z axis Iz. Moreover, B¯i is the friction matrix, and
ui = [u
x
i u
y
i u
z
i u
φ
i ]
> is the vector of generalized torques applied to the vehicle [85],
[151]. These features are typically found in commercially-available multicopters and
flight controllers [75]. Additionally, in Section 5.3.4 each UAV implements a local PID
controller that actuates on the system described by (5.1) to track a desired input set-point
as shown in Figure 5.2(a). These models are implemented in the MATLAB/Simulink
environment to generate the results of Section 5.3.6. From now on, due to the fact that
the distributed control presented in this chapter is applicable for any multi-agent system,
UAVs are going to be treated as agents in a multi-agent system.
Remark 5.1. Due to the fact that the formation control is known in the context of
multi-agent systems, then (only in this chapter) UAVs are going to be treated as agents
and individuals composing the population are going to be treated as decision makers. ♦
5.2 Problem Statement over Information Graphs
Consider a set of finite agents denoted by A = {1, . . . , n}, where n ≥ 2. One of the
agents is a leader denoted by ` ∈ A, which influences decisions of the entire set of the
remainder agents known as followers, i.e., the set of follower agents is F = A\{`}, and
104
Chapter 5. Distributed Formation Control Using Population Games
notice that F 6= ∅. Each agent i ∈ A is located in the positive orthant space, i.e.,
at non-negative measurable coordinates denoted by cxi , c
y
i , and c
z
i ∈ R≥0; and with a
measurable yaw angle denoted by cφi ∈ R≥0 that is considered to be also non-negative.
All these measurements are collected in a vector denoted by ci = [c
x
i c
y
i c
z
i c
φ
i ]
>, for
all i ∈ A. In addition, let D = {x, y, z, φ} be the set of all possible position parameters
for all the agents from A.
On the other hand, it is assumed that each agent can communicate to all other
agents, which are located within a communication-range radius denoted by ψi ∈ R>0,
for all i ∈ A. This situation leads to a time-varying communication network depending
on the spatial distribution of agents. This communication network is represented by
an undirected graph denoted by G(t) = (A, E(t),A(t)) (the graph is considered to be
undirected since each link is assumed to be a bidirectional channel), where A is the set
of nodes corresponding to each agent (i.e., the set of nodes in the graph is the same as
the set of agents), E(t) is the set of links describing the communication network among
agents, and A(t) = [aij(t)] is the adjacency matrix whose elements aij(t) = 1 if the i
th
agent shares information with the jth agent, and aij(t) = 0, otherwise. More precisely,
the element aij(t) depends on the communication range given by ψi as follows:
ξij =
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2 + (zi − zj)2,
aij(t) = max
(
0, sgn
[
ψi − ξij
])
,
where aij(t) = aji(t). Then, the constructed adjacency matrix A(t) implies that each
agent i ∈ A has a time-varying set of neighbors with whom it can communicate. The
set of neighbors for the ith agent is given by Ni(t) = {j : (i, j) ∈ E(t)}.
Assumption 5.1. In order to achieve the leader tracking satisfying a desired formation
shape in a distributed manner, the communication should be represented by a connected
graph. ♦
The leader agent ` ∈ A goes over a pre-established trajectory, and constitutes a
spatial reference for all the follower agents i ∈ F to perform a desired formation, i.e.,
the follower agents i ∈ F track the trajectory of the leader ` ∈ A in an organized
manner maintaining a required formation. Furthermore, notice that, depending on the
engineering application, the interpretation of the leader might be changed by a target
agent that is desired to track in an organized manner given a formation structure.
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Figure 5.1: Two different and possible formations with the same yaw angle φi, and the
same zi coordinate, for all the followers, and the leader. (a) diagonal formation, and (b)
triangular formation (taken from [7]).
The objective formation is established by assigning desired Euclidean distances from
each follower i ∈ F to the leader ` ∈ A independently for each coordinate x, y, and z, and
an angle for the yaw φ. These desired distances to achieve the formation are denoted by
rdi , for all i ∈ F , and d ∈ D. Each agent has information about the formation reference
distance represented by ri = [r
x
i r
y
i r
z
i r
φ
i ]
>, for all i ∈ F .
For instance, Figure 5.1(a) shows a diagonal shape whose formation references are
given by
ri = [i − i 0 0]>, for all i ∈ F ,
and Figure 5.1(b) shows a triangular shape whose formation references are given by
r1 = [2 0 0 0]
>, r2 = [0 2 0 0]
>,
r3 = [4 0 0 0]
>, r4 = [2 2 0 0]
>,
r5 = [0 4 0 0]
>.
These formation references play an important role in the design of the distributed
population-games-based formation controller presented in Section 5.3.
5.3 Population-games Approach
Having stated the formation control problem, a distributed strategy based on population
games is presented and its main properties and advantages are discussed. Preliminary
concepts are introduced with subtle differences with respect to Chapter 4 due to the
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context of the application. The methodology to address the problem with this approach
is presented, and detailed control schemes are explained. Also, an illustrative example
for a linear formation is shown for clearness.
5.3.1 Preliminaries
Consider four different populations. Different from Chapter 4 where populations were
composed of agents, in this chapter each population is composed of a large and finite num-
ber of rational decision makers. Each population represents a possible position parame-
ter, i.e., the set of labels for the four populations is given by D = {x, y, z, φ}. Moreover,
there is a set of n available strategies at each population denoted by A = {1, . . . , n} for
all d ∈ D (each strategy is associated to a UAV, which is an agent in this context). Then,
decision makers decide to select a strategy from the set A. Similarly as in Section 5.2,
and for notation clearness, F = A\{`} that is also a subset of strategies, where ` ∈ A is
a fictitious strategy as in [114] related to the leader agent. Strategy ` is fictitious due to
the fact that there is not a desired position and yaw rotation for the leader agent (leader
UAV) since it has a pre-established trajectory.
The scalar value pdi ∈ R≥0 is a portion of decision makers selecting the strategy
(agent/UAV) i ∈ F in the population (position parameter) d ∈ D. Moreover, the
portion of decision makers pdi is associated to the corresponding desired position of the
ith agent in the position parameter d ∈ D. In this regard, notice that the desired position
and yaw rotation for the follower agents are given by pi = [p
x
i p
y
i p
x
i p
φ
i ]
> ∈ R4≥0, for
all i ∈ F . Besides, there is a portion of decision makers selecting ` as in [114] denoted
by pd` ∈ R≥0, where ` ∈ A, and ` /∈ F .
On the other hand, pd = [pd1 . . . p
d
n]
> ∈ Rn≥0 is a vector that collects all the
portions of decision makers in the population d ∈ D. This vector is known as the
population state or the strategic distribution in the respective population. The set of
possible strategic distributions for the population d ∈ D is given by the simplex
∆d =
{
pd ∈ Rn≥0 :
∑
i∈A
pdi = pi
d
}
, (5.2)
where pid ∈ R>0 denotes the population size. Furthermore, pid is associated to the
constrained space for the corresponding coordinates (x, y, or z) or rotation (φ) that
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agents should respect. Additionally, the interior of ∆d is defined as follows:
int∆d =
{
pd ∈ Rn>0 :
∑
i∈A
pdi = pi
d
}
.
Notice that the simplex in (5.2) implies that all the decision makers, corresponding
with the follower agents, are constrained to be within a space characterized by∑
i∈F
pdi ≤ pid, (5.3)
which means that it is desired that UAVs positions satisfy a constrained space
cxi
cyi
czi
cφi
 ≤

pix
piy
piz
piφ
 , ∀ i ∈ F .
Decision makers in the population d ∈ D select among the different strategies in
order to enhance their benefits. These benefits are described by a function denoted by
fdi , and whose mapping is f
d
i : ∆
d → R, for all i ∈ A. Besides, let fd be the vector of
fitness functions whose mapping is given by fd : ∆d → Rn.
5.3.2 Distributed Replicator Dynamics and Their Properties
The distributed replicator dynamics are one of the fundamental distributed population
dynamics presented in Section 4.2, which are given by
p˙di = p
d
i
fdi (pd) ∑
j∈Ni
pdj −
∑
j∈Ni
pdjf
d
j (p
d)
 , (5.4)
for all i ∈ A, and d ∈ D. Alternatively, (5.4) can be compacted as
p˙d = diag
(
pd
) [
diag
(
fd(pd)
)
Apd −Adiag
(
fd(pd)
)
pd
]
, (5.5)
for all d ∈ D. The equilibrium point pd? ∈ NE(fd) of the distributed replicator dynamics
equation (5.4) implies any of two situations, i.e., that the portion of decision makers is
pi = 0 for some i ∈ A (there is an extinction for a strategy), or that fdi (pd?) = fdj (pd?),
for all i, j ∈ A, d ∈ D. Consequently, notice that if pd? ∈ int∆d, and if there is no
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extinction for any strategy, then the equilibrium point implies that fdi (p
d?) = fdj (p
d?),
for all i, j ∈ A, d ∈ D.
Then, it is shown that the equilibrium point p? ∈ int∆d is asymptotically stable
under the distributed replicator dynamics.
Theorem 5.1. Let fd be a full-potential game with strictly concave potential function
fd(pd), and let pd? ∈ int∆d be a Nash equilibrium. If the graph G = (A, E ,A) is
connected and pd? ∈ ∆d, then pd? is asymptotically stable under the distributed replicator
dynamics (5.5).
Proof. See proof of Theorem 4.2.
In Corollary 5.1, it is highlighted that Theorem 5.1 also holds for time-varying com-
munication sharing, broadening the spectrum in engineering applications to implement
distributed population games as follows.
Corollary 5.1. The asymptotic stability of pd
? ∈ int∆d under the distributed repli-
cator dynamics (5.4) stated in Theorem 5.1 holds for connected time-varying graphs
G(t) = (A, E(t),A(t)), i.e., for time-varying neighborhood Ni(t) and for all i ∈ A.
This statement can be seen from Theorem 5.1 since the Lyapunov function (4.6) is a
common function for all possible connected-graph topologies. ♦
Furthermore, the simplex ∆d is an invariant set under the distributed replicator
dynamics (5.4). This can be seen from the fact that (5.4) may be re-written as a function
of the adjacency matrix, i.e.,
p˙di =
∑
j∈A
aijp
d
i p
d
jf
d
i (p
d)−
∑
j∈A
aijp
d
jp
d
i f
d
j (p
d), (5.6)
for all i ∈ A, and d ∈ D. It follows that ∑i∈A p˙di = 0, for all d ∈ D, due to the fact
that aij = aji. This makes the first and second term in (5.6) equal, showing invariance
property of the simplex ∆d, for all d ∈ D. This property also guarantees that the
constraint in (5.3) is satisfied along the time.
5.3.3 Fitness Functions Design
Once the preliminary concepts of population games have been introduced with their
modifications with respect to Chapter 4 and the distributed replicator dynamics have
been presented, the design of the fitness functions is explained and discussed.
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The distributed formation problem can be seen as a distributed control in charge
of maintaining certain desired distances among a set of agents as presented in Section
5.2 (see Figure 5.1). In this regard, if each agent is controlled in a manner that tracks
the leader, then each agent maintains a constant distance to the leader agent, and the
formation objective is achieved.
Taking advantage of the asymptotic convergence to a Nash equilibrium pd
? ∈ int∆d
under the distributed replicator dynamics, the fitness functions are designed. Let fd` =
−cd` be the fitness function assigned to the portion of decision makers selecting the
fictitious strategy associated to the leader agent ` ∈ A, ` /∈ F . Now, let fdi (pdi ) = rdi − pdi
be the fitness functions for all the follower agents i ∈ F . First, notice that these fitness
functions collected in fd(pd) satisfy the condition for a stable game (see Definition 2.2).
The matrix Dfd(pd) is a non-positive diagonal matrix, and with only one null element
over the diagonal corresponding to the leader ` ∈ A.
Assuming that there is no extinction in the portion of decision makers, it is known
that pd
? ∈ int∆d implies that fdi (pd?) = fdj (pd?), for all i, j ∈ A, and d ∈ D. Then,
fd` (p
d?) = fdi (p
d?),
−cd` = rdi − pdi
?
,
pdi
?
= cd` + r
d
i , (5.7)
for all i ∈ F , and d ∈ D. The equilibrium point condition in (5.7) shows that pdi , for
all i ∈ F , converges to values such that the formation references are met for all the
coordinate positions and yaw angles (see Figure 5.1). Besides, the portion of decision
makers pd` , for all d ∈ D, and for the fictitious strategy, adopts a value that satisfies the
simplex ∆d.
Remark 5.2. Notice that it is not necessary that all the follower agents i ∈ F have
communication to the leader agent ` ∈ A, ` /∈ F (this fact depends on the non-centralized
communication topology given by G). Nonetheless, all the follower agents –also those
without communication with the leader– converge to the appropriate position to achieve
the formation with a spatial reference given by the leader agent. ♦
5.3.4 Distributed Control Scheme
It is assumed that all the follower agents have an already designed local controller in
charge of achieving a position set-point given by pi = [p
x
i p
y
i p
x
i p
φ
i ]
> ∈ R4≥0 within
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fdirdi
pdi
{fj , pj : j ∈ Ni(t)}
+−
∀i ∈ F , and ∀d ∈ D
fd` = −cd`
pd`
{fj , pj : j ∈ N`(t)}
` ∈ A, ` /∈ F , and ∀d ∈ D
(b)
(c) (d)
pxi
pyi
pzi
pφi
pi
pi
+−
PIDi
ci
∀i ∈ A
(a)
ui
ith UAV p˙d`
p˙di
Figure 5.2: Different control stages with their information dependence. (a) local PID
position controller for each agent. (b) population-games-based formation control for the
fictitious strategy representing the leader agent. (c) population-games-based formation
control for all the follower agents. (d) collection of all the set-points for the local position
controllers (taken from [7]).
the positive orthant space. In this chapter, these local controllers are PIDs as presented
in Figure 5.2(a).
Moreover, depending on the current position of the agents, there is going to be a
connected graph G(t) representing the communication network and possible information
sharing. Then, the leader agent disposes of the information given by
{(f`, p`)} ∪ {(fj , pj) : j ∈ N`(t)},
and the follower agents i ∈ F have information given by
{(fi, pi)} ∪ {(fj , pj) : j ∈ Ni(t)}.
Figure 5.2(b) shows the replicator-dynamics-based formation control for the fictitious
strategy corresponding to the leader agent ` ∈ A, for all d ∈ D. Figure 5.2(c) presents
the replicator-dynamics-based formation control for all the follower agents i ∈ F , and for
all d ∈ D. The formation control in Figure 5.2(c) generates the appropriate position set-
points, which are collected as presented in Figure 5.2(d), i.e., pi = [p
x
i p
y
i p
x
i p
φ
i ]
>,
which are established to the local controllers presented in Figure 5.2(a).
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ri, ∀i ∈ F
` ∈ A, ` /∈ F
c` pi
∀i ∈ F
ciui
` ∈ A, ` /∈ F
j ∈ A
∀i ∈ F
pre-established
trajectory
p`
Leader agent
Local position
control (PID)
c`u`
Distributed formation control based
on population dynamics
Follower agents
Local position
control (PID)
Figure 5.3: Hierarchical control scheme for the distributed multi-agent formation (taken
from [7]).
Then, the general control structure composed of local-position controllers for each
agent, and the distributed formation control, constitutes a hierarchical scheme.
Figure 5.3 presents the overall hierarchical control scheme for the distributed replicator-
dynamics-based formation controller with time-varying communication network. It can
be seen that the leader agent has a local position controller whose reference describes
a pre-established trajectory. On the other hand, all the follower agents have a local
position controller whose position references denoted by pi, for all i ∈ F , come from
the upper layer, which is the distributed replicator-dynamics-based formation control.
At this upper layer, all the position references pi, for all i ∈ F , are computed in a
distributed manner by using only information about the leader position ci and the for-
mation references ri, for all i ∈ F . Notice that the replicator-dynamics-based formation
control is distributed since each position reference is computed by using both local and
partial information.
5.3.5 Communication Topology: Illustrative Example
An illustrative example to show the distributed communication dependency among n = 6
agents is presented.
Consider a control problem for the multi-agent formation presented in Figure 5.1(a).
Moreover consider that, at certain time t = t˜, the communication graph is as fol-
lows: the set of nodes is A = {1, . . . , 6}, where the leader agent is ` = 1 ∈ A,
and the follower agents are F = {2, . . . , 6}; and the set of links is given by E(t˜) =
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Figure 5.4: Illustrative example for the distributed communication network in the
replicator-dynamics-based formation control (taken from [7]).
{(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 5), (5, 6)}. Then, the communication network, involving also the
respective local controllers, is the one presented in Figure 5.4.
Notice that follower agents {3, . . . , 6} ∈ F can achieve a desired spatial position with
respect to the leader agent even though they do not have information about its current
position.
5.3.6 Population-games-based Control Results
In order to illustrate the performance of the population-games approach in the formation
control, two different scenarios are considered for n = 6 agents. For these scenarios, and
due to the fact that any agent from A may be the leader, it is selected arbitrarily to be
` = 6. Scenarios are defined as follows:
Scenario 1: The first scenario consists in a linear formation (see Figure 5.1(a)).
Moreover, a follower agent 5 ∈ F is initially located out of the communication range
of all other agents. The leader trajectory is established such that it passes by certain
coordinates, such that, along the time, the set of agents A can detect the isolated
member, including it automatically in the formation. This scenario allows to illustrate
the behavior of the distributed game-theoretical approach when a new agent is integrated
into the problem.
Scenario 2: The second scenario consists in a linear formation (see Figure 5.1(a))
that switches to the triangle formation (see Figure 5.1(b)) along the time. This scenario
illustrates the performance of the distributed game-theoretical approach for time-varying
formation objectives.
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Figure 5.5(a) shows the agents trajectory for the linear formation. Figures 5.5(b)-
5.5(c) show the evolution of the communication network. It can be seen that, at the
beginning, the follower agent 5 ∈ F is isolated and is not able to communicate with any
other agent. Consequently, this agent remains without moving in the positive-orthant
space until time t = 138 s, when it can communicate to agents three and four. Then,
agent 5 ∈ F is dynamically integrated to the formation problem. Furthermore, Figures
5.5(d)-5.5(f) show the evolution of the UAV positions cdi , for all i ∈ A and d ∈ D\{φ}.
It can be seen that follower agents maintain the desired distance to the leader in the
coordinates x, and y, and that all the follower agents track the same position in z as the
leader agent moves.
On the other hand, Figure 5.6(a) shows the agents trajectory for the time-varying
formation. First, a linear formation is established and, once this objective is achieved,
the objective is changed to a triangular formation at time t = 300 s. Figures 5.6(b)-
5.6(c) show the evolution of the communication network. It can be seen that, when
the formation is modified, the communication network is accommodated conveniently
according to agents communication range. Furthermore, Figures 5.6(d)-5.6(f) show the
evolution of the UAV positions cdi for all i ∈ A and d ∈ D\{φ}. It can be seen that
follower agents achieve the desired distances in all the position parameters rdi , for all
i ∈ F and d ∈ D\{φ}. Then, at time t = 300 s evolutions of the UAV positions vary
to achieve the new formation objective.
5.4 Summary
A novel distributed formation control based on population games has been presented.
It has been shown that the formation is achieved by using non-centralized communi-
cation structures among the agents. In addition, it has been shown that the proposed
distributed controller can deal with time-varying formation objectives, and that the in-
formation sharing network can be varied conveniently as a function of the communication
range for each agent. Under this time-varying graph scenario, it has been highlighted
that stability remains as connectivity of the graph is preserved. Besides, a degree of mod-
ularity has been discussed, where a new agent can be incorporated or removed to/from
the formation problem in a dynamical manner without affecting other agents controllers.
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The fact that population games satisfy a single-coupled constraint has been used
in this chapter for the design of a distributed controller. Moreover, the game theoret-
ical approach presented in Chapters 3 and 4, and in this one, cannot consider more
than one coupled constraint, becoming a limitation for further engineering applications.
Then, next chapter addresses the issue of considering multiple coupled constraints with
a population-games approach.
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Chapter 6
Distributed Predictive Control
Using Density-dependent
Population Games
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have presented the role of population games in control applications
involving only one coupled constraint. This chapter addresses the issue of dealing with
multiple coupled constraints using a population-games approach that allows the popula-
tion mass to vary along the time, i.e., considering birth and death. To this end, density
games are studied. First, it is proposed to extend the mean dynamics with strategy-
interaction constraints to the case considering a reproduction rate parameter, i.e., the
density-dependent mean dynamics with non-complete population-interaction structures.
Then, by using different revision protocols [134], the distributed density-dependent repli-
cator, Smith, and projection dynamics are deduced. Afterwards, it is shown that these
density dynamics may be used to solve distributed constrained optimization problems
when selecting properly the fitness functions in the strategic interaction based on a
Lagrangian function. As a second part, and taking advantage of the properties that
density games have, a DMPC controller design is proposed based on the distributed
density-dependent population games (DDPG). Besides, the relationship between the
population-interaction structure and the distributed information-sharing network for
the DMPC controller is discussed. It is shown that the population-interaction structure
can be modified dynamically along the time by adding conditions over the optimiza-
tion problem constraints depending on the current system state, this fact leading to
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a time-varying information-sharing network for control purposes. Preliminary results
corresponding to the contributions presented in this chapter have been published in [18].
6.1 Density-dependent Population Games
The density-dependent mean dynamics are obtained from the mean dynamics (4.1) in-
cluding a function of reproduction rate denoted by δi, for all i ∈ S, i.e.,
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
pj%ji(f(p),p)− pi
∑
j∈Ni
%ij(f(p),p) + δi(f(p),p), ∀i ∈ S. (6.1)
When δi > 0, then there is birth in the strategy i ∈ S since there are positive
conditions promoting reproduction. On the other hand, if δi < 0, then there is death
(interpretation of negative reproduction rates) in the strategy i ∈ S due to the fact that
there are not ideal conditions for reproduction. In this regard, δi should be directly
proportional to the fitness function fi, i.e., successful agents (those with greater fitness
functions) have more chances to have offspring [100].
Definition 6.1. The reproduction rate, denoted by δ : Rn × Rn≥0 → Rn, is a function
satisfying that reproduction rates decline as population increases [100], i.e., δi(f(p),p)
should decrease as the portion pi increases. ♦
Remark 6.1. Notice that the population mass is not longer constant when considering
the reproduction rate. Therefore, the possible population states are given by the set
∆o = {p ∈ Rn≥0}, which is the positive orthant. ♦
6.1.1 Distributed Density-dependent Replicator Dynamics
First, the distributed density-dependent replicator dynamics (D3RD) are generated. In
order to deduce a version of the D3RD, the pairwise proportional imitation protocol is
used (see Table 2.1), i.e., %ij(f(p),p) = pj
[
fj(p)− fi(p)
]
+
.
The interpretation of the revision protocol dictates that an agent selecting a strategy
i ∈ S, comparing itself with an agent selecting strategy j ∈ S, decides to move to
j ∈ S only if the change represents an improvement over its reproductive chances, i.e.,
if fj(p) > fi(p), and the switch rate is made in relation to the number of agents pj
selecting strategy j ∈ S. Furthermore, the reproduction rate function is selected to be
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of the form δi(f(p),p) = βifi(p), where βi ≥ 0 can be either constant or time varying,
e.g., βi = 1, or βi = pi.
Under the framework of stable games, fi(pi) is decreasing with respect to the number
of agents pi. The proposed reproduction-rate function is suitable according to Definition
6.1 since fi declines as pi increases, then δi also declines as pi increases. Replacing
%ij(f(p),p), and δi(f(p),p) in (6.1) yields
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
pjpi
[
fi(p)− fj(p)
]
+
− pi
∑
j∈Ni
pj
[
fj(p)− fi(p)
]
+
+ βifi(p), ∀i ∈ S,
where the first term is null when fj(p) ≥ fi(p), and the second term is null when
fi(p) ≥ fj(p). Moreover, notice that the first term is the same as the second term with
opposite sign. Taking these two observations into account, it follows that
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
pjpi
(
fi(p)− fj(p)
)
+ βifi(p), ∀i ∈ S.
Finally, the D3RD are obtained as
p˙i = pi
fi(p) ∑
j∈Ni
pj −
∑
j∈Ni
pjfj(p)
+ βifi(p), ∀i ∈ S,
or, in its matricial form depending on the adjacency matrix A of the graph G that
describes the population-interaction structure, as
p˙ =diag(p) [diag (f(p)) Ap−Adiag (f(p)) p] + diag(β)f(p). (6.2)
The equilibrium point of (6.2) is a Nash equilibrium denoted by p? ∈ NE(f), where
fi(p
?) = fj(p
?), for all i, j ∈ S. Additionally, the equilibrium considering the reproduc-
tion rate implies that f(p?) = 0n. The interpretation of this situation from a biological
perspective is that there is no agent with incentives to move among strategies, since it
could not increase its reproduction chances. Likewise, there is an equilibrium between
birth and death (δi = 0, for all i ∈ S), such that the population size remains constant.
Furthermore, the D3RD in (6.2) can be re-written simplifying the expression as in [9],
i.e.,
p˙ = L(p)f(p) + diag(β)f(p), (6.3)
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where β ∈ Rn≥0 is the vector of all the βi for all i ∈ S, and L(p) = [l(p)ij ] is a matrix
depending on the population state p, whose entries are defined as follows:
l
(p)
ij =

−aijpipj , if i 6= j∑
r∈S,r 6=i
airpipr, if i = j.
6.1.2 Distributed Density-dependent Smith Dynamics
The distributed density-dependent Smith dynamics (D3SD) are generated from the
density-dependent mean dynamics in (6.1) and by using the pairwise comparison proto-
col (see Table 2.1), i.e., %ij(f(p),p) =
[
fj(p)− fi(p)
]
+
.
The interpretation of the revision protocol indicates that an agent selecting a strategy
i ∈ S switches to strategy j ∈ S if the change represents an improvement over its
reproductive chances, i.e., if fj(p) > fi(p). Furthermore, the reproduction rate function
is selected as in the case of the D3RD, i.e., δi(f(p),p) = βifi(p), where βi ≥ 0 can be
either constant or time varying, e.g., βi = 1, or βi = pi. Replacing %ij(f(p),p), and
δi(f(p),p) in (6.1) yields
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
pj
[
fi(p)− fj(p)
]
+
− pi
∑
j∈Ni
[
fj(p)− fi(p)
]
+
+ βifi(p), ∀i ∈ S,
which is the differential equation corresponding to the D3SD. Alternatively, the D3SD
can be written as using simplification presented in [9], i.e.,
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
1
2
(
(1− νij)pi + (1 + νij)pj
) [
fi(p)− fj(p)
]
+ βifi(p), ∀i ∈ S, (6.4)
where νij = sgn(fi(p)− fj(p)). It follows that (6.4) can be expressed as
p˙ = L˜(p)f(p) + diag(β)f(p), (6.5)
where L˜(p) = [l˜
(p)
ij ] is a matrix depending on the population state p, whose entries are
as follows:
l˜
(p)
ij =

−aij
2
(
(1− νij)pi + (1 + νij)pj
)
, if i 6= j
∑
r∈S,r 6=i
air
2
(
(1− νir)pi + (1 + νir)pr
)
, if i = j.
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6.1.3 Distributed Density-dependent Projection Dynamics
The distributed density-dependent Projection dynamics (D3PD) are deduced from the
density-dependent mean dynamics in (6.1) and by considering the modified pairwise
comparison protocol (see Table 2.1), i.e., %ij(f(p),p) =
[fj(p)−fi(p)]+
pi
.
Notice that the interpretation of the revision protocol is the same as the pairwise
proportional imitation protocol with a different switching rate. In this case, the switching
rate is proportional to the inverse of the portion of agents selecting strategy i ∈ S.
Moreover, the reproduction rate is selected to be the same as in the deduction of the
D3RD. Replacing %ij(f(p),p), and δi(f(p),p) in (6.1) yields
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
[
fi(p)− fj(p)
]
+
−
∑
j∈Ni
[
fj(p)− fi(p)
]
+
+ βifi(p), ∀i ∈ S,
it follows that the D3PD are given by
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
[fi(p)− fj(p)] + βifi(p), ∀i ∈ S. (6.6)
Finally, the D3PD can be re-written as
p˙ = Lf(p) + diag(β)f(p),
where L = [lij ] is the Laplacian of the graph G, i.e.,
lij =

−aij , if i 6= j∑
r∈S,r 6=i
air, if i = j.
6.1.4 Stability Analysis
Once the density-dependent population dynamics have been formally introduced, a sta-
bility analysis of the equilibrium point is made. Then, it is shown that the mentioned
Nash equilibrium p? ∈ ∆o is asymptotically stable under the density-dependent popu-
lation dynamics with region of attraction given by the positive orthant as it is stated in
the following theorems.
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Theorem 6.1. Let f be a full-potential game with strictly concave potential function
V (p), and let p? ∈ ∆o be a Nash equilibrium for a corresponding population size pi ∈ R≥0
such that f(p?) = 0n. If the population-interaction structure is given by a connected
graph G, then p? ∈ ∆o is asymptotically stable under the D3RD (6.2), and the D3SD
(6.4).
Proof. Since f is a full-potential game with potential concave function V (p), it is con-
sidered the same Lyapunov candidate function as in [9], i.e., EV (p) = V (p
?) − V (p),
where EV (p
?) = 0, and EV (p) > 0, for all p 6= p?. Then, it follows that E˙V (p) =
− (∇V (p))> p˙, which is the same as E˙V (p) = −f(p)>p˙. Now, replacing p˙ from (6.3)
for the D3RD, it is obtained that
E˙V (p) =− f(p)>
(
L(p)f(p) + diag(β)f(p)
)
,
=− f(p)>L(p)f(p)− f(p)>diag(β)f(p). (6.7)
For the first term in (6.7), notice that L(p) corresponds to the Laplacian of a graph
G(p) = (S, E ,A(p)), where A(p) = [a(p)ij ] is the adjacency matrix with entries given by
a
(p)
ij = aijpipj . The entries of the adjacency matrix are non-negative due to the fact that
p ∈ ∆o, which is the positive orthant. Therefore L(p)  0 for any p ∈ ∆o. Regarding
the second term in (6.7), the diagonal matrix is diag(β)  0 due to the fact that βi ≥ 0
for all i ∈ S. Finally, it is concluded that E˙V (p) ≤ 0.
Regarding the D3SD, it is obtained that E˙V (p) = −f(p)>L˜(p)f(p)−f(p)>diag(β)f(p).
The analysis is the same but with L˜(p) corresponding to the Laplacian matrix of the
graph G(p) = (S, E ,A(p)) with a(p)ij = (aij/2)((1 − νij)pi + (1 + νij)pj). Therefore,
L˜(p)  0 for any p ∈ ∆o, and it is concluded that E˙V (p) ≤ 0. The equality E˙V (p) = 0
holds when f(p) = 0n, and hence p
? is asymptotically stable under the D3SD (6.4).
Moreover, E˙V (p) = 0 in all the cases holds when f(p) = 0n, and hence p
? is asymp-
totically stable under the D3RD (6.2), and the D3SD (6.4) with region of attraction in
the positive orthat ∆o.
Theorem 6.2. Let f(p) = ∇V (p), where V (p) is a strictly concave function, and let
p? ∈ Rn be an equilibrium point such that f(p?) = 0n. If the population-interaction
structure is given by a connected graph G, then p? ∈ Rn is globally asymptotically stable
under the D3PD (6.6).
Proof. Consider the same Lyapunov candidate function as in Theorem 6.1, i.e., EV (p) =
V (p?)− V (p), where EV (p?) = 0, and EV (p) > 0, for all p 6= p?. Then, it follows that
E˙V (p) = − (∇V (p))> p˙, which is the same as E˙V (p) = −f(p)>p˙. Now, replacing p˙
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from (6.6) for the D3PD, it is obtained that
E˙V (p) =− f(p)> (Lf(p) + diag(β)f(p)) ,
=− f(p)>Lf(p)− f(p)>diag(β)f(p). (6.8)
The first term in (6.8) is negative since L  0 for a connected graph G. Moreover,
the second term in (6.8) is also negative since diag(β)  0 due to the fact that βi ≥ 0
for all i ∈ S. Then, it is concluded that E˙V (p) ≤ 0. The equality E˙V (p) = 0 holds when
f(p) = 0n, and therefore p
? is globally asymptotically stable under the D3PD (6.6) with
region of attraction in the Rn since EV (p) is radially unbounded.
Corollary 6.1. The asymptotic stability of p? ∈ ∆o under the D3RD (6.2), and the
D3SD (6.4) stated in Theorem 6.1; and p? ∈ Rn under the D3PD (6.6) stated in The-
orem 6.2 hold for connected time-varying graphs G(t) = (S, E(t),A(t)), i.e., for a time-
varying neighborhood Ni(t), for all i ∈ S. This statement is concluded since the postu-
lated Lyapunov function EV (p) = V (p
?) − V (p) is a common function for all possible
connected-graph topologies. ♦
6.1.5 Full-potential Game with DDPG
Consider the following constrained optimization problem as an illustrative example:
maximize
p
V (p) = −(p1 − 1)2 − (p2 − 2)2, (6.9a)
subject to
2∑
i=1
pi = pi, (6.9b)
p1, p2 ≥ 0, (6.9c)
where pi ∈ R>0 is constant. The optimization problem (6.9) can be solved by using
any of the six classical population dynamics, i.e., replicator, Smith, projection, Logit
choice, BNN or best response dynamics [134]. To this end, function (6.9a) is taken as
the potential function of a full-potential game (see Definition 2.3), i.e., f(p) = ∇V (p).
Moreover, the initial condition for the classical population dynamics should satisfy the
constraints (6.9b) and (6.9c), i.e., p(0) ∈ R≥0, and
∑2
i=1 pi(0) = pi. Now, suppose that
the constraint (6.9b) is no longer considered in the optimization problem, but (6.9c)
is still imposed. Therefore, the new optimization problem can be solved with DDPG,
i.e., the D3RD (6.2), the D3SD (6.4), or the D3PD (6.6), and with an initial condition
belonging to the positive orthant p(0) ∈ ∆o.
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Figure 6.1: Phase plane of trajectories corresponding to the replicator, Smith and projec-
tion dynamics with the full-potential game f(p) for both classical approach and density-
dependent approach. Black dots show the equilibrium points for initial conditions in the
positive orthant.
Figure 6.1 shows the phase plane for both classical population dynamics, and density-
dependent population dynamics. It can be seen that the classical population dynamics
converge to the optimal point subject to constraint (6.9b) with pi = p1(0)+p2(0). In con-
trast, the density-dependent population dynamics converge to the optimal point without
considering the constraint (6.9b), i.e., p? = [1 2]> ∈ ∆o for any initial condition in the
positive orthant p(0) ∈ ∆o. The solution coincides for both approaches as long as pi = 3
for the classical population dynamics.
.
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6.1.6 Solving Constrained Optimization Problems with DDPG
Consider a quadratic programming (QP) optimization problem of the form
maximize
y
f(y), (6.10a)
subject to Ey ≤ e, (6.10b)
Gy = g, (6.10c)
y ∈ Rv≥0, (6.10d)
where f : Rv≥0 → R is concave, and continuously differentiable. Moreover, E ∈ Rq×v,
and e ∈ Rq allow to state the q inequality constraints (6.10b), and G ∈ Rr×v, and g ∈ Rr
define the r equality constraints (6.10c).
Inequality constraints can be transformed into equality constraints by adding non-
negative slack variables denoted by s ∈ Rq≥0. To this end, consider the vector variable
ξ = [y> s>]> ∈ Rp, where p = v + q, then the QP optimization problem (6.10) is
reformulated as follows:
maximize
ξ
f(ξ), (6.11a)
subject to Hξ = h, (6.11b)
ξ ∈ Rp≥0, (6.11c)
where f : Rp≥0 → R is concave, and continuously differentiable. The matrix H ∈ Rw×p,
and h ∈ Rw determine the w equality constraints (6.11b), where w = q + r.
Now, omitting the positiveness constraints (6.11c), the Lagrangian function L : Rp×
Rw → R is
L(ξ,µ) = f(ξ) + µ> (Hξ − h) , (6.12)
where µ ∈ Rw corresponds to the Lagrange multipliers associated to the w equality
constraints of (6.11). Moreover, ∇ξL(ξ,µ) = ∇f(ξ) +H>µ, and −∇µL(ξ,µ) = −Hξ+
h.
The Lagrange condition is used to find the possible extreme points ξ? ∈ Rp of the
function f(ξ) (maximum of the function f) subject to constraints (6.11b), in which[ ∇ξL(ξ?,µ?)
−∇µL(ξ?,µ?)
]
= 0p+w. (6.13)
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Now, let p = [ξ> µ>]> ∈ Rn be the vector representing the number of agents in a
strategic interaction with S = {1, . . . , n}, where n = p+ w. Besides, let
f(p) = [∇ξL(ξ,µ)> −∇µL(ξ,µ)>]> (6.14)
be the fitness functions corresponding to all the strategies S. The population game
(6.14) can be seen as two different potential games fξ(ξ,µ) = ∇ξL(ξ,µ), and fµ(ξ,µ) =
−∇µL(ξ,µ), whose potential functions are L(ξ,µ), and −L(ξ,µ), respectively. There-
fore, notice that the Hessian of the potential functions is ∇2ξL(ξ,µ) = ∇2f(ξ), and
∇2µ(−L(ξ,µ)) = 0. Therefore, fξ(ξ,µ), and fµ(ξ,µ) are stable games [134]. Finally,
since f(p) is a full-potential and stable game, and according to Theorem 6.1 and Corol-
lary 6.1, the optimization problem (6.10) can be solved in a distributed way by using the
D3RD (6.2), the D3SD (6.4), or the D3PD (6.6), and under time-varying graphs G(t).
Remark 6.2. Even though population dynamics only admit values within the positive
orthant ∆o, an optimization problem allowing negative values can also been solved by
using the D3RD (6.2), the D3SD (6.4), or the D3PD (6.6). This is made by applying a
change of variables in the fitness functions, e.g., if it is necessary to consider a constraint
of the form y ≤ y ≤ y¯, and let y < 0 and y¯ > 0 be a lower and upper bound, respectively,
it is possible to make a change of variables as 0 ≤ y − y ≤ y¯ − y, or equivalently,
0 ≤ y˜ ≤ y¯ − y. Obtaining an optimization problem expressed in the required form as in
(6.10). ♦
Remark 6.2 shows that the proposed method with DDPG is versatile to solve opti-
mization problems with different types of inequality constraints in a distributed manner.
As an application, the next section presents a DMPC controller design based on the
D3RD (6.2), the D3SD (6.4), or the D3PD (6.6).
Proof-of-concept Example
Let S = {1, . . . , 7} be the set of strategies in a population with restricted information
sharing information given by an undirected connected graph G, which is presented in
Figure 6.2(a). Consider the following constrained optimization problem:
maximize
p
−1
2
p>p + [25 23 20 21 24 19 26]p, (6.15a)
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Figure 6.2: Communication network for a population with seven strategies. (a) graph
to compute the fitness functions, and (b) graph separating full-potential games.
subject to
pi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ S, (6.15b)
50
16
25
18
 =

1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
p. (6.15c)
In order to solve the problem with DDPG, it is necessary to compute the Lagrangian
function and determine the fitness functions as in (6.14). Due to the fact that the
Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 hold for full-potential games, then fp(p,µ) = ∇pL(p,µ), and
fµ(p,µ) = −∇µL(p,µ) should be solved independently, even though those games share
information in order to compute the fitness functions, i.e., fitness functions are computed
using the graph shown in Figure 6.2(a). It is desired that all games converge to an
equilibrium point such that fp(p
?,µ?) = 0, and fµ(p
?,µ?) = 0, i.e., the same fitness
function. Therefore, games can be solved independently. In addition, it is possible
to solve different groups of games as it is illustrated next, i.e., the game is solved by
using the information-sharing graph presented in graph 6.2(b) corresponding to three
independent full-potential games. Also, those games may be solved by using different
density-dependent population dynamics.
In order to solve the optimization problem with the Lagrangian function, there are
dynamics associated to the Lagrange multipliers. Moreover, it is possible that the La-
grange multipliers get negative values. This fact represents a problem for the D3RD
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Figure 6.3: Evolution of the population states (a)-(c), and fitness functions (d)-(f) with
DDPG for the example (6.15). Sub-figures (a) and (d) D3RD with an offset of 35, (b)
and (e) D3SD with an offset of 35, and (c) and (f) D3PD.
and for the D3SD since those dynamics can only evolve in the positive orthant ∆o (see
Theorem 6.1). Therefore, to solve the optimization problem using the D3RD and the
D3SD, a change of variable must be made to establish an offset. On the other hand, the
fact that the Lagrange multipliers can get negative values is not an inconvenient for the
D3PD since trajectories evolve in Rn (see Theorem 6.2).
Figure 6.3 shows the evolution of the proportion of agents under the D3RD with off-
set, the D3SD with offset, and the D3PD for the game corresponding to the optimization
problem (6.15). It can be seen that the fitness functions converge to zero and proportion
of agents to the solution.
6.2 DMPC Controller Based on DDPG with Time-varying
Information-sharing Network
Consider the state-space discrete-time system presented in (3.1) with a sampling time
τ , i.e.,
xk+1 = Adxk + Bduk + Bldk, (6.16)
where vectors x ∈ Rnx , u ∈ Rnu , and d ∈ Rnd denote the states, control inputs and
disturbances, respectively as it has been presented in Chapter 3, and the state-space
matrices are given by Ad ∈ Rnx×nx , Bd ∈ Rnx×nu , and Bl ∈ Rnx×nd . States and
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control inputs are subject to physical and operational constraints that define feasible sets
denoted by X , {x ∈ Rnx : x ≤ x ≤ x¯}, and U , {u ∈ Rnu : u ≤ u ≤ u¯}, where vectors
x and x¯ correspond to the lower and upper limits for the system states, respectively.
Similarly, vectors u and u¯ denote the lower and upper limits for the control inputs,
respectively. The control sequence for a fixed-time Hp ∈ Z>0 at time instant k ∈ Z≥0
is denoted by uˆk (see (3.3a)). When the control-input sequence uˆk is applied to the
system (6.16) with initial state xk|k , xk, a system states sequence xˆk is generated (see
(3.3b)). Finally, the time-varying sequence of system disturbances along Hp is denoted
by dˆk (see (3.3c)).
The system in (6.16) is controlled with an MPC controller whose optimization prob-
lem can be formulated as follows:
minimize
Uk
U>k Φ Uk + φ
>
k Uk, (6.17a)
subject to E Uk ≤ ek, (6.17b)
G Uk = gk. (6.17c)
Moreover, for the optimization problem (6.17) vectors ek and gk, which determine
the inequality and equality constraints, vary every discrete-time instant k.
Remark 6.3. The optimization problem behind the MPC controller considers q = 2nu+
2nx inequality constraints corresponding to the physical and operational limits for the
system states and control, i.e., x ≤ x ≤ x¯ and u ≤ u ≤ u¯, respectively. In this regard,
it is assumed that the constraints are organized in the QP problem (6.17) as follows: the
first nu constraints in (6.17b) are associated to the upper limits for the control inputs u¯,
the next nu constraints to the lower limits for the control inputs u, the next nx constraints
to the upper limits for the states x¯, and finally, the last nx constraints to the lower limits
for the states x. ♦
Therefore, notice that the QP problem formulation in (6.17) for the MPC controller
has the same form as the optimization problem in (6.10). Furthermore, by adding non-
negative slack variables s ∈ Rq≥0, the cost function may be re-written, and the constraints
can be compacted, i.e.,
minimize
ξ
[
U>k s
>]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξk
>
[
Φ 0nu×q
0q×nu 0q×q
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ
[
Uk
s
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξk
+
[
φ>k 0
>
q
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ
>
k
[
Uk
s
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξk
, (6.18a)
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subject to [
E Iq
G 0r×q
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
[
Uk
s
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξk
=
[
ek
gk
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
hk
. (6.18b)
Having added the slack variables, the optimization problem behind the MPC con-
troller is formulated in the form (6.11), and it can be solved in a distributed manner by
using the D3RD (6.2), the D3SD (6.4), or the D3PD (6.6), as explained in Section 6.1.
Assumption 6.1. States are measurable and their current value are available in order
to state the QP problem in (6.17). ♦
Regarding the information dependence, it is mainly given by the fitness functions
coupling. In order to determine the information-sharing structure for the D3RD (6.2),
the D3SD (6.4), or the D3PD (6.6), the fitness functions (6.14) are expressed in the form
f(p) =
 f1(p)...
fn(p)
 =
 f1(p)f2(p)
f3(p)
 . (6.19)
The first block of the vector f(p) in (6.19) corresponding to the nu control input
variables is given by
f1(p) =
[
∂L(p)
∂p1
. . .
∂L(p)
∂pnu
]>
,
while its second block corresponding to the q inequality constraints is given by
f2(p) = −
[
∂L(p)
∂p(nu+1)
. . .
∂L(p)
∂p(nu+q)
]>
.
Finally, the third block corresponds to the r equality constraints satisfying the order
according to Remarks 6.3, i.e.,
f3(p) = −
[
∂L(p)
∂p(nu+q+1)
. . .
∂L(p)
∂p(nu+q+r)
]>
.
Assumption 6.2. In the population game f , convergence to the Nash equilibrium under
the D3RD (6.2), the D3SD (6.4), or the D3PD (6.6), is achieved in shorter time than
the sampling time τ for the discrete system in (6.16). ♦
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Figure 6.4: Different regions for the consideration of inequality constraints.
Notice that the satisfaction of Assumption 6.2 depends on the type of system under
control, i.e., the required time to compute the distributed population dynamics should
be evaluated in comparison to how fast the dynamical system is. For instance, the case
study proposed in this chapter has a sampling time of an hour, for which the Assumption
6.2 is satisfied.
In order to check from which strategies it is necessary to get information, the Hessian
matrix of the Lagrangian function Θ = [θij ] = ∇2L(p) is computed, i.e., θij = ∂fi(p)∂pj .
Then, the biggest required information-sharing matrix denoted by Θ˜ = [θ˜ij ], which
corresponds to the existing coupling among the portion of agents at each strategy, is
given by
θ˜ij =
{
1, if θij 6= 0,
0, otherwise.
(6.20)
For the scenario with constant graph G, the adjacency matrix is given by the biggest
required information-sharing matrix, i.e., A = Θ˜. Nevertheless, conditions over the
adjacency matrix A can be added in order to use less information-sharing links when
convenient. It is highlighted that conditions can be versatile and the time-varying graph
can be addressed in different ways besides the one proposed in this chapter.
It is proposed to have an information-sharing graph topology depending on the nec-
essary active constraints. This is made since, under some system state conditions, it
is not necessary to consider the whole set of constraints. In this regard, some of them
can be properly neglected reducing both the size of the information-sharing network and
the computational burden. Figure 6.4 shows different possible regions for states and
control inputs established by parameters g¯xi , g
x
i
, g¯ui , and g
u
i
, which are constant values
determined at a design stage.
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Regions describe non-safe sectors in the feasible set, or sectors near limits of a con-
straint. Figure 6.4 presents two examples, i.e., for a time k < k1, the constraint xi ≥ xi
is active whereas the constraints xi ≤ x¯i is neglected. Then, for the time k > k2, the
constraint xi ≥ xi is neglected whereas the constraints xi ≤ x¯i is considered. Similarly,
Figure 6.4 also shows the scenario of control input uj with the respective time instants
k3, and k4. The regions, shown in Figure 6.4, are formally defined as follows:
• Upper region for states: R¯xi = {xi : g¯xi ≤ xi ≤ x¯i},
• Lower region for states: Rxi = {xi : xi ≤ xi ≤ gxi },
• Upper region for inputs: R¯uj = {uj : g¯uj ≤ uj ≤ u¯j},
• Lower region for inputs: Ruj = {uj : uj ≤ uj ≤ guj },
for all i = 1, . . . , nx , and j = 1, . . . , nu. Besides, binary variables γ¯
x
i,k, γ
x
i,k
, which indicate
whether or not the current state xi,k belongs to a region, are defined as follows:
γ¯xi,k =
{
1, if xi,k ∈ R¯xi
0, otherwise,
γx
i,k
=
{
1, if xi,k ∈ Rxi
0, otherwise,
where i = 1, . . . , nx. Parameters γ¯
u
j,k, and γ
u
j,k
, indicating whether or not the current
control input ui,k belongs to a given region, are stated similarly for j = 1, . . . , nu. These
binary variables lead to a vector that determines the active and non-active constraints
for states and control inputs at each time instant, i.e.,
Γuk =
[
γ¯u1,k, . . . , γ¯
u
nu,k
, γu
1,k
, . . . , γu
nu,k
]>
,
Γxk =
[
γ¯x1,k, . . . , γ¯
x
nx,k
, γx
1,k
, . . . , γu
nx,k
]>
.
Then, let Γ˜k be the diagonal matrix of the active constraints at time instant k ∈ Z≥0
in the same order as explained in Remark 6.3, i.e.,
Γ˜k = diag
([
1
>
nu
Γuk
>
Γxk
>
1
>
r
])
.
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Figure 6.5: Summary of the DMPC controller with distributed DDPG.
Finally, these conditions over the active constraints lead to a time-varying graph
with adjacency matrix A(t) that varies its topology every τ , given by A(kτ) = Γ˜kΘ˜Γ˜k,
and the topology A(kτ) is maintained during a time τ , i.e., A(t) = A(kτ), for all
kτ ≤ t < (k + 1)τ . Alternatively, time-varying adjacency matrix can be denoted that
Ak = Γ˜kΘ˜Γ˜k.
Figure 6.5 shows the scheme corresponding to the DMPC controller based on DDPG
with time-varying information-sharing network. The non-safe regions are determined
in function of the current system state. Therefore, the information-sharing graph is
established with an adjacency matrix Ak. Finally, the DMPC controller based on DDPG
computes the optimal control input at each time instant k satisfying the information-
sharing restrictions.
6.3 Case Study: Barcelona Water Supply Network
Consider the same case study presented in Section 3.3.3, which is the aggregate model
of the BWSN presented in Figure 3.4. An MPC controller is designed for the BWSN
considering the slew rate ∆uk+j = uk+j−uk+j−1, for all j ∈ [0, Hp−1]∩Z>0. Therefore,
the corresponding optimization problem behind the MPC controller is as follows:
minimize
uk|k,...,uk+Hp|k
J(x,u) =
Hp∑
j=1
(
‖xk+j|k − xr‖Q˜ + ‖∆uk+j|k‖R˜ + γ|
(
α1 +α2,k+j
)>
uk+j|k|
)
,
(6.21a)
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subject to
xk+j+1|k = Adxk+j|k + Bduk+j|k + Bldk+j|k, ∀j ∈ [0, Hp − 1] ∩ Z≥0, (6.21b)
uk+j|k ∈ U , ∀j ∈ [0, Hp − 1] ∩ Z≥0, (6.21c)
xk+j|k ∈ X , ∀j ∈ [1, Hp] ∩ Z≥0, (6.21d)
0r = Euuk+j|k + Eddk+j|k, ∀j ∈ [0, Hp − 1] ∩ Z≥0, (6.21e)
where xr ∈ Rnx is a constant desired set-point for the system states x ∈ Rnx . Moreover,
α1 ∈ Rnu represents the time-invariant costs associated to the water resource, and
α2 ∈ Rnu represents the time-varying costs associated to the operation of valves and
pumps. On the other hand, Eu ∈ Rr×nu , and Ed ∈ Rr×nd construct the r equality
constraints in (6.21e). The matrices Q˜ ∈ Rnx×nx and R˜ ∈ Rnu×nu , and the scalar
γ ∈ R≥0 are weights assigning a prioritization for the control objectives related to the
error and to energy slew rate, respectively. Assuming that the optimization problem
(6.21) is feasible, an optimal sequence is computed, and following the MPC philosophy,
a new optimization problem is formulated for the next time instant [77]. Notice that the
optimization problem in (6.21) is also suitable for the real application since it minimizes
an error with respect to a desired volume that may vary along the time, and it also
takes into account the smoothness operation in order to avoid damage in the network.
Finally, the economical aspect to minimize the costs associated to water and energy are
also included in the cost function.
Then, some re-formulations over the cost function (6.21a) and constraints (6.21b)-
(6.21e) are presented to obtain a QP problem. These modifications are necessary in
order to show the density-dependent population-games approach as an alternative tool
for DMPC controller design. The optimization problem behind the MPC controller in
(6.21) can be conveniently re-formulated with a cost function given by
J = (Xk −Xr)>Q (Xk −Xr) + ∆U>k R∆Uk + γU>k α,
where weighting matrices are: Q = diag([Q˜ . . . Q˜]), R = diag([R˜ . . . R˜]), and
α =
[(
α1 +α2,k+1
)>
. . .
(
α1 +α2,k+Hp
)>]>
.
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The reference vector along Hp is Xr = [x
>
r x
>
r . . . x
>
r ]
>, and vectors Xk and
Uk are composed of the same elements of sequences in (3.3a) and (3.3b), i.e.,
Xk = [x
>
k+1|k x
>
k+2|k . . . x
>
k+Hp|k]
>,
Uk = [u
>
k|k u
>
k+1|k . . . u
>
k+Hp−1|k]
>.
Moreover, applying the appropriate transformations [77], the optimization problem
can be re-written as a QP problem in (6.17). Moreover, the BWSN is controlled under
two different scenarios, i.e.,
Scenario 1: DMPC controller based on DDPG with time-varying information-
sharing network for the BWSN.
Scenario 2: CMPC controller with constant information-sharing network for the
BWSN.
In order to evaluate the performance of the control strategy, two different KPIs are
proposed. One of them associated to the economical costs for operating the actuators as
presented in (3.15), and the other one associated to the communication costs depending
on the information-sharing links that are required to perform each control scheme. These
KPIs are defined as follows:
• Economical costs: these costs correspond to the required energy, and the time-
varying water costs during a day, i.e.,
KPIEcosts(day) =
24+24(day−1)∑
k=1+24(day−1)
(
α1 +α2,k
)>
uk. (6.22)
• Communication costs: these costs correspond to the required permanent information-
sharing links to compute the control inputs during a day, i.e.,
KPICcosts(day) =
24+24(day−1)∑
k=1+24(day−1)
(1>nMk1n)
2
, (6.23)
where Mk = Ak for the control strategy proposed in this chapter. The KPI in
(6.23) is also used later in this thesis by modifying the matrix Mk
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.6: Communication topologies for the DMPC controller based on DDPG. (a)
information-sharing topology for the DMPC controller based on DDPG, i.e., A = Θ˜.
The number of links in this graph for this case study is 614; and time-varying information-
sharing topology for the DMPC controller based on DDPG at time instant: (b) k = 33,
i.e., A(33τ) = Γ˜(33)Θ˜Γ˜(33), (c) k = 11, i.e., A(11τ) = Γ˜(11)Θ˜Γ˜(11), and (d) k = 77,
i.e., A(77τ) = Γ˜(77)Θ˜Γ˜(77). The number of links in the graphs for this case study are:
(b) 468, (c) 435, and (d) 392.
For the simulation results, the reference has been selected to be xr = 0.6x¯, and
the weights in the cost function are selected to be Q˜ = Inx , R˜ = 1000Inu , and γ = 1.
Furthermore, the regions to determine the activeness of constraints are computed by
using the following parameters: g¯xi = g
x
i
= 0.6x¯i, for all i = 1, . . . , nx; and g¯
u
j = 0.65u¯j ,
and gu
j
= 0.35u¯j , for all j = 1, . . . , nu.
Figure 6.6(a) presents the information-sharing topology required to solve the opti-
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Figure 6.7: The evolution of four states are presented at first row, i.e., x4, x10, x11, and
x13. The evolution of four control inputs are presented at second row, i.e., u11, u29, u36,
and u44.
Figure 6.8: Number of connected information-sharing links along the time. The mini-
mum achieved number of links is 392 corresponding to Figure 6.6(d).
mization problem by using the D3RD (6.2), the D3SD (6.4), or the D3PD (6.6), when
all the inequality constraints are active, i.e., A(t) = Θ˜. This topology also corresponds
to the topology at k = 1 to initialize the control strategy when considering time-varying
graphs. Figure 6.6(b) corresponds to the graph when adopting time-varying graphs
and the proposed distributed density-dependent population-dynamics-based DMPC con-
troller. Graph in Figure 6.6(d) has a reduction of 36.15% of the information-sharing links.
This reduction in the number of links from Figure 6.6(a) to Figure 6.6(d) is produced
due to the fact that, at k = 77, inequality constraints are non-active according to the
regions presented in Figure 6.4. Furthermore, Figures 6.6(b) and 6.6(c) correspond to
time instants k = 33 and k = 11, respectively.
Figure 6.7 shows the evolution of some states achieving the imposed reference, also re-
flecting a proper performance of the proposed distributed density-dependent population-
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Figure 6.9: The evolution of four demand profiles, i.e., disturbances d4, d8, d16, and d24.
dynamics-based DMPC achieving the references and minimizing abrupt changes in the
control signals –it is quite important to highlight that the evolution of system states and
control inputs are exactly the same for both Scenario 1 and 2 –. On the other hand,
Figure 6.7 also presents the behavior of some control signals. It can be seen that these
control inputs oscillate in order to satisfy the demands. That is why these control inputs
have the same periodicity as the disturbances (period of 24 hours). Figure 6.8 shows the
evolution of the number of connected links in the information-sharing network along the
time. It can be seen that, at the beginning, it is needed to have the information-sharing
graph corresponding to the biggest required information-sharing matrix, i.e., A(t) = Θ˜.
Then, after few iterations, the system reduces the number of required links consider-
ably. Moreover, it can be seen a periodic behavior of the number of required links in
the information-sharing network, is daily (period of 24 hours) as the disturbances, i.e.,
although all the demands have different magnitudes and mean values, they have the
same daily periodicity as the disturbances d4, d8, d16, and d24 presented in Figure 6.9.
Table 6.1 presents the economical and communication KPIs corresponding to both
considered scenarios. It can be seen that the economical costs associated to the water
and the required energy to operate the valves and pumps are the same for both scenarios,
i.e., the evolution of control inputs are equivalent even though the information-sharing
networks are different. This fact regarding the difference of information-sharing networks
is evidenced in the KPI in (6.23) (compare the total cost corresponding to KPICcost for
both scenarios in Table 6.1). Moreover, it can be seen that there is a reduction in the
communication costs for the second scenario, and therefore, there is a reduction in the
overall costs without affecting the performance of the closed-loop system.
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Table 6.1: Summary of KPIs corresponding to operation of actuators and communication
links.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Day KPIEcosts (e.u.) KPICcost (e.u.) KPIEcosts (e.u.) KPICcost (e.u.)
1 24.2456 10724 24.2456 14736
2 21.6782 9800 21.6782 14736
3 21.4634 9828 21.4634 14736
4 21.3294 9838 21.3294 14736
5 21.2401 9840 21.2401 14736
Total 109.9567 50030 109.9567 73680
Overall∗ 50139.95 73789.65
∗
The overall cost is computed by adding the total costs for both KPIs, i.e., the total values for KPIEcosts + KPICcost.
6.4 Summary
A general methodology to generate distributed density-dependent population dynamics
has been presented by considering a reproduction rate in the distributed mean dynamics.
Furthermore, the relationship between the equilibrium point of density games with the
optimal point has been shown in a constrained optimization problem by selecting the
description of benefits throughout the strategies using the Lagrangian of a potential
function. Besides, the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium point under the D3RD has
been formally proven for constant and time-varying population structures. Then, after
introducing this class of dynamics and their properties, they have been applied to the
design of a DMPC controller under a time-varying communication network. Simulation
results have shown a reduction in the number of links in the information-sharing network
over a 36% with respect to the total number of links for the communication network
without neglecting any constraint.
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Power Index in Control
Previous chapters have studied the role of non-cooperative-game approaches in the de-
sign of controllers. In contrast, this chapter discusses in studying a cooperative-game
approach. Indices of power are alternative ways to solve a game, which are characterized
for satisfying a certain system of axioms. Some of these power indices are, among others,
the Shapley value, the Banzhaf-Coleman index, or the dictatorial index [111]. Moreover,
even though for some examples different indices are equivalent, in the general case they
adopt different values. Specifically, this chapter addresses the role of the Shapley power
index in the design of controllers. In [111], it has been shown that the computation of the
Shapley value is more complex than the computation of other power indices. The main
reason is that the computation of the Shapley value involves a combinatorial explosion
since it evaluates all the possible coalitions that can be made among players. Therefore,
this fact implies a high computational burden. In addition, the computation requires
information from all the players, i.e., it is computed under centralized communication
structures, which constitutes an additional challenge for real applications, specially in
cases with large amount of players, where big communication networks would be needed.
The issue of computing the Shapley power index under distributed structures is
discussed. This chapter proposes a different way to compute the Shapley value for a
specific characteristic function in the cooperative game in order to reduce the computa-
tional burden, which is one of the main issues when using this game-theoretical approach.
Unlike the classical cooperative-games approach, which has a limited application due to
the combinatorial explosion issues, the alternative method allows calculating the Shap-
ley value in polynomial time and hence can be applied to large-scale problems (games
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involving large amount of players).
In addition, most of game-theoretical contributions address engineering problems
from either a cooperative or non-cooperative perspective. However, this chapter shows
that there must be control problems involving both cooperation and competition. There-
fore, it is suitable to solve it by using both directions. In this chapter, the Shapley value
and also population games are used together to solve a unique multi-objective control
problem.
In order to show the performance of the proposed methodology based on both co-
operative and non-cooperative games, a resource allocation problem in a water system
treated in [123] is presented, and the stability of the closed-loop system is analyzed by us-
ing passivity theory as in [69], [35]. Moreover, analysis regarding invariant-set properties
that guarantee a limitation-resource constraint and the stability of the whole closed-loop
system are presented extending preliminary result presented in [12]. The resource allo-
cation problem has been addressed with both replicator and projection dynamics since
they share some important gradient characteristics, which have been studied in [135].
Besides, it is discussed the fact that the main result related to the cooperative-game ap-
proach allows to compute the Shapley value under a distributed structure, i.e., without
considering a complete graph connecting the whole set of players. Also, it is shown that
this result leads to an additional alternative to compute the Shapley value through a
linear set of equations and using the coalitional rationality axiom (in a centralized man-
ner, or under a distributed structure). As a consequence of the decrement of required
communication links to make the computation under distributed structures, there is an
increment in the computational cost. However, a comparison between three alternatives
to compute the Shapley value, including the computation under a distributed structure,
has been presented in function of the number of players. This comparison shows that
the computation under a distributed structure is faster with respect to the traditional
computation of the Shapley value as there is an increment in the number of players.
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7.1 Problem Statement in Distribution Flow-based Net-
works
Several engineering problems may be addressed as a flow-based distribution network just
by defining general elements such as suppliers and demands, flow capacity, and storage
capacity [56]. Consider a specific resource flow-based distribution network, which is
composed only of three types of elements:
• Storage: element that stores the resource and with both inflows and outflows.
Let V = {1, . . . , n} be the set of n ∈ Z>0 storage nodes1.
• Sink: element that receives the resource from a storage node and with only inflows.
Let B = {n+ 1, . . . , 2n} be the set n ∈ Z>0 of sink nodes.
• Source: element that provides the resource and with only outflows. Let R =
{2n+ 1} be the singleton set of a source node.
Consider a directed graph denoted by G˜ = (V˜, E˜), where V˜ = {V ∪ B ∪R} is the set
of 2n + 1 nodes representing the storage, sink, and source elements in the flow-based
distribution network, and E˜ ⊂ {(r, `) : r, ` ∈ V˜} is the set of directed links composed of
two ordered pairs of nodes, which represent the resource outflow from r, being an inflow
to node `, with r, ` ∈ V˜. On the other hand, consider a bidirectional communication net-
work among the sub-systems, which determines the possible information sharing in order
to compute the appropriate control inputs. The communication network is represented
by an undirected graph denoted by G = (V, E ,A), where E ⊂ {(r, `) : r, ` ∈ V} is the set
of links allowing bidirectional communication between r, ` ∈ V, i.e., (r, `) and (`, r) rep-
resent the same link, and A ∈ Rn×n is the adjacency matrix, i.e., ar` = 1 indicates that
r and ` can share information. These two graphs G¯ and G are presented in Figure 7.1.
Notice that storage elements in the distribution flow-based network presented in Figure
7.1 may be considered as source elements supplying other lower-level storage elements
as, in turn, are presented in Figure 7.2.
1
The set V has three different interpretations depending on the context in which it is used, i.e.,
a) V is the set of n storage nodes in the distribution flow-based networks context (Section 7.1).
b) V is the set of n strategies in the population-games context (Section 7.2).
c) V is the set of n players in the cooperative-games context (Section 7.3).
145
Chapter 7. Power Index in Control
2n
. . .
n+ 2 n+ 3n+ 1
2 3 n
. . .
1
2n+ 1
B
V
R
2n
. . .
n+ 2 n+ 3n+ 1
2 3 n
. . .
1
2n+ 1
B
V
R
(a) (b)
Figure 7.1: Distribution flow-based network. (a) directed graph corresponding to the ex-
isting network flows. (b) undirected-graph example corresponding to the communication
sharing among sub-systems (associated to storage nodes).
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Figure 7.2: Tree-shaped topology composed by multiple flow-based distribution net-
works.
Storage nodes have discharge coefficients given by K` > 0, for all ` ∈ V, which
determine their outflow resource. Furthermore, the inflows of the storage nodes p` ∈
R>0, for all ` ∈ V, are manipulated imposing a proportion of resource, i.e., Qp`, where
0 < p` ≤ 1, for all ` ∈ V, and let Q ∈ R>0 be the total resource in the system. Besides,
storage nodes have associated a vector of system states denoted by z ∈ Rn>0 determining
the amount of resource at each of these nodes. The storage nodes have the following
dynamics:
z˙` = Qp` −K`z`, ∀` ∈ V, (7.1)
where the equilibrium duple (p?` , z
?
` ) implies that a non-null steady state has been
achieved for the stored resource, i.e., z?` > 0 since p
?
` > 0. In the aforementioned
flow-based network, the resource Q is distributed throughout the storage nodes, which
can be seen as sub-systems within the network. For this distribution system, there are
two objectives. First, it is desired to make an evenhanded distribution of a resource
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zjip
j
i
Σji
Γji
Figure 7.3: Closed loop for the sub-system corresponding to the jth partition of the ith
topology.
throughout different sub-systems, i.e.,
minimize
p
(
z` −
1
n
n∑
`=1
z`
)
, ∀` ∈ V,
while the second objective consists in determining the appropriate distribution of costs
for the sub-systems in function of their contribution to the first control objective, which
is attained by using the available communication channels to coordinate the distribution
of the resource. The communication cost in a time interval [t0, tf ] associated to the use
of G = (V, E ,A) is given by
KPIlinks =
1
2
∫ tf
t0
1
>
nA1n dt, (7.2)
where t0 and tf denote the initial and final simulation time, respectively. In order to
achieve the second aforementioned objective, the fair cost C˜` that the `
th sub-system
should pay for using the communication network must be found. It should be satisfied
that
∑
`∈V C˜` = KPIlinks.
Finally, assume that the communication graph can have T different topologies from
the set T = {1, . . . , T}. Moreover, each topology i ∈ T has Pi different partitions
from the set Pi = {1, . . . , Pi}, where each partition j ∈ Pi of the topology i ∈ T
is a complete undirected graph denoted by Gji = (Vji , Eji ), where Vji is the set of nji
storage nodes within the corresponding partition, and Eji = {(r, `) : r, ` ∈ Vji } is the set
of links representing the full information within each partition. Besides, each partition
j ∈ Pi of the topology i ∈ T represents a sub-system denoted by Σji , which has a disjoint
controller denoted by Γji as presented in Figure 7.3.
The two different control objectives are achieved by using a game-theoretical ap-
proach in a distributed manner. The first control objective associated to an evenhanded
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distribution of the resource is reached with a non-cooperative approach (using a power
index). In contrast, the determination of the fair distribution of costs for all the sub-
systems is made with a cooperative-game approach. Furthermore, suppose that the
topology of the communication graph can be reconfigured conveniently to achieve the
control objectives every time τ > 0 (this fact is discussed in Section 7.2).
A feature of the flow-based distribution network is its passivity property. Lemma 7.1
presents this property as in [10], [46].
Lemma 7.1. The storage model of the flow-based distribution network Σji in Figure 7.3
is passive defining its inputs as the error ez` = z` − z
?
` , and its outputs as the error
ep` = p` − p
?
` , for all ` ∈ Vji , and for all partitions j ∈ Pi of the topology i ∈ T .
Proof. The storage model dynamics in error coordinates, i.e., the error dynamics e˙z` ,
are as follows:
e˙z` = Q
(
ep` + p
?
`
)−K` (ez` + z?` ) , ∀` ∈ Vji .
Then, consider the storage function (also Lyapunov function)
E1 =
1
2Q
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
∑
`∈Vji
e2z` , (7.3)
whose derivative is given by
E˙1 =
1
Q
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
∑
`∈Vji
ez` e˙z` ,
=
1
Q
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
∑
`∈Vji
ez`Q
(
ep` + p
?
`
)− ez`K` (ez` + z?` ) ,
=
1
Q
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
∑
`∈Vji
ez`Qep` + ez`Qp
?
` − e2z`K` − ez`K`z
?
` ,
=
1
Q
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
∑
`∈Vji
ez`Qep` − e
2
z`
K` + ez`
(
Qp?` −K`z?`
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
z˙
?
` = 0
,
≤
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
∑
`∈Vji
ez`ep` ,
=
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
∑
`∈Vji
(
z` − z?`
) (
p` − p?`
)
,
=
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
zji − zj?i
)> (
pji − pj?i
)
.
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Then, since
(
zji − zj?i
)
are the inputs of Σji and
(
pji − pj?i
)
are the outputs of Σji , then
E˙1 ≤
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
zji − zj?i
)> (
pji − pj?i
)
allows to conclude that storage-node dynamics in
the flow-based distribution network are passive.
7.2 Population Games in a New Context
Consider a population composed of a finite and large number of rational agents that
make the decisions to select among a set of possible strategies V = {1, . . . , n} (each
strategy associated to a storage node, see Section 7.1). Agents change the strategy to
improve their utilities or benefits.
Within the population there are T ∈ Z>0 possibly different topologies represented
by a graph. This graph also determines how the population structure is configured,
i.e., how the agents can interact among them. Each topology i ∈ T is given by a non–
complete graph denoted by Gi = (V, Ei,Ai), where V is the set of n nodes representing the
strategies, the set of links that represent the possible interaction among agents selecting
the corresponding strategies is denoted by Ei, and Ai is the adjacency matrix of the
corresponding ith topology.
Each topology i ∈ T has Pi ∈ Z>0 disjoint partitions. The set of partitions of the
population topology i ∈ T is given by Pi = {1, ..., Pi}. The partition j ∈ Pi of the
topology i ∈ T is denoted by a complete graph Gji = (Vji , Eji ), where Vji is the set
of nji < n nodes representing the set of strategies within the corresponding partition
Vji ⊂ V, and Eji is the set of nji (nji − 1)/2 links representing the full-information sharing
and interaction within each partition. Furthermore, it must be satisfied that all the
partitions form the entire topology, i.e.,
⋃
j∈Pi G
j
i = Gi, for all i ∈ T .
In the population, the scalar p` ∈ R≥0 is the proportion of agents selecting the strat-
egy ` ∈ V. The vector p ∈ Rn≥0 is a population state or a strategic distribution composed
of all the proportion of agents selecting the available strategies. The set of all the pos-
sible population states is given by a simplex denoted by ∆ =
{
p ∈ Rn≥0 : p>1n = pi
}
with pi = 1 for the application presented in this chapter. Similarly, pji,` ∈ R≥0 is the
proportion of agents selecting the strategy ` ∈ Vji available in the partition j ∈ Pi of
the topology i ∈ T . The vector pji ∈ Rn
j
i
≥0 is the strategic distribution of agents in the
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partition j ∈ Pi of the topology i ∈ T . Finally, let piji be the total mass in the partition
j ∈ Pi of the topology i ∈ T given by piji = pji
>
1
n
j
i
. Since partitions are disjoint, then∑
j∈Pi pi
j
i = pi, with pi = 1.
The payoff that agents receive for selecting a particular strategy is given by a fitness
function f` : ∆ → R, for the associated strategy ` ∈ V. The vector of fitness functions
in the population, denoted by f , is composed of all the fitness functions f`(p), ` ∈ V.
Similarly, the vector of fitness functions of the partition j ∈ Pi of the topology i ∈ T is
denoted by f ji , which is composed of all the fitness functions f`(p), ` ∈ Vji . The average
fitness function in the population is given by f¯ = p>f . The average fitness for each
partition of each topology is given by f¯ ji =
(
pji
>
f ji
)
/piji , for j ∈ Pi, i ∈ T , and the
average fitness vector for the partition j ∈ Pi of the topology i ∈ T is f¯ ji = 1nji f¯
j
i .
In this chapter, both replicator and projection dynamics are used [134]. These two
population dynamics are especially appealing since they have gradient properties dis-
cussed in [135].
Replicator and Projection Dynamics
For a fixed topology, there is a replicator dynamics system for each partition (see repli-
cator dynamics in (2.14)). For a topology i ∈ T and a partition j ∈ Pi, the replicator
dynamics introduced in [144] are given by
p˙ji = diag
(
pji
)(
f ji − f¯ ji
)
, (7.4)
and the projection dynamics introduced in [95] (see projection dynamics in (2.16)) are
given by
p˙ji = f
j
i −
1
nji
1
n
j
i
f ji
>
1
n
j
i
. (7.5)
Then, the system changes among topologies1 in order to use, at each iteration, a limited
number of communication links. The equilibrium of interest in (7.4) for this chapter is
the non-pure Nash equilibrium given by the condition f j?i = f¯
j?
i , for all j ∈ Pi, i ∈ T .
This is equivalent to f j?i ∈ span{1nji }, for all i ∈ T and j ∈ Pi. Notice that the
dynamics (7.4) have an equilibrium point pj?i = 0, which implies the extinction of the
1
These topologies are determined by a partitioning performed by using a cooperative game approach,
which is later discussed in this chapter.
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agents. Consequently, it is assumed that, under the replicator dynamics (7.4), there is
not extinction of proportion of agents. Regarding the equilibrium for (7.5), it is achieved
when all the fitness functions get the same value, i.e., f j?i ∈ span{1nji }, for all i ∈ T and
j ∈ Pi. Due to the fact that each topology is a non-connected graph, this equilibrium
is achieved at each partition. Moreover, since topologies and partitions are varying over
time, it is necessary to identify the equilibrium for all topologies and for all partitions,
i.e., fk(p
?) = f`(p
?), for all k, ` ∈ V.
Remark 7.1. Suppose that f is a stable game, then (p−p?)>(f(p)−f(p?)) ≤ 0 according
to Definition 2.2. Moreover, due to the fact that f(p?) ∈ span{1n}, and that p,p? ∈ ∆,
then (p− p?)>f(p?) = 0. This leads to (p− p?)>f(p) ≤ 0. ♦
The first property of both replicator and projection dynamics is the invariance of the
simplex set ∆, which is analyzed in Proposition 7.1.
Proposition 7.1. Let p(0) be the initial condition of (7.4) or (7.5). If p(0) ∈ ∆, then
p ∈ ∆, for all t ≥ 0, i.e., the simplex ∆ is an invariant set under replicator dynamics
(7.4) or projection dynamics (7.5), for any partition topology.
Proof. The invariant-set property is analyzed for both population dynamics.
Replicator dynamics: in order to prove that the simplex ∆ is an invariant set, it is
shown that the sum of p˙ji for all topologies i ∈ T and for all partitions j ∈ Pi is null,
i.e.,
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
1
>
n
j
i
p˙ji =
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
pji
>
(
f ji −
1
piji
1
n
j
i
pji
>
f ji
)
,
=
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
pji
>
f ji −
1
piji
pji
>
1
n
j
i
pji
>
f ji
)
,
=
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
pji
>
f ji − pji
>
f ji
)
,
= 0.
Projection dynamics: in order to prove that the simplex ∆ is an invariant set, it is shown
that the sum of p˙ji for all topologies i ∈ T and for all partitions j ∈ Pi is null, i.e.,∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
1
>
n
j
i
p˙ji =
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
1
>
n
j
i
(
f ji −
1
nji
1
n
j
i
f ji
>
1
n
j
i
)
,
=
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
1
>
n
j
i
f ji −
1
nji
1
>
n
j
i
1
n
j
i
f ji
>
1
n
j
i
.
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Notice that 1
n
j
i
1
>
n
j
i
1
n
j
i
= 1, then
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
1
>
n
j
i
p˙ji =
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
1
>
n
j
i
f ji − f ji
>
1
n
j
i
,
= 0.
Both results complete the proof.
Now, the passivity property of both the replicator and the projection dynamics is
analyzed in Lemma 7.2.
Lemma 7.2. Γji in Figure 7.3 can be given by either the replicator dynamics (7.4) or
the projection dynamics (7.5). For any of these dynamics, Γji is lossless defining its
inputs as f ji , and its outputs as p
j
i − pj∗i , for all partitions j ∈ Pi of the topology i ∈ T .
Proof. The analysis is made for both replicator and projection dynamics using different
storage functions.
Replicator dynamics: consider the following entropy function as a storage function
(also Lyapunov function), i.e.,
E2(p) = −
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
∑
`∈Vji
pj?i,` ln
(
pji,`
pj?i,`
)
, (7.6)
= −
∑
i∈T
∑
`∈V
p`
? ln
(
p`
p`
?
)
,
which is a valid Lyapunov function since E2(p
?) = 0 and E2(p) > 0, for all p 6= p?, fact
that is verified by using the Jensen’s inequality (i.e., G(g(x)) ≥ g(G(x)) for any convex
function as the logarithm [66]), e.g., E(p) ≥ −∑i∈T ln(∑
`∈V
p?`
p`
p
?
`
)
, and due to the fact
that ln
(∑
`∈V p
?
`
p`
p
?
`
)
= ln (1), it follows that E(p) ≥ 0. Then E(p) > 0, for all p 6= p?.
Hence,
E˙2(p) = −
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
∑
`∈Vji
pj?i,`
pji,`
p˙ji,`. (7.7)
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Replacing dynamics (7.4) in (7.7) yields
E˙2(p) = −
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
pji
?>
(
f ji −
1
piji
1
n
j
i
pji
>
f ji
)
,
= −
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
pji
?> − 1
piji
pji
?>
1
n
j
i
pji
>
)
f ji ,
=
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
pji − pji
?
)>
f ji .
Projection dynamics: consider the quadratic error as a storage function (also Lya-
punov function), i.e.,
E3(p) =
1
2
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
∑
`∈Vji
(
pji,` − pj?i,`
)2
, (7.8)
where E3(p) > 0 for all p 6= p?, and E3(p?) = 0. Replacing dynamics (7.5) in the
storage function derivative yields
E˙3(p) =
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
pji − pj?i
)>(
f ji −
1
nji
1
n
j
i
f ji
>
1
n
j
i
)
,
=
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
pji − pj?i
)>
f ji −
1
nji
(
pji − pj?i
)>
1
n
j
i
f ji
>
1
n
j
i
,
=
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
pji − pj?i
)>
f ji −
1
nji
(
pji
>
1
n
j
i
− pj?i
>
1
n
j
i
)
f ji
>
1
n
j
i
,
=
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
pji − pj?i
)>
f ji .
Then, since fji are the inputs and
(
pji − pj?i
)
are the outputs, both results show that
the replicator and projection dynamics are lossless.
Remark 7.2. According to Remark 7.1 and taking into account the derivative of the
storage functions (also Lyapunov functions) E˙2 ≤ 0, and E˙3 ≤ 0, there exists a time
τ > 0 such that ‖p`(t)− p?` (t)‖ ≥ ‖p`(t+ τ)− p?` (t+ τ)‖, for all ` ∈ V. ♦
Once the passivity features of the considered flow-based distribution network and
both the replicator and projection dynamics have been presented, it is shown that the
equilibrium point of the closed-loop system in Figure 7.3 is stable as stated in Proposition
7.2.
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Proposition 7.2. The equilibrium pair (zj?i ,p
j?
i ), for all partitions j ∈ Pi in the topology
i ∈ T (i.e., the equilibrium zj?i of the sub-system Σji , and the equilibrium pj?i of the
system Γji , for the closed loop presented in Figure 7.3) is stable under the replicator and
projection dynamics selecting f ji = z
j
max,i − zji , where zjmax,i is the constant maximum
capacity of the storage nodes belonging to Vji .
Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function given by E = E1+E2 for the replicator dynamics,
and E = E1 + E3 for the projection dynamics, where E1, E2 and E3 are the functions
presented in (7.3), (7.6), and (7.8), respectively. According to Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2, for
both cases E˙ satisfies
E˙ ≤
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
zji − zj?i
)> (
pji − pj?i
)
+
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
pji − pj?i
)>
f ji . (7.9)
Adding and substracting
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
zjmax,i in (7.9) yields
E˙ ≤
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
−zjmax,i + zji + zjmax,i − zj?i
)> (
pji − pj?i
)
+
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
(
pji − pj?i
)>
f ji ,
=
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
{(
−zjmax,i+zji
)>(
pji − pj?i
)
+
(
zjmax,i − zj?i
)>(
pji − pj?i
)
+ f ji
>(
pji − pj?i
)}
,
=
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pi
{
−f ji
> (
pji − pj?i
)
+ f j?i
> (
pji − pj?i
)
+ f ji
> (
pji − pj?i
)}
,
= 0.
Therefore, the equilibrium point (zj?i ,p
j?
i ), for all partitions j ∈ Pi in the topology i ∈ T ,
is stable.
Notice that the population-games-based controller in Figure 7.3 is a data-driven
controller since it is designed without requiring the model of the system.
7.3 Coalitional-Game Role and Partitioning Criterion
Consider a cooperative game with transferable utility defined as a pair (V, Vc), where
V = {1, .., n} is the set of players (each player associated to a storage node, see Section
7.1), and Vc is the characteristic function. From the cooperative-game viewpoint for
each topology i ∈ T , each node ` ∈ V is a player and each partition j ∈ Pi represents a
coalition of players.
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7.3.1 Computation of the Shapley Value
The characteristic function Vc assigns a real value to each of the 2
V coalitions and
returns a real value. Formally, the characteristic function is a mapping Vc : 2
V → R.
For each coalition, O ⊆ V, Vc(O) is the value that players can share among themselves.
Additionally, for the empty coalition, Vc(∅) , 0.
Prior to defining the characteristic function, costs associated to each coalition are
defined as
C˜(O) = 1|O|
∑
`∈O
C˜`, (7.10)
where C˜` is the individual cost of player belonging to the coalition ` ∈ O. For the
considered flow-based distribution networks, costs are defined to be C˜` = zmax,`− z`, for
all ` ∈ V, where zmax,` is the maximum capacity of the storage node, and z` is the current
state of the corresponding storage node. This individual value represents a cost that a
player would have to assume in case that it does not cooperate with anyone. Notice
that the error C˜` is an appropriate selection for the costs since a player ` with null error
does not have incentives to cooperate with others due to the fact it has achieved the
first control objective, and cooperation would imply to increment the error. In contrast,
a player with a big error C˜` has incentives to cooperate in order to minimize its error
and should assume costs associated to that cooperation. In addition, if two players have
identical errors C˜`, then it is reasonable that both assume the same costs to cooperate
each other. In other words, it is reasonable that those players with bigger errors incur
in higher costs to achieve the first control objective.
Furthermore, the individual cost allows the player to determine its incentives to es-
tablish a coalition with another player, i.e., the player would have incentives to cooperate
with others as long as the cooperation implies a reduction of its costs. Besides, these
individual costs allow computing the contribution of a player to a coalition, i.e., how
the cost is reduced as the player collaborates with an existing coalition. Afterwards, the
specific considered characteristic function is given by the difference between the sum of
individual costs and the cost of the corresponding coalition. Then, the difference be-
tween the costs when each player operates by itself and the costs when all these players
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collaborate with each other can be used to define the cost function as
Vc(O) =
∑
`∈O
C˜` − C˜(O). (7.11)
A solution of the cooperative game is an allocation rule that provides each player with
a payoff according to its contribution. Let y ∈ Rn be the payoff vector given by y =
[y1 · · · yn]>. Some desirable properties for the distribution of the Vc(O) among the
players are:
1. Efficiency:
∑
`∈O y` ≤ Vc(V),
2. Coalitional rationality:
∑
`∈O y` = Vc(O) for all coalitions O ⊆ V,
3. Individual rationality: y` ≥ Vc({`}), for all ` ∈ V.
A payoff rule that satisfies the mentioned desired requirements is the Shapley value
(or Shapley power index) [110], [140], which is given by
Φ(`) =
∑
O⊆V\{`}
Ψ(O)(Vc(O ∪ {`})− Vc(O)), (7.12)
where
Ψ(O) = |O|! (n− |O| − 1)!
n!
.
Notice that the sum in (7.12) considers all the possible coalitions where player ` ∈
V can be added. Its computation requires full information from all the players and
coalitions of the cooperative game, resulting in high computational burden. In particular,
the combinatorial explosion when having a high number of players is a common issue in
this context.
Once the characteristic function has been defined as in (7.11), a mathematical re-
lationship between the Shapley values can be determined to mitigate the high compu-
tational cost enhancing the possibilities to use a distributed structure. This result is
presented in Theorem 7.1.
Theorem 7.1. Let (7.11) be the characteristic function of a cooperative game with the
set of players V = {1, ..., n}. Let C˜` be the cost associated to each player ` ∈ V, and
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(7.10) be the costs associated to each coalition O ⊆ V. The Shapley value Φ(`) for any
player ` ∈ V is computed as follows:
Φ(`) =
1
n
Vc(V)−Θ
 ∑
r∈V\{`}
C˜r − (n− 1)C˜`
 , (7.13)
where Θ > 0 is a constant for the cooperative game whose value only depends on the
number of players n, i.e.,
Θ =
n−2∑
s=1
{(
(n− 2)!
s!(n− 2− s)!
)(
s
s+ 1
)(
s! (n− s− 1)! + (s+ 1)! (n− s− 2)!
n!
)}
.
Besides, there is a relationship between Shapley values given by Φ(r) = Φ(`)+(C˜r−C˜`)Θ,
for all r, ` ∈ V.
Proof. First, it is proven the relationship between the Shapley values of different players
with the constant Θ given by Φ(r) = Φ(`) + (C˜r − C˜`)Θ, for all r, ` ∈ V. The Shapley
value Φ(`) of the player ` ∈ V in (7.12) may be re–written by expressing the set of
coalitions to which the player ` ∈ V can be added, in terms of a second player r ∈ V, as
follows:
Φ(`) =
∑
O⊆V\{`,r}
Ψ(O) (Vc(O ∪ {`})− Vc(O)) +∑
O⊆V\{`,r}
Ψ(O ∪ {r}) (Vc(O ∪ {r} ∪ {`})− Vc(O ∪ {r})) .
Similarly, the Shapley value Φ(r) of the player r ∈ V may be written in terms of player
` ∈ V as follows:
Φ(r) =
∑
O⊆V\{`,r}
Ψ(O) (Vc(O ∪ {r})− Vc(O)) +∑
O⊆V\{`,r}
Ψ(O ∪ {`}) (Vc(O ∪ {r} ∪ {`})− Vc(O ∪ {`})) .
Now, it is found the difference between the Shapley values Φ(r) and Φ(`), denoted by
Φ˜(r, `) = Φ(r) − Φ(`). Here, it is taken into account that Ψ(O ∪ {r}) = Ψ(O ∪ {`}).
Hence
Φ˜(r, `) =
∑
O⊆V\{`,r}
Ψ(O) {Vc(O ∪ {r})− Vc(O ∪ {`})}+∑
O⊆V\{`,r}
Ψ(O ∪ {r}) {Vc(O ∪ {r})− Vc(O ∪ {`})} . (7.14)
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Replacing (7.11) and (7.10) in (7.14), it is obtained
Φ˜(r, `) =
∑
O⊆V\{`,r}
Ψ(O)
{(
1− 1|O|+ 1
)
(C˜r − C˜`)
}
+
∑
O⊆V\{`,r}
Ψ(O ∪ {r})
{(
1− 1|O|+ 1
)
(C˜r − C˜`)
}
.
Briefly, the difference between the Shapley values Φ˜(r, `) = Φ(r)− Φ(`) is given by
Φ˜(r, `) = (C˜r − C˜`)
∑
O⊆V\{`,r}
θ1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Ψ(O) + Ψ(O ∪ {r}))
θ2︷ ︸︸ ︷( |O|
|O|+ 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ
.
Notice that the constant value Θ can be re-written as
Θ =
n−2∑
s=1

θ3︷ ︸︸ ︷(
(n− 2)!
s!(n− 2− s)!
) θ2︷ ︸︸ ︷(
s
s+ 1
)(
s! (n− s− 1)! + (s+ 1)! (n− s− 2)!
n!
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ1
 ,
where θ3 represents the amount of coalitions that can be formed in the cooperative game
with s players, i.e., |O| = s. Finally,
Φ(r) = Φ(`) + (C˜r − C˜`)Θ, ∀ r ∈ V\{`}.
It follows that making the sum over all the elements of the set V\{`}, it is obtained the
desired relationship. i.e.,∑
r∈V\{`}
Φ(r) = (n− 1)Φ(`) + Θ
∑
r∈V\{`}
C˜r −Θ(n− 1)C˜`.
Then, if Φ(`) is added at both sides of the previous equality, it yields
∑
r∈V
Φ(r) = nΦ(`) + Θ
(∑
r∈V
C˜r − (n− 1)C˜`
)
,
and since Vc(V) =
∑
r∈V Φ(r), then
Φ(`) =
1
n
Vc(V)−Θ
 ∑
r∈V\{`}
C˜r − (n− 1)C˜`
 ,
completing the proof.
Remark 7.3. If C˜r > C˜`, then Φ(r) > Φ(`), for all r, ` ∈ V. Suppose that C˜r > C˜`,
and since Θ > 0, then Φ(r) = Φ(`) + (C˜r − C˜`)Θ > Φ(`). ♦
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7.3.2 Computation of the Shapley Value under a Distributed Structure
The reduction of the computational time according to the result obtained in Theorem
7.1 allows investing extra computational effort to gather all the needed information
to compute the Shapley value under a distributed structure. In order to make the
distributed Shapley computation, let one player be a pivot player in charge of collecting
all the required information from all the other players known as supply players.
Remark 7.4. Even though the computation of the Shapley value is performed by one
player, the required structure is a non-complete graph. In this regard, the computation
of the Shapley value is made under a distributed structure. ♦
2 3 n. . .1
pivot
Figure 7.4: Path graph for the distributed Shapley computation. Without loss of gen-
erality, the pivot player is considered to be player 1.
Consider a connected non-complete graph for the distributed computation of the
Shapley value denoted by G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes representing the
players within the cooperative game. Moreover, let q ∈ V denote the pivot player, and
V\{q} is the set of supply players. The set of links E represents possible communication
among the players. Moreover, let N` be the set of neighbors of player ` ∈ V, i.e.,
N` = {r : (`, r) ∈ E}. Figure 7.4 shows the case for a path graph where the first player
is the pivot player, i.e., q = 1 ∈ V. Notice that the required information to compute the
Shapley value is given by all the individual costs of all the supply players according to
(7.10) (since the pivot player knows its own individual cost), and the total number of
players. This information is required by the pivot player who is in charge of the Shapley
value computation in order to perform the partitioning (which is used for establishing
the proper topologies introduced in Section 7.2) and also assign the fair distribution of
costs associated to the communication links. It is necessary that the pivot player obtains
the information in a distributed way subject to the communication topology given by
the graph G.
The distributed algorithm is inspired by the work presented in [49], and it is split
into two different tasks, i.e., the distributed computation of the number of players n,
and the distributed computation of all the individual costs for all the supply players C˜`,
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for all ` ∈ V\{q} as it has been presented in Chapter 4. Each stage of the algorithm is
presented next.
7.3.2.1 Computation of the Number of Players
Consider an auxiliary variable for the pivot player ξq, and for each supply player ξ`, where
` ∈ V\{q}. The initial conditions of these auxiliary variables are given by ξq(0) = 1,
and ξ`(0) = 0, for all ` ∈ V\{q}. The following consensus algorithm can be implemented
taking advantage of the relationship between the initial conditions and the stationary
point as [109], [26]
ξ˙` =
∑
r∈N`
(ξr − ξ`), ∀ ` ∈ V. (7.15)
Since the communication graph G among players is connected, according to [109]
the stationary value of (7.15) is ξ?` = (
∑
r∈V ξr(0))/n, for all ` ∈ V. Consequently, the
stationary value is given by ξ?` = n
−1, for all ` ∈ V. This fact shows that the pivot player
can get information about the total number of players n in a distributed way.
7.3.2.2 Computation of the Individual Costs
For simplicity, it is assumed that the pivot player is the player q = 1 ∈ V (see, e.g.,
Figure 7.4). Since there are n− 1 values for individual costs that should be sent to the
pivot player, then there is a turn value denoted by κ ∈ Z>0. The token assigns a flag for
each player to distribute its individual cost. For the case with a pivot player q = 1 ∈ V,
the turn value κ should vary from 2 to n in order to cover the total number of players
in the cooperative game. After determining the possible values for the turn variable κ,
i.e., κ = 2, . . . , n, this variable is initialized for the first supply player, i.e., κ = 2. Once
the pivot player determines the individual cost corresponding to this supply player, the
turn value is increased, i.e., κ = κ+ 1 in order to allow the next supply player distribute
its individual cost. This process is repeated until the last player distributes its cost to
the pivot player, i.e., until κ = n.
Consider the auxiliary variables ψ`, for all ` ∈ V. The initial conditions of these
auxiliary variables are given by ψκ = C˜κ from (7.10), and ψ` = 0, for all ` ∈ V\{κ}.
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Then, the consensus algorithm [109] is implemented, i.e,
ψ˙` =
∑
r∈N`
(ψr − ψ`), ∀` ∈ V. (7.16)
The stationary value is given by ψ?` =
1
n
∑
r∈V ψr(0). For the selected initial condi-
tions, ψ?` = n
−1C˜κ. Furthermore, since the number of players is already known from the
procedure presented in Subsection 7.3.2.1, then
ψ?` = C˜κξ
?
` , ∀κ ∈ V\{q}.
It is concluded that, finding the number of players and finding each individual cost
by assigning turns to the supply players, it is possible to compute the Shapley value in
a distributed way.
Remark 7.5. Notice that it is necessary to compute n distributed consensus algorithms,
one algorithm for the determination of the number of players, and n − 1 algorithms to
distribute the individual costs of supply players to the pivot player. This fact implies
an extra computational burden. However, it is shown that the distributed computation
of the Shapley value using distributed consensus and Theorem 7.1 is lower than the
computational burden of the classical approach (7.12) as the total number of players is
increased. ♦
In order to verify the difference between the computational burden of computing
the Shapley value with (7.12), and by using the relation proposed in Theorem 7.1 with
the constant value Θ, different Shapley values for several amount of players have been
computed.
The comparison among the computation of the Shapley value in a distributed and
centralized way using Theorem 7.1, and in a centralized way using (7.12), is presented
in Table 7.1. Moreover, Figure 7.5 shows the summary of the computational burden for
all the approaches and for different number of players n.
7.3.3 Partitioning Procedure
In order to perform the partitioning of the system, first it is established a time τ that
satisfies Remark 7.2, which defines when the proper topology is evaluated1. Every
1
The proper topology is determined by considering a fair distribution of costs given by the Shapley
value, which establishes the appropriate partitioning within the system at every time τ that satisfies
Remark 7.2.
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Table 7.1: Comparison of computational burden for computing the Shapley value for
different number of players.
Total Number Centralized approach Centralized approach Distributed approach
of players by using (7.12) by using (7.13) by using (7.13)
n time [s] time [ms] time [s]
3 0.4232 0.09 2.7899
4 0.8020 0.12 3.6002
6 1.2907 0.18 5.4838
8 2.3421 0.24 7.2707
10 5.9998 0.30 9.0004
12 25.6436 0.36 10.8073
14 110.6065 0.42 12.6004
16 1944.7919 0.48 14.4005
18 53938.9433 0.54 16.2210
100 − 3 90.0030
C
om
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u
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ti
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en
[s
]
Number of players n
Figure 7.5: Computational burden for computing the Shapley value (semi-log plot).
Centralized computation with typical approach using (7.12), centralized computation
with the proposed approach using (7.13), and with distributed computation with the
proposed approach using (7.13).
time τ , the Shapley value Φ(`) of all the players ` ∈ V is computed by using the low-
computational-cost operation with the factor Θ. A second necessary parameter is the
size of the desired partitions, denoted by g˜ ∈ Z>0, i.e., make partitions with a number
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Algorithm 3 Partitioning algorithm based on the Shapley value
1: procedure initialization
2: g˜ ← desired number of players per partition
3: {H}` ← Φ(`) set of the Shapley values |H| = n
4: j ← 1 index for partitions
5: end procedure
6: while |H| ≥ g˜ do
7: b ← 0 flag for amount of players
8: Cj ← ∅ initialization of the jth partition
9: r ← arg max
`∈V
{H}` player with maximum value
10: H ← H\{H}r reduce the set without rth value
11: Cj ← Cj ∪ {r}
12: b ← b+ 1 number of players in Cj
13: while b ≤ g˜ do
14: r ← arg min
`∈V
{H}` player with minimum value
15: H ← H\{H}r reduce the set without rth value
16: Cj ← Cj ∪ {r}
17: b ← b+ 1 number of players in Cj
18: end while
19: j ← j + 1 number of partitions
20: end while
21: if H 6= ∅ then
22: Cj ← H leftover players forming a smaller partition
23: end if
g˜ < n of players.
In the partitioning procedure, it is desired to gather the player with the highest
Shapley value with the g˜ − 1 players with the lowest Shapley values. In this sense, it is
possible to make a cooperation in which the best players share their benefits with those
in a worst situation. Details of this partitioning process at every time τ are presented in
Algorithm 3. It is worth to highlight that this partitioning criterion might be different
depending on the control objectives and the system dynamical behavior. In this chapter,
the partitioning is performed in function of the Shapley value by grouping players with
the highest power index with those with lowest power index. This procedure allows
players to unify their power index and therefore to achieve an evenhanded distribution
of resource.
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Lemma 7.3. The stable closed-loop system presented in Figure 7.3, changing the parti-
tions every τ by using the Shapley values, converges to the common equilibrium z?` = z
?
r
for all r, ` ∈ V.
Proof. Consider the arbitrary initial condition for the storage nodes z(0) ∈ Rn≥0, the
maximum capacities for the storage nodes zmax ∈ Rn≥0, and the costs C˜i(0) = zmax,i −
zi(0), for all i ∈ V. Now, consider r0 = arg maxi∈V C˜i(0), and `0 = arg mini∈V C˜i(0).
Then, it is known that according to Remark 7.3, Φ(r0) > Φ(`0) and that r0, `0 ∈ V
are assigned to the same partition according to the proposed partitioning procedure
(Algorithm 3). It follows that, during the interval time τ with the closed loop presented
in Figure 7.3 and according to Remark 7.2, it is obtained C˜
`
0 ≤ z
max,r
0 − z
r
0(τ) ≤ C˜
r
0 ,
and C˜
`
0 ≤ z
max,r
0 − z
r
0(τ) ≤ C˜
r
0 . Then computing r1 = arg maxi∈V C˜i(τ), and `
1 =
arg mini∈V C˜i(τ), it is obtained that C˜`0 ≤ C˜`1 , and C˜r1 ≤ C˜r0 .
Making the partitioning, it follows that C˜
`
0 ≤ C˜
`
1 ≤ z
max,`
1 − z
`
1(2τ) ≤ C˜
r
1 ≤ C˜
r
0 , and
C˜
`
0 ≤ C˜
`
1 ≤ z
max,r
1 − z
r
1(2τ) ≤ C˜
r
1 ≤ C˜
r
0 . It is concluded that
min
i∈V
C˜i(kτ) ≤ zmax,` − z`((k + 1)τ) ≤ max
i∈V
C˜i(kτ),
min
i∈V
C˜i(kτ) ≤ zmax,r − zr((k + 1)τ) ≤ max
i∈V
C˜i(kτ),
where r = arg maxi∈V C˜i(kτ), and ` = arg mini∈V C˜i(kτ). Then
[maxi∈V C˜i(kτ) − mini∈V C˜i(kτ)]→ 0 as k →∞, until maxi∈V C˜i(kτ) = mini∈V C˜i(kτ).
This situation leads to the equilibrium z?r = z
?
` , for all r, ` ∈ V. Consequently, it is
obtained that all fitness functions are the same, then x∗` is achieved for all ` ∈ V.
7.4 Case Study: Water Supply Network
As a case study, a multi-objective problem involving both competition and cooperation
is presented. The case study is shown in Figure 7.6, which is composed of n = 13 tanks.
There are two control objectives. The former objective is to maintain all the tanks at
the same maximum level, which is solved by finding a Nash equilibrium. The latter
objective is to determine the cost each player should pay for these communication links
according to its contribution to achieve the desired equilibrium. The fair cost that each
player should pay is given by using the Shapley value.
Let KPIlinks in (7.2) denote the communication cost associated to the undirected
graph G (see Figure 7.1(b)). Therefore, the fair cost distribution is given by the Shapley
value, i.e.,
L˜` =
Φ(`)∑n
r=1 Φ(r)
KPIlinks, ` ∈ V, (7.17)
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Figure 7.6: Case study: Resource Q allocation throughout n tanks.
where L˜` is the fair cost corresponding to the player ` ∈ V. The Shapley value is
normalized in (7.17) since it is computed in terms of the error rather than in economical
units. These communication links allow sharing, in a local way, information about the
measured levels in order to achieve the first control objective. Notice that this is a
decentralized control scheme since each control input is computed by using only partial
and local information.
In order to solve the control problem, it is proposed to make a partitioning based on
the Shapley value as presented in Section 7.3. Therefore, the individual cost associated
to each player is the error between the current level and the maximum level of each tank,
i.e.,
C˜` = hmax,` − h`, (7.18)
where hmax,` denotes the maximum and constant possible level for the `
th tank, and
h` is the current measured level of the `
th tank. Once the partitions are determined, a
population-dynamics approach is applied to each partition, where the fitness function for
each strategy is given by the error defined according to Proposition 7.2, which is equal
to the cost C˜`, i.e., f` = hmax,`−h`, for all ` ∈ V. It is assumed that this fitness function
is always non-negative since physically the current measured level is h` ≤ hmax,`. Notice
that, with this fitness function, more resource is assigned to those tanks with lower level.
The dynamics for the `th tank are given by
h˙` = qin,` − qout,`,
qout,` = K`h`,
where h` is the current level, qin,` is the inflow, qout,` is the outflow, and K` is a constant
factor characterizing the outflow (discharge coefficient), for the `th tank. There is a
constant available resource given by Q = 30 m3/s. Each inflow qin,` is controlled by
a valve commanded by a control signal p`, i.e., qin,` = Qp`, with 0 ≤ p` ≤ 1. It is
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assumed that there is a local controller at each valve that guarantees the desired flow
given by p`. The limited resource establishes a constraint over all the inflows, i.e.,∑n
`=1 qin,` = Q. This equality constraint leads to the condition
∑n
`=1Qp` = Q, and
consequently,
∑n
`=1 p` = 1, then p ∈ ∆. This condition is also satisfied in the partitioned
system if the initial condition of the proportion of agents satisfies
∑
j∈Pi 1
>
n
j
i
pji (0) = 1,
for the initial topology i ∈ T , due to Proposition 7.1.
In order to analyze the performance of the closed-loop system composed of the flow-
based distribution network and the population dynamics, three KPIs are stated.
• The costs associated to the communication links ϕlinks is taken as a KPI given by
KPIlinks =
1
2
∫ tf
t0
1
>
nAi1n dt, i ∈ T , (7.19)
which is the same KPI presented in (7.2) but for the graph Gi corresponding to
the current topology i ∈ T , where t0 is an initial time and tf a final time.
• The error of each tank level with respect to the average levels of the system tanks
is also considered as a performance indicator, i.e.,
KPIerror,` =
∫ tf
t0
(
h` −
1
n
h>1n
)
dt, ` ∈ V,
where h = [h1 · · · hn]>. Then, there is a KPI for the whole system in function
of the mentioned error levels, i.e.,
KPIerror =
n∑
`=1
KPIerror,`.
• The settling time of the system states (level of tanks) with criterion of the 5%, i.e.,
KPIsettling = min
t
{t : t˜ ≥ t, h ≤ h(t˜) ≤ h¯},
where h = 0.95h?, h¯ = 1.05h?, with h? corresponds to the equilibrium point of
the system.
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Figure 7.7: Complete graph given by the grand coalition.
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Figure 7.8: Evolution of the 13 tank levels for three different cases: (a) partitions of two
players, (b) partitions of three players, and (c) partition of n players (full information).
Initial condition for each tank level has been determined by a random value within the
interval [0, 1].
7.4.1 Results
As a reference to analyze the performance of the proposed control strategy, results for
the centralized case are also presented. This is equivalent to the case with a topology
given by a complete graph (see Figure 7.7).
For this example, τ = 2.5 s, and the Shapley value is computed as a function of the
error costs in (7.18). It is important to mention that the initial condition for each tank
level has been established as a random value from the interval [0, 1]. The objectives are:
i) maintain all the tank levels at the same maximum value; and
ii) determine the fair costs for the players.
Figure 7.8 shows the evolution of the tank levels for three different cases (partitions
of 2 players, partitions of 3 players and the grand partition), where it is also shown the
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Figure 7.9: Evolution of the graph topologies given by partitions of two and three players
(i.e., g˜ = 2, and g˜ = 3), for five different iterations.
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Figure 7.10: Sensitivity analysis made based on scenarios with random initial conditions
with n = 13 tank levels. Mean evolution of the tank levels and their corresponding
standard deviation along the time for three different cases: (a) partitions of two players,
(b) partition of three players, and (c) partition of n players (full information).
gap that determines the settling time. Every τ , the topology of the system is determined.
In Figure 7.8, it can be also seen that the first objective is met for all the cases. The
second objective is achieved by determining the Shapley value as presented in Table 7.2.
Figure 7.9 shows some different topologies obtained based on the Shapley value (see
Algorithm 3) at five different time instants. In that figure, it can be seen how topologies
vary dynamically with partitions of two and three players.
Figure 7.10 shows a sensitivity analysis for the evolution of the tank levels for ns = 10
different scenarios. The only difference among these ten scenarios is the vector of initial
conditions, which are selected randomly within the interval [0, 2]. First, it is presented
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Table 7.2: Fair economical costs for each player determined with the Shapley value.
Player Fair costs according Shapley value
` ∈ V (Φ(`)KPIlinks)/(
∑n
r=1 Φ(r))
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total
Partitions 2 Players Partitions 3 Players
101.9982 162.7683
103.4772 164.7666
103.0618 175.4056
67.3064 161.5046
69.9416 294.2980
69.7096 146.2820
78.9709 215.1184
123.0623 167.3544
91.6612 290.9280
76.7914 146.8018
99.1411 154.4804
75.6172 170.1767
139.2561 150.1145
1200 2400
the mean of all the tank levels for the scenarios, i.e.,
%˜(h(wδ˜)) =
1
ns n
ns∑
s=1
n∑
i=1
hsi (wδ˜),
where w = 1, . . . , 2000, are the data used to make the sensitivity analysis, δ˜ = 0.1 s in
order to cover the whole simulation time (i.e., tf = 200 s), and h
s
i corresponds to the tank
i ∈ V in the sth simulation. Then, the standard deviation along the time is presented
to analyze the transitory event for each one of the three cases, partitions of two players,
three players, and the grand partition. The standard deviation is computed as follows:
σ˜(wδ˜) =
√√√√ 1
ns n
ns∑
s=1
n∑
i=1
(
hsi (wδ˜)− %˜(h(wδ˜))
)2
.
It can be seen in Figure 7.10 that the standard deviation is smaller as there is an
evolution of the tank levels. Besides, the standard deviations are reduced more quickly
when there are larger partitions. This fact is because when having bigger partitions,
there are more exchange of communication among different strategies in the population
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game achieving the closed-loop system equilibrium in a faster way. The graph sequence
presented in Figure 7.9 varies as the initial conditions are modified because the Shapley
value depends on them. However, the sensitivity analysis presented in Figure 7.10 shows
that the system achieves the equilibrium point for all the different initial conditions.
Finally, the comparison of the three cases with the proposed KPI is presented in
Table 7.3. In these results, it can be seen the proper performance of the proposed
methodology with respect to the centralized case with full information (partition of n
players). Economical costs are reduced significantly, but it implies an increment of the
transitory errors and settling time of the evolution of the system states (tank levels).
Table 7.3: Closed-loop system performance for different topologies. Coalitions of two
and three players, and with full information.
Players per Communication Error Settling time
partitions g˜ KPIlinks KPIerror KPIsettling
2 players 1200 197.1742 33.23
3 players 2400 58.1723 21.80
n players 15600 20.9294 19.73
7.4.2 Discussion
In general, game theory models the interaction between rational players. The two dif-
ferent main approaches, the cooperative- and the non-cooperative-game directions, solve
quite different problems. One approach addresses problems in which there is competition
whereas the other one is more appropriate to model cooperation. As it has been discussed
here, it is possible to face engineering applications by implementing both approaches in
different but related objectives.
The combination of game theoretical approaches (cooperative and non-cooperative)
implies that the elements within the system (storage, sink and source elements) take
different roles depending on the game theoretical perspective. For instance, in the pre-
sented flow-based distribution network of Section 7.1, storage nodes represent strategies
in the non-cooperative-game approach. In contrast, storage nodes assume the role of
players that demand information by using the communication network in the coopera-
tive game. This multi-role situation is quite interesting due to the fact that each role
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is tightly related to each particular control objective, i.e., the optimal resource distri-
bution for the non-cooperative game and both the fair distribution of costs and proper
partitioning for the cooperative game.
It has been shown that the closed-loop system with the non-cooperative approach
(i.e., with both the replicator and the projection dynamics) is stable, performing the par-
titioning criteria based on cooperative games. This is achieved based on the assumption
that all the partitions, for all the topologies, form individually a complete graph. Adi-
tionally, when selecting conveniently the characteristic function of the cooperative game,
it is possible to compute the Shapley value of the whole set of players from the Shapley
value of any arbitrary player by following a polynomial-time procedure. Moreover, it has
been shown that, by taking advantage of the coalition-rationality axiom, it is possible
to compute the Shapley value by solving a set of linear equations. This result allows to
reduce considerably the computational burden from an exponential-time procedure to a
polynomial one. Besides, due to the fact that the computation can be reduced, it is also
possible to spend time to compute the Shapley value under a distributed structure. For
example, the comparison of the computational burden in Figure 7.5 shows less compu-
tation cost for the distributed structure with respect to the traditional Shapley equation
and a case involving more than ten players.
7.5 Summary
A control problem involving two objectives associated to competition and cooperation
has been presented. In particular, a flow-based distribution network composed of differ-
ent sub-systems (storage nodes) has been considered. The first objective is associated
to an optimal distribution of the available resource, i.e., it is desired to achieve a maxi-
mum and equal amount of resource throughout all the sub-systems (storage nodes). To
this end, a communication network allows the interaction among different storage nodes,
whose communication links have an economical cost. As a second objective, it is desired
to distribute the costs of the communication network throughout the sub-systems. To
this end, more influent tanks (with higher power index) must pay less than those with
lower influence (with lower power index). In this regard, costs are assigned in a fair
way for each storage node according to their contributions to the achievement of the
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first objective. A non-cooperative-game approach is used to solve the former objective,
whereas a cooperative-game approach is proposed to solve the latter objective. Further-
more, for the non-cooperative-game approach, the stability of the closed-loop system is
analyzed to guarantee that the first objective is achieved. On the other hand, regarding
the cooperative-game approach that determines the fair distribution of communication
costs, an alternative way to compute the Shapley value for the selected specific char-
acteristic function has been presented in order to mitigate the computational burden.
The proposed approach also allows the computation of the Shapley value under dis-
tributed structures within shorter computational time in comparison with the standard
computation.
Moreover, bigger partitions imply more information exchange among the storage
nodes, and therefore the resource-distribution objective is achieved faster. Simula-
tion results have shown that having more communication links imply shorter settling
time.When having large partitions, the dynamic resource allocation is made faster due to
the fact that there is more available information in the non-cooperative-game approach.
Nevertheless, when having more players making partitions, more communication links
are required and this implies higher economical costs. Furthermore, a smaller overshoot
and settling time for the system states (tank levels) are obtained when partitions are
larger. Hence, there is a need for balancing economical cost and performance in relation
to the complexity of the system and the number of players involved in the cooperative
game to perform the partitioning. Finally, the sensitivity analysis for the evolution of
the system states with arbitrary initial conditions shows that, despite of the fact that
the partitioning highly depends on the initial conditions of the system, the equilibrium
of the closed-loop system is always achieved.
This chapter has used the concept of partitioning, which is obtained as a prod-
uct of the power index value, but it is not the main purpose of the game-theoretical
approach. Moreover, it is worth to highlight that the partitioning task and/or decom-
position of systems is crucial in the design of distributed controllers, and it should be
determined considering several aspects, e.g., dynamical coupling, coupled constraints,
and/or balance size among sub-system states. Therefore, next chapter is devoted to the
development of a methodology to perform partitioning of large-scale systems.
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Chapter 8
Partitioning for Large-scale
Systems: Sequential DMPC
Design
Chapter 7, where the Shapley value has been studied, has also discussed a partitioning as
a result of the power index. On the contrary, this chapter is devoted to the development
of a partitioning strategy. More precisely, the main contribution presented in this chapter
is a novel partitioning approach of a non-directed graph representing information sharing
inspired by the Kernighan-Lin algorithm [59], considering four different objectives, i.e.,
to minimize the number of links connecting partitions, to minimize the difference of the
size of partitions, to minimize the distance among elements composing each partition,
and to minimize the amount of relevant information that connects different partitions,
i.e., it is also considered how relevant the information that a link provides is. Further-
more, prioritization weights assign importance to each objective as desired. Most of the
partitioning methods consider a graph representation, i.e., algorithms consider graphs
associated to the dynamics of the system. Differently, this chapter proposes to generate
a graph that describes the information dependence among variables considered in the
control design. As an application to illustrate the advantages of the partitioning ap-
proach addressed by using an information representation instead of a dynamical-model
representation, a large-scale water supply system is considered, and an MPC controller
is designed. To this end, the information graph is computed in order to determine an
appropriate partitioning by using the proposed algorithm.
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8.1 Large-scale System Partitioning
Consider an undirected connected graph denoted by G = (S, E) representing the topol-
ogy of an information-sharing network, which is determined depending on the informa-
tion that a control strategy requires to compute the appropriate control inputs, where
S = {1, . . . , n} is the set of n ∈ Z>0 nodes representing variables considered within the
control strategy, and E ⊂ {(i, j) : i, j ∈ S} is the set of links of the graph represent-
ing possible information sharing among nodes. The set of neighbors of a node i ∈ S
is given by Ni = {j : (i, j) ∈ E}. The graph is undirected since it is assumed that
links represent bidirectional-information channels. In the information-sharing network,
it is defined a distance function among nodes from the set S whose mapping is given
by d˜ : S × S → R≥0. Let D ∈ Rn×n≥0 be the constant matrix representing distances,
i.e., d˜ij = d˜(i, j). Additionally, consider a function whose mapping is c : S × S → R≥0,
where c(i, j) determines how relevant the information shared between node j ∈ S and
node i ∈ S is. Therefore, let C ∈ Rn×n≥0 be the constant matrix representing all the
relevance factors, i.e., cij = c(i, j). On the other hand, let K = {1, . . . ,m} be the set of
indices for the m ∈ Z>0 partitions of the graph G. The partitioning at time instant k is
represented by the set Pk = {S`k : ` ∈ K}, i.e., each partition of G at time instant k is an
undirected connected graph of the form G`k = (S`k, E`k), for all ` ∈ K, where
⋂
`∈K S`k = ∅,
and
⋃
`∈K S`k = S, for all k. Given a partition Pk, consider the function g : S → K
that receives a node i ∈ S and returns the index ` ∈ K that allows to identify to which
partition the node i ∈ S belongs to, i.e., g(i) = {` ∈ K : i ∈ S`k}. Finally, let Vk ∈ Rn×n
be the time-varying matrix whose element vij,k = |Sg(i)k | − |Sg(j)k | if g(i) 6= g(j), and
nodes i, and j are neighbors, i.e., j ∈ Ni.
Remark 8.1. Notice that if Pk is an admissible partition, i.e.,
⋂
`∈K S`k = ∅, and⋃
`∈K S`k = S, then the set {` ∈ K : i ∈ S`k} is singleton, for all ` ∈ K, and
g(i) is a function, for all i ∈ S. ♦
8.1.1 Partitioning Problem Statement
The m−partitioning problem consists in finding the optimal set of partitions denoted by
P? such that the following objectives are minimized:
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Links1: minimize the amount of links connecting different partitions given by σ1, i.e.,
links (i, j) ∈ E such that (i, j) /∈ E`k, for all ` ∈ K,
σ1(Pk) =
1
2
∑
`∈K
∑
i∈S`k
∑
j∈S\S`k
aij .
Nodes2: minimize the difference between the amount of nodes in the partitions
∣∣∣S`k∣∣∣, for
all ` ∈ K, and the average of total nodes of the graph G given by nm , i.e., 1m
∑
`∈K
∣∣∣∣∣S`k∣∣− nm ∣∣∣.
Notice that this objective may be expressed as the minimization of a function σ2 de-
pending on the time-varying matrix Vk, i.e.,
σ2(Pk) =
∑
`∈K
∑
i∈S`k
∑
j∈S\S`k
vij,k.
Distance: minimize the distance among the nodes belonging to the same partition, i.e.,
1
2
∑
`∈K
∑
i∈S`k
∑
j∈S`k\{i} d˜ij . This objective may be expressed conveniently considering
the inverse distance of links that are connecting different partitions, i.e.,
σ3(Pk) =
1
2
∑
`∈K
∑
i∈S`k
∑
j∈S\S`k
d˜−1ij .
Relevance: minimize the information relevance of the links that are connecting different
partitions, i.e.,
σ4(Pk) =
∑
`∈K
∑
i∈S`k
∑
j∈S\S`k
cij .
The four aforementioned objectives are prioritized by setting the vector of weights
denoted by ϕ ∈ R4≥0. The optimal partitioning P? is obtained by solving the following
optimization problem:
minimize
P
4∑
j=1
ϕjσj(Pk), (8.1a)
subject to
⋂
`∈K
S`k = ∅, (8.1b)⋃
`∈K
S`k = S. (8.1c)
1
Presented as external balance in [106].
2
Presented as internal balance in [106].
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8.1.2 Distributed Partitioning Algorithm
In order to solve the optimization problem (8.1), consider the weighted graph G where
Wk ∈ Rn×n is a time-varying weighting matrix, i.e., G = (S, E ,Wk). The elements of
Wk are denoted by wij,k ∈ R≥0 representing a cost associated to the link (i, j) ∈ E , where
wij,k = ϕ1aij +ϕ2vij,k +ϕ3d
−1
ij +ϕ4cij . Then, it is proposed to solve the m−partitioning
problem (8.1) as follows:
minimize
P
∑
`∈K
∑
i∈S`k
∑
j∈S\S`k
wij,k, (8.2)
and subject to constraints (8.1b) and (8.1c). The set of nodes S`k of the subgraph G`k is
composed of a set of internal nodes denoted by Sˇ`k, and a set of external nodes denoted
by Sˆ`k, for all ` ∈ K. The internal nodes from the set Sˇ`k only have connection to nodes
that belong to the same partition. In contrast, the external nodes from the set Sˆ`k have
connection to at least one node that belongs to a different partition. Formally,
Sˇ`k = {i ∈ S`k : Ni ⊆ S`k}, ∀ ` ∈ K,
Sˆ`k = {i ∈ S`k : Ni 6⊆ S`k}, ∀ ` ∈ K,
S`k = Sˇ`k ∪ Sˆ`k, ∀ ` ∈ K.
Each external node i ∈ Sˆ`k, for all ` ∈ K, represents a decision maker that is able to
select a partition from the set
Qi,k = {g(j) : j ∈ Ni}\{g(i)}.
Moreover, each decision maker i ∈ {∪`∈KSˆ`k}, at time instant k, has associated an
internal cost denoted by hˇi, i.e.,
hˇi(Pk) =
∑
j∈Sg(i)k ∩Ni
wij,k, ∀ i ∈ Sˆ`k, and ` ∈ K,
and an external benefit denoted by hˆ`i , for each partition ` from the set Qi,k, i.e.,
hˆ`i(Pk) =
∑
j∈S`k∩Ni
wij,k, ∀ i ∈ Sˆ`k, and ` ∈ Qi,k.
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Then, the best external benefit for the decision maker i ∈ Sˆ`k, for all ` ∈ Qi,k, is obtained
as follows:
hˆi(Pk) = max
`∈Qi,k
hˆ`i(Pk).
Finally, as previously mentioned, the decision maker selects among the possible avail-
able partitions depending on a utility denoted by ηi, i.e., if the decision maker has
incentives to move from one partition to another one, then
ηi(Pk) = max
(
0, hˆi(Pk)− hˇi(Pk)
)
, ∀ i ∈ Sˆ`k, and ` ∈ K.
Further, consider an undirected graph G˜k = (S˜k, E˜k) at time instant k –not necessarily
connected– composed of all the decision makers –external nodes of G–. Then, the set of
nodes of G˜k is given by S˜k =
⋃
`∈K Sˆ`k, and the set of links is given by E˜k ⊂ {(i, j) : i ∈
Sˆ`k, j ∈ Sˆrk , ` 6= r}. Let A˜k ∈ {0, 1}|S˜k|×|S˜k| be the adjacency matrix of the graph. Since
G˜k is not necessarily a connected graph, it has q ∈ Z>0 components at time instant k,
where the set of components of the graph is Ck = {1, . . . , q}. Each component is a graph
denoted by G˜zk = (S˜zk , E˜zk ), with adjacency matrix A˜zk, is connected and not necessarily
complete, for all z ∈ Ck. Furthermore, only the decision maker with higher incentives(
winner decision maker in the component z ∈ Ck denoted by izk? ∈ Wzk ⊆ S˜zk
)
would
make a decision to switch from its current partition to another one among the set of
available partitions, i.e.,
izk
? ∈ arg max
i∈S˜zk
ηi(Pk) =Wzk , ∀ z ∈ Ck. (8.3)
Remark 8.2. The decision maker izk
?
, for all z ∈ Ck, can be computed as in (8.3) in
a distributed manner satisfying the information-sharing graph G˜zk , for all z ∈ Ck. This
procedure is made by using maximum consensus as in [109]. Therefore, the proposed
partitioning algorithm can be performed in a distributed manner. ♦
Notice that (8.3) should be solved at each time instant k ∈ Z≥0. The best option for
the decision maker izk
? ∈ S˜zk , for all z ∈ Ck, to select a new partition is
`zk
? ∈ argmax
`∈Q
i
z
k
?
,k
hˆ`izk
?(Pk). (8.4)
179
Chapter 8. Partitioning for Large-scale Systems: Sequential DMPC Design
Hence, the partitioning is modified only if ηi(Pk) > κ, where κ ∈ R>0 establishes a
ending-up condition. The updating is as follows:
Sg(i
z
k
?)
k+1 = S
g(izk
?)
k \{izk?}, ∀ z ∈ Ck, (8.5a)
S`
z
k
?
k+1 = S`
z
k
?
k ∪ {izk?}, ∀ z ∈ Ck. (8.5b)
Theorem 8.1. If the initial partitioning P0 = {S10 , . . . ,Sm0 } satisfies constraints (8.1b),
and (8.1c), then these constraints are satisfied by Pk = {S1k , . . . ,Smk } for all k ∈ Z≥0
under the partitioning updating performed in (8.5).
Proof. It is assumed that P0 is a partition set such that
⋂
`∈K S`0 = ∅, and
⋃
`∈K S`0 = S.
Therefore, Sg(i
z
0
?)
0 ∩ S`
z
0
?
0 = ∅ since g
(
iz0
?) 6= `z0? according to (8.4), and given that
g
(
iz0
?)
, `z0
? ∈ K, then{⋃
`∈K\{g(iz0?),`z0?} S
`
0
}
∪
{
Sg(i
z
0
?)
0 ∪ S`
z
0
?
0
}
= S. From (8.5), it is obtained that
Sg(i
z
k
?)
k+1 ∪ S`
z
k
?
k+1 =
{
Sg(i
z
k
?)
k \{izk?}
}
∪
{
{izk?} ∪ S`
z
k
?
k
}
,
= Sg(i
z
k
?)
k ∪ S`
z
k
?
k ,
for all z ∈ Ck. Finally, if S
g(izk
?)
k ∩ S`
z
k
?
k = ∅, for all z ∈ Ck, then
{
Sg(i
z
k
?)
k \B
}
∩{
S`
z
k
?
k ∪ B
}
= ∅, for any set B. Therefore, Sg(i
z
k
?)
k+1 ∩ S`
z
k
?
k+1 = ∅.
8.1.3 Partitioning in Flow-based Distribution Systems
According to the algorithm for the m-partitioning problem, it is necessary to provide
the number of partitions m, and the initial partition set P0, i.e., S`0, for all ` ∈ K.
This section is devoted to present the procedure to determine these two elements in the
context of flow-based distribution systems. Many engineering systems may be modeled as
a flow-based distribution system as presented in [56], e.g., water, energy or transportation
systems. Section 7.1 has presented a simplified flow-based network since it only considers
three elements. In general, flow-based distribution systems are composed of the following
elements:
1. Storage: element that stores a resource and with both inflows and outflows. The
set of storage elements is denoted by S¯st. Notice that the notation corresponding
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to storage elements in the simplified flow-based network in Section 7.1 is different
in order to distinguish the kind of network, i.e., simplified or general.
2. Actuator: element that manipulates the flow of the resource, having a unique
inflow and outflow. The set of actuator elements is denoted by S¯ac.
3. Joint: element without storage capabilities with an associated mass-balance con-
straint, and with both inflows and outflows. The set of joint elements is denoted
by S¯jo.
4. Sink: element that receives the resource from either a storage or joint element,
e.g., demands in the system. The set of sink elements is denoted by S¯si.
5. Source: element that provides the resource and with only outflows. The set of
source elements is denoted by S¯so.
6. Flow: directed link (i, j) allowing resource flow from an element i ∈ {S¯st ∪ S¯ac ∪
S¯so ∪ S¯jo} (storage, actuator, source, or joint elements) to an element j ∈ {S¯st ∪
S¯ac∪S¯si∪S¯jo} (storage, sink, or joint elements). The set of flow elements is denoted
by E¯ .
Let G¯ = (S¯, E¯) be a directed graph representing a given flow-based distribution
system describing the possible direction of the flows, where S¯ = {S¯st∪S¯ac∪S¯si∪S¯so∪S¯jo}
is the set of r ∈ Z>0 system elements, i.e., storage, actuator, sink, source, and joint
elements. On the other hand, E¯ ⊂ {(i, j) : i, j ∈ S¯} is the set of flows from the element
i ∈ S¯ to element j ∈ S¯.
Remark 8.3. Each physical element in the system has an equivalent node in the graph
G¯. In addition, there is a direct relationship between the nodes S¯ in the flow graph G¯,
and the nodes S in the information-sharing graph G. ♦
The introduced elements for a flow-based distribution system, and the representa-
tion of the system by a directed graph, allow to identify some features of the system
throughout indices and elements presented next.
Definition 8.1. (Network resource-feeding index) A non-source element i ∈ S¯\S¯so in
the flow-based distribution system has a resource-feeding index denoted by τi ≤ |S¯so|,
which gives information about the amount of source elements that may provide resource
to the ith element, i.e., there are τi source elements that can feed the element i ∈ S¯\S¯so.
♦
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Definition 8.2. (Anchor elements) A non-source element i ∈ S¯\S¯so is anchor if there
is only one source able to feed it, i.e., the resource-feeding index of an anchor element
is unitary. Let A˜ ⊆ S¯ be the set of anchor elements within the flow-based network, i.e.,
A˜ = {i ∈ S¯\S¯so : τi = 1}. ♦
Definition 8.3. (Maximum resource-feeding index of the network) The maximum resource-
feeding index of the network is denoted by τ? and it corresponds to τ? = maxi∈S¯ τi. This
index provides information about the non-source element in the system with more avail-
able source elements given by i?τ ∈ arg maxi∈S¯ τi. ♦
Definition 8.4. (Maximum resource-feeding index per partition) Given a partition of
the flow-based distribution system into m sub-systems, the maximum resource-feeding
index per partition is denoted by τ ` = max
i∈S¯` τi, for all ` ∈ K. Notice that source
elements that do not belong to the current partition are also taken into account. Finally,
the non-source element with more available source elements is given by i`?τ ∈ maxi∈S¯` τi,
for all ` ∈ K. ♦
Definition 8.5. (Resource-feeding co-relation index) The availability of resource at each
partition ` ∈ K is assessed with respect to the maximum resource index of the network
given by the resource-feeding co-relation index denoted by ε` ∈ [0, 1]. Formally, the
resource-feeding co-relation index is ε` = τ `
(
τ?
)−1
, for all ` ∈ K. Notice that if ε` = 1
for a partition ` ∈ K, then the non-source element in the network with more available
source elements belongs to the partition `. ♦
Definition 8.6. (Available source elements for non-source elements) The available source
elements that can provide resource to a non-source element is given by the set Ri and
with |Ri| = τi for all i ∈ S¯\S¯so. ♦
The number of partitions is determined by setting a desired minimum resource-feeding
co-relation index (see Definition 8.5), i.e., partitions should satisfy that min`∈K ε
` ≥ ε?.
In addition, further criteria to define the number of partitions may be included such
that it is not desired that the elements i`?τ , for all ` ∈ K, were not neighbors. Once the
aforementioned elements i`?τ , for all ` ∈ K are identified in the graph G¯, then those can
be associated to the corresponding variables in the information-sharing graph G and the
initial partition P0 can be determined by adding each node from the set S\{i1?τ , . . . , im?τ }
to the partition associated to the nearest connected node from the set {i1?τ , . . . , im?τ } (see
Definition 8.3).
Figure 8.1 shows the summary of the partitioning procedure for a flow-based distri-
bution system. First, a directed graph, denoted by G¯, is determined based on the flows
throughout the system, which is used to determined the anchor elements, and the num-
ber of appropriate partitions that depend on the design parameter known as resource-
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G¯
A˜, τi, τ?
ε?
G
m,P0
P? P
?
G ϕ
Flow-based distribution system
Flow directed graph Control strategy
Information graph
Anchor elements
resource-feeding indices
Resource-feeding
co-relation index
Number of partitions
Initial partition
Distributed-partitioning
algorithm
Physical partitioning
Communication-graph
partitioning
Prioritization
Figure 8.1: Summary of the distributed partitioning procedure for flow-based distribu-
tion systems and for control purposes.
feeding co-relation index (see Definition 8.5). On the other hand, an information-sharing
graph, denoted by G, describing how information dependence among the elements of the
flow-based distribution system is determined according to a control strategy. An ini-
tial partition P0 is computed by using the number of partitions and the correspondence
between elements in the directed graph and the information-sharing graph, i.e., each
variable considered in the controller corresponds to a physical element in the directed
graph. Therefore, it follows to perform the distributed partitioning algorithm by setting
a prioritization for the four objectives presented in Section 8.1.1. Finally, an optimal
partitioning P? is obtained based on the information-sharing graph, and it can be in-
terpreted into the physical system since there is a correspondence between each variable
and an element in the flow-based distribution system.
8.2 Case Study: Partitioning of the BWSN
8.2.1 Management Criteria
The same management criteria considered in Section 3.3.4 are taken into account in
this chapter, i.e., the first objective is the minimization of economical costs, which are
associated to the costs of the supplied water given by α>1 uk, and the costs of the energy
required to operate the system actuators (valves and pumps) given by α>2,kuk, where
the vector α2 ∈ Rnu varies along the time. The second objective is to operate the
system smoothly to avoid possible damage, i.e., minimize ‖∆uk‖2, guaranteeing that
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the variations over the control inputs are smooth. Finally, it is desired that the volumes
for all the tanks are higher than some predetermined constant volumes denoted by
xs ∈ Rnx , i.e., constraint xk ≥ xs− ςk should be satisfied where ςk ∈ Rnx≥0 is an auxiliary
variable. The third objective is to minimize
∥∥ςk+j∥∥2. These three different objectives
are prioritized with weights γ1, γ2, and γ3 where γ1 > γ3 > γ2.
8.2.2 Optimization Problem for the Predictive Controller
Once the system management criteria have been established with the three objectives,
it can be set the optimization problem behind the MPC controller design as follows:
minimize
uk|k,...,uk+Hp|k,ςk|k,...,ςk+Hp|k
J(u, ς) =
Hp−1∑
j=0
(
γ1
∣∣∣(α1 +α2,k+j)> uk+j∣∣∣+ γ2 ∥∥∆uk+j∥∥2+
+γ3
∥∥ςk+j∥∥2) , (8.6a)
subject to xk+i+1|k = Adxk+i|k + Bduk+i|k + Bldk+i|k, (8.6b)
0 = Euuk+i|k + Eldk+i|k, (8.6c)
uk+i|k ∈ U , (8.6d)
xk+i|k ∈ X , (8.6e)
xk+i|k ≥ xs − ςk+i|k, (8.6f)
ςk+i|k ≥ 0, (8.6g)
where (8.6b)-(8.6d) for all i ∈ [0, Hp−1]∩Z≥0, and (8.6e)-(8.6g) for all i ∈ [0, Hp]∩Z≥0.
Feasible sets X , and U are defined as in Section 6.2, i.e., X , {x ∈ Rnx : x ≤ x ≤ x¯},
and U , {u ∈ Rnu : u ≤ u ≤ u¯}.
8.2.3 Computing the Information-sharing Graph
The optimization problem in (8.6) may be written as a quadratic programing problem
of the form [77]
minimize
ξk
1
2
ξ>k Hξk + h
>ξk, (8.7a)
subject to Gξk = g, (8.7b)
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where ξk = [ω
>
k . . . ω
>
k+Hp−1]
>, each element of ξk is ωk = [u
>
k ς
>
k s
>
k ]
>, and let
sk be the vector of slack variables for all the inequality constraints to make them equality
constraints. Furthermore, the Lagrangian function corresponding to (8.7) is [31]
L(ξk,λ) =
1
2
ξ>k Hξk + h
>ξk + λ
> (Gξk − g) .
Therefore, the KKT conditions are obtained from ∇ξkL(ξ
?
k,λ
?) = 0, and ∇λL(ξ?k,λ?) =
0 giving by the following equality:[
H G>
G 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ
[
ξ?k
λ?
]
=
[ −h
g
]
. (8.8)
Notice that the matrix Ψ represents the information dependence among variables ξk
and λ in order to solve in (8.8) and thus solve the optimization problem (8.6). In this
regard, if there is a node per each variable in (8.8), then the adjacency matrix A of the
graph G is given by aij = 1 if ψij 6= 0, and aij = 0, otherwise, defining the topology of
the information-sharing graph.
Remark 8.4. The information dependence among variables, which generates the infor-
mation-sharing graph G, can be computed considering any control strategy and for any
system. In this regard, the proposed partitioning method is general. ♦
8.2.4 Anchor Elements
In order to find the anchor elements in the BWSN, the directed graph G¯ = (S¯, E¯) is
obtained by replacing each element of the network (i.e., sources, actuators, tanks, sinks,
and mass-balance joints) for nodes of the graph denoted by S¯ and replacing each flow
for a graph edge denoted by E¯ . The network resource-feeding indices are shown in
Table 8.1 (see Definition 8.1). Therefore the anchor-storage elements from the i ∈ A˜
are x1, x2, x5, and x8 (see Definition 8.2). Moreover, these storage elements and their
respective source elements must belong to the same partition, e.g., the tank x1, and the
source s2 should belong to the same partition. Finally, the maximum resource-feeding
index of the network is given by τ? = 7.
The appropriate number of partitions is determined based on the resource-feeding
co-relation index, and further conditions may be added to this criterion. As an example,
suppose that it is desired to have a resource-feeding co-relation index given by ε? = 0.25
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Figure 8.2: Information-sharing graph of the BWSN. The optimal partitioning is also
presented (partitions 1−4 with colors green, blue, magenta, and red, respectively). Links
within the same partition with black color and links connecting different partitions with
red color.
(i.e., it is desired that the partition with less-available source elements has at least
25% of the maximum resource elements that can provide resource in the system τ?).
Additionally, it is desired that the storage elements corresponding to the maximum
resource-feeding index per partition i`?τ , for all ` ∈ K, do not have the same source
elements Ri. Therefore, x3, x4, x12, and x17 should belong to the same partition since
they have a common set of available sources (first partition with resource-feeding co-
relation index ε1 = 1). The same situation happens with x7, x9, x10, x11, and x13 (second
partition with relation resource-feeding index ε2 = 0.7142); x14, x15, and x16 (third
partition with resource-feeding co-relation index ε3 = 0.2857); and x6 (fourth partition
with resource-feeding co-relation index ε4 = 0.2857).
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Table 8.1: Resource-feeding network indices for the storage elements in the BDWN.
Storage element i ∈ S¯st Resource-feeding indices τi Source element Ri
x1 1 s2
x2 1 s1
x5, x8 1 s6
x6 2 s1, s6
x14, . . . , x16 2 s7, s8
x7, x9, . . . , x11, x13 5 s1, s3, s6, . . . , s8
x3, x4, x12, x17 7 s1, s3, s4, . . . , s8
2
Figure 8.3: Aggregate model of the BSWN. The optimal physical partitioning is also
presented (sub-systems 1− 4 with colors green, blue, magenta, and red, respectively).
8.3 DMPC Applying Large-scale System Partitioning
Once the appropriate number of partitions is determined by using a desired resource-
feeding co-relation index ε?, then the partitioning algorithm is run. In this chapter, it
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Figure 8.4: Hierarchical and information dependence among the m sub-systems.
is proposed to use the information-sharing graph G computed in Section 8.2.3, which
is shown in Figure 8.2. The initial partition P0 considered within the algorithm is de-
termined by using the nodes associated to the elements corresponding to the maximum
partition resource-feeding indices i`?τ , for all ` ∈ K. Therefore, the rest of nodes are
incorporated to the closest partition with which there is connection. The partitioning
algorithm is performed with weights ϕ = [0.5 0.2 0.2 1]>, and with the parameter
κ = 0 for the algorithm ending-up condition. The optimal partitioning P? is the one
presented in Figure 8.2. It is important to highlight that the total number of commu-
nication links in order to compute the optimal control input according to problem (8.8)
is (1>A1)/2 = 361. Furthermore, the optimal partition P? has 13 links among parti-
tions that is the 3.6% of the total number of communication links, representing reduced
communication dependence among different partitions, which is desired for the design
of non-centralized controllers.
With the optimal partition P? presented in Figure 8.2, the information-sharing graph
is interpreted/translated into the physical system, obtaining the physical partitioning
into m sub-systems presented in Figure 8.3 (the indices of the m sub-systems are given
by the set K). With the m-partitioning, an LMPC controller is designed for each sub-
system, identifying the information dependence among them as in [106]. This procedure
results in the sub-system dependence presented in Figure 8.4 (partitions from 1 to m
correspond to colors green, blue, magenta, and red, respectively), where the terms µr` are
the information provided by sub-system r ∈ K to sub-system ` ∈ K. It can be seen that
the optimization problem behind the LMPC controller associated to the Sub-system 1
may be solved since it does not require information from other sub-systems. After that,
Sub-system 1 provides information µ12, and µ13 to Sub-system 2 and 3, respectively.
Therefore, the optimization problem behind the LMPC associated to the Sub-system 2
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Table 8.2: Costs comparison between the CMPC and DMPC controllers.
CMPC DMPC
Day Energy Water Slew Rate Energy Water Slew Rate
KPIE(day) KPIW (day) KPI∆u(day) KPIE(day) KPIW (day) KPI∆u(day)
1 9.8133 5.8964 0.23766 10.499 2.6238 0.35532
2 8.5959 5.8829 0.018947 10.266 2.4903 0.010012
3 8.5959 5.8829 0.018947 10.267 2.489 0.010074
4 8.5959 5.8829 0.018947 10.267 2.4886 0.010066
Total 52.793 35.311 0.33239 61.833 15.069 0.4056
is solved, providing information µ23, and µ24 to Sub-systems 3 and 4, respectively. The
mentioned information shared among sub-systems is structured as follows:
µ12 = [u˜
?>
15,k u˜
?>
18,k u˜
?>
32,k u˜
?>
34,k u˜
?>
40,k u˜
?>
47,k]
>,
µ13 = [u˜
?>
56,k u˜
?>
60,k]
>,
µ23 = [u˜
?>
46,k u˜
?>
49,k]
>,
µ24 = u˜
?
6,k,
where u˜?i,k = [u
?
i,k . . . u
?
i,k+Hp−1]
> ∈ RHp . Different from the work presented in [106],
there are not cycles in the hierarchical structure describing information dependence
among sub-systems, therefore, it is not required to solve a CSP.
In order to evaluate the performance of the DMPC controller, a comparison with
the performance of a CMPC is made. Both approaches are designed with the same
prioritization weights, i.e., γ1 = 1, γ2 = 0.001, and γ3 = 0.1, and simulations are made
for four days. Table 8.2 shows the costs for each day denoted by y. The operational
costs of energy
KPIE(day) =
24day∑
k=24day−24
α>1 uk,
the operational costs of water
KPIW (day) =
24day∑
k=24day−24
α>2,kuk,
and costs associated to the smooth operation (slew rate)
KPI∆u(day) =
24day∑
k=24day−24
‖∆uk‖2.
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Figure 8.5: Evolution of five system states, and five control inputs for both the CMPC
and DMPC controllers. (a)-(e) shows the evolution of x4, x7, x12, x14, and x17, respec-
tively. (f)-(j) shows the evolution of u11, u13, u18, u23, and u54, respectively.
It can be seen that, the system operation with the distributed control approach im-
plies higher energy costs and also more variations over the control signals in comparison
to the centralized-control scheme. In contrast, the costs associated to the water are lower
with the distributed approach.
Figure 8.5 shows the evolution of five system states and five control inputs for both
the CMPC, and DMPC controllers. It can be seen that the periodicity of the signals
for both cases is the same. In general, the performance corresponding to the DMPC
controller exhibits higher variations over the evolution of the system states. In partic-
ular, Figures 8.5(a), and 8.5(c) show higher amplitudes in the oscillation of the system
states x4, and x12, respectively. Moreover, the same occurs with the control inputs, e.g.,
Figure 8.5(i) shows a higher amplitude for the control input u23. However, the compu-
tational tasks of the CMPC controller are divided and assigned to four different LMPC
controllers, and the distributed controller continues achieving the control objectives and
satisfying all the constraints.
8.4 Summary
A multi-objective partitioning procedure considering several aspects such as amount of
links connecting different partitions, size of partitions, distance among elements, and
importance of links has been presented in order to determine the appropriate parti-
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tioning in a large-scale flow-based system. As one of the most relevant features, the
proposed partitioning is a general methodology since it can be implemented for any dy-
namical system, including flow-based network systems, and any control strategy since
an information sharing graph is considered.
Motivated by the fact that some nominal conditions might vary along the time for
a dynamical system, e.g., disturbances affecting the system under control, next chapter
in this thesis extends the partitioning procedure to the dynamical case. Thus, the
large-scale system can be divided conveniently and permanently in order to enhance the
performance of closed-loop systems operated by DMPC controllers.
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Chapter 9
Distributed System Partitioning
and DMPC
This chapter addresses the design of a DMPC based on both DDPG and a distributed
dynamical system partitioning. To this end, the contributions presented in Chapters 6
and 8 are combined to design a distributed optimization-based controller also consid-
ering a dynamical system partitioned. Depending on the current system states, some
constraints are neglected in order to reduce the number of decision variables of the opti-
mization problem behind the MPC controller design. Thus, the size of the information-
sharing network is also reduced. The partitioning algorithm is performed to determine
the appropriate set of sub-systems in function of the information-sharing network. Fi-
nally, the DDPG approach computes all the optimal control inputs at each time instant.
Notice that, due to the fact that the information-sharing network varies along the time,
then the obtained optimal system partitioning is also different.
First, the general QP problem presented in Chapter 6 is recalled, where a DMPC
without system partitioning is presented. Then, the partitioning presented in Chapter
8, where a sequential DMPC controller has been designed, is used in this chapter as an
off-line system partitioning for the design of a parallel DMPC design based on population
games. The consideration that the links connecting different partitions are not available
for all the time is taken into account. Once this static system partitioning is presented
for the control design, then the partitioning is applied in a dynamical manner preserving
the same population-games strategy.
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9.1 Control Problem Statement
Consider the same MPC controller design presented in Chapter 6, and with an optimiza-
tion problem as in (6.17), i.e.,
minimize
Uk
U>k Φ Uk + φ
>
k Uk, (9.1)
subject to
E Uk ≤ ek, (9.2)
G Uk = gk. (9.3)
The cost function is re-written, and the constraints can be compacted by adding
slack variables, i.e.,
minimize
ξ
[
U>k s
>]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξk
>
[
Φ 0nu×q
0q×nu 0q×q
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ
[
Uk
s
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξk
+
[
φ>k 0
>
q
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ
>
k
[
Uk
s
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξk
, (9.4)
subject to [
E Iq
G 0r×q
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
[
Uk
s
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξk
=
[
ek
gk
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
hk
. (9.5)
Therefore, the optimization problem behind the MPC controller is formulated in the
form (6.11), and it can be solved in a distributed manner by using the D3RD in (6.2),
the D3SD in (6.4), or the D3PD in (6.6), as explained in Section 6.1.
9.2 System Partitioning for DDPG-based DMPC Control
design
This section presents how to apply a static off-line system partitioning for the design
of a DMPC controller based on DDPG. The first step in order to apply the proposed
distributed system partitioning algorithm is to determine the information-sharing graph.
The adjacency matrix that determines the graph G is given by the required information-
sharing matrix, i.e., A = Θ˜. Recalling the optimization problem behind the MPC
controller in (9.4), the corresponding Lagrangian function is as follows:
L(ξk,λk) = ξ
>
k Ψξk +ψkξk + λ
> (Hξk − hk) . (9.6)
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Figure 9.1: Summary of the DMPC controller with distributed DDPG and static system
partitioning.
Therefore, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are obtained from ∇ξkL(ξ
?
k,λ
?
k) = 0,
and ∇λkL(ξ
?
k,λ
?
k) = 0. When the information-sharing graph G with adjacency matrix A
is available, i.e., when there is not partitioning of the system, then the fitness functions
are given by the following expression corresponding to (6.14):
f(p) =
[
2Ψ H>
−H 0(q+r)×(q+r)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω
[
ξ?k
λ?k
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
?
+
[
ψk
hk
]
.
Moreover, when the system is partitioned, there are two classifications for the informa-
tion-sharing links. Notice that when the partitioning is performed, then there are
information-sharing links within the same partition and links connecting different par-
titions. According to the partitioning approach presented in Section 8.1.2, an optimal
partition P? has an associated graph (not necessarily connected) denoted by G˜. The
graph G˜ represents the graph whose links E˜ correspond to the links connecting different
partitions and with adjacency matrix A˜.
9.2.1 DMPC Controller with DDPG and Static System Partitioning
The optimization problem behind the DMPC controller is solved by capturing infor-
mation from other partitions throughout the information-sharing links E˜ . Afterwards,
these links E˜ are disconnected, and the DDPG evolve independently at each partition
satisfying the information-sharing graph now imposed with an adjacency matrix Aˆ as
presented in (9.7). Therefore, the amount of required information-sharing links along
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the time is reduced since the links E˜ are not needed for all the time. Hence, the fitness
functions are computed as follows:
f(p) =
[ (
A− A˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aˆ
◦Ω
] [ ξk
λk
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
+
[
A˜ ◦Ω
] [ ξ?k−1
λ?k−1
]
+
[
ψk
hk
]
. (9.7)
Remark 9.1. Notice that the fitness functions in (9.7) do not share information among
different partitions since the DDPG evolve satisfying an information-sharing graph whose
adjacency matrix is Aˆ = A− A˜. ♦
Once the equilibrium point p? for the DDPG is obtained, the procedure can be
repeated in order to find a better solution for the optimization problem, i.e., the val-
ues corresponding to the information provided throughout the links E˜ are updated. In
this regard, information from other partitions can be updated to improve the solution,
and in fact, the same solution that is gotten without performing any partitioning can
be obtained. To this end, the update of information from other partitions can be re-
peated until [ξ?>k λ
?>
k ]
> = [ξ?>k−1 λ
?>
k−1]
>. Moreover, in order to avoid infeasibility
in the DMPC controller based on DDPG with a system partitioning, more importance
is assigned to those links associated to the equality constraints, throughout the rele-
vance matrix C as presented in the partitioning algorithm (see Section 8.1.2). Thus, the
optimal partitioning P? integrates those links (critical for feasibility) within partitions
avoiding that they belong to E˜ .
Figure 9.1 presents the summary scheme of the DMPC controller with DDPG and
with static system partitioning. The Lagrangian function allows to compute the informa-
tion-sharing graph G, and provides information about Ω, and [ψ>k h>k ]>. On the other
hand, an off-line partitioning procedure is performed, providing the constant adjacency
matrix of the graph G˜, i.e., A˜. With data from both the Lagrangian function and the
off-line partitioning, the fitness functions are computed as in (9.7). Thus, the DMPC
controller based on DDPG computes the optimal control input that is applied to the
system.
9.2.2 DMPC Controller with DDPG and Dynamical System Partition-
ing
The system partitioning approach presented in Section 8.1 considers several aspects. One
of the objectives dictates that all the partitions should have similar size, which results
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Figure 9.2: Summary of the DMPC controller with distributed DDPG and dynamical
system partitioning.
in having DMPC controllers with similar number of decision variables and constraints.
Therefore, this aspect implies to have similar computational burden for all the distributed
controllers. Moreover, as discussed in Section 9.2.1, the relevance matrix C can be
selected appropriately by assigning higher weights to those links involved in equality
constraints in order to avoid infisibility for the optimization problem. On the other
hand, Section 6.2 addresses the case in which the set of considered constraints varies
depending on the current state of the system, reducing conveniently the number of
required information-sharing links in order to compute the optimal control input at each
time instant.
Consider that the information-sharing graph G varies over time as it has been pre-
sented in Section 6.2, i.e., that the adjacency matrix A varies along the time. Then, due
to the fact that the information-sharing graph varies, it is necessary to determine the
appropriate partitioning of the system in a dynamical manner such that the partitioning
criteria hold. Besides, the set of links E˜ also varies along the time, which are links that
are not required for all the time but only to update the fitness functions, i.e.,
f(p) =
[ (
Ak − A˜k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aˆk
◦Ω
] [ ξk
λk
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
+
[
A˜k ◦Ω
] [ ξ?k−1
λ?k−1
]
+
[
ψk
hk
]
. (9.8)
Remark 9.2. Notice that the fitness functions in (9.8) do not share information among
different partitions since the DDPG evolve satisfying an information-sharing graph whose
adjacency matrix is Aˆk = Ak − A˜k. ♦
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The application of a dynamical system partitioning for the design of distributed
controllers has several advantages, e.g., the computational burden is distributed for
all the non-centralized controllers for all the sub-systems. When considering that the
information-sharing graph varies along the time getting rid of non-active constraints,
then the computational burden associated to the optimization problem is reduced. The
same partitioning objectives are still considered although the information-sharing graph
varies along the time, and the appropriate set of not required links E˜ is found after
performing the system partitioning. Finally, suppose that there is any inconvenient
or fault at any partition. For the conventional CMPC approach, the whole system is
affected. In contrast, when adopting a non-centralized MPC controller approach using
applying a system partitioning, any inconvenient at a partition is decoupled from other.
Figure 9.2 shows the summary of the DMPC with DDPG and with dynamical sys-
tem partitioning. The current state of the system determines the non-safe regions for
the constraints as in Section 6.2, defining the adjacency matrix Ak associated to the
information-sharing graph. Therefore, the system partitioning is performed with the
adjacency matrix A, finding the appropriate matrix A˜ describing all the links connect-
ing different partitions. It follows that the fitness functions can be defined by using the
Lagrangian function and matrices A, and A˜, and the DMPC controller with DDPG com-
putes the optimal control input u?k. Afterwards, the new system state is measured and
the aforementioned procedure is repeated, i.e., it is found the new information-sharing
graph with matrix A, the new partitioning with associated matrix A˜ is computed, new
fitness functions f(p) are established, and a new optimal control input is computed at
each time instant in a distributed manner.
9.3 Case study: Barcelona Water Supply Network
Consider the same case study presented in Section 3.3.3, i.e., the BWSN presented in
Figure 3.4. It is proposed the design of three DMPC controllers based on DDPG for three
different scenarios. Then, the DMPC is compared with a CMPC that uses a constant
information-sharing graph without partitioning. The different scenarios are described as
follows:
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• Scenario 1: DMPC controller based on DDPG with constant information-sharing
network and static system partitioning for the BWSN.
• Scenario 2: DMPC controller based on DDPG with time-varying information-
sharing network and dynamical system partitioning for the BWSN.
• Scenario 3: CMPC controller based on DDPG with constant information-sharing
network for the BWSN.
In order to evaluate the performance of the three scenarios, two different KPIs are
proposed as in Chapter 6, i.e., the same economical costs KPIcosts(day) presented in
(6.22) and communication costs KPIcosts(day) presented in (6.23), where Mk = A− A˜
for Scenario 1 (constant), and Mk = Ak − A˜k for Scenario 2, and Mk = A for Scenario
3 (constant).
Regarding the Scenario 1, the same parameters for the partitioning algorithm of
the Chapter 8 are used for this scenario, i.e., the information-sharing network and the
system partitioning presented in Figure 8.2 are used for the DMPC controller based in
DDPG. Figure 9.3 shows the evolution of some states achieving the imposed reference
and control inputs for the DMPC controller with DDPG and the static system parti-
tioning presented in Figure 8.2(a). Moreover, Figure 9.4 presents the evolution of the
corresponding variables with the CMPC controller without system partitioning. It can
be seen that the behavior is the same for the evolution of states since the differences
between the control inputs is quite subtle. Finally, Figure 9.5 shows the constant number
of connected links in the information-sharing network along the time.
On the other hand, the simulation parameters are selected as in Scenario 1, i.e., the
reference has been selected to be xr = 0.6x¯, and the weights in the cost function in
(8.6a) are selected to be Q˜ = Inx , R˜ = 1000Inu , and γ = 1. The partitioning algorithm
is performed with weights ϕ = [1 0.26 0.1 0.5]>, and with the parameter κ = 0 for
the algorithm end-up condition.
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Figure 9.3: Evolution of eight system states. Figures (a)-(h) correspond to states
x2, x7, x9, x10, x14, x15, x16, and x17 for all the considered scenarios in this chapter.
Figure 9.4: Evolution of eight control inputs. Figures (a)-(h) correspond to states
u1, u16, u37, u40, u50, u56, u58, and u61 for all the considered scenarios in this chapter.
Figure 9.5: Evolution of the connected links for the three scenarios.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 9.6: Partitions for different time instants for the BWSN. Figures (a) and (b)
correspond to optimal system partitioning for the information-sharing graph, Figures
(c) and (d) correspond to the graph of links connecting partitions, and Figures (e) and
(f) correspond to the respective physical partitioning. Moreover, Figures (a), (c) and
(e) correspond to time instant k = 15, and Figures (b), (d) and (f) correspond to time
instants k ∈ {40− 42, 44− 47, 64− 66, 68− 71, 88− 90, 92− 95, 112− 114, 116− 119}.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 9.7: Partitions for different time instants for the BWSN. Figures (a) and (b)
correspond to optimal system partitioning for the information-sharing graph, Figures
(c) and (d) correspond to the graph of links connecting partitions, and Figures (e) and
(f) correspond to the respective physical partitioning. Moreover, Figures (a), (c) and (e)
correspond to time instants k ∈ {43, 67, 91, 115}, and Figures (b), (d) and (f) correspond
to time instants k ∈ {55− 47, 79− 81, 103− 105}.
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Figures 9.6, and 9.7 present the time-varying information-sharing graphs, the corre-
sponding optimal system partitioning highlighting the links connecting different parti-
tions, and the corresponding physical partitioning for the BWSN1. Figure 9.6(a) corre-
sponds to a unique time instant, i.e., k = 15, whereas Figure 9.6(b) corresponds to 28
time instants, being the most frequent partitioning. Moreover, Figure 9.7(a) corresponds
to four time instants, i.e., k ∈ {43, 67, 91, 115}, and Figure 9.7(b) corresponds to nine
time instants, i.e., k ∈ {55, . . . , 47, 79, . . . , 81, 103, . . . , 105}.
Looking at Figures 9.3 and 9.4 again, Figure 9.3 shows the evolution of some states
and Figure 9.4 shows the evolution of some control inputs for the DMPC controller
with DDPG and the dynamical system partitioning in comparison to the evolution of
the respective variables for the same controller without system partitioning. It can be
seen that the system states achieve the reference. Making a comparison with respect
to the performance observed for the case with static system partitioning (see Scenario
2), the dynamical system partitioning produces more variations around the reference
(even more than the ones generated by the permanent disturbances in the system).
This behavior occurs due to the fact that several links are not permanently used in the
computation of the optimal control input at each time instant, i.e., links denoted by E˜ .
Therefore, there is a compromise between the subtle variations to achieve the reference
and the amount of permanent information-sharing links the controller uses. In this
regard, when contemplating economical costs associated to the information-sharing links,
it is convenient to implement control strategies with dynamical system partitioning.
Finally, Figure 9.5 shows the evolution of the information-sharing graph along the time,
achieving a periodic behavior from the third day. It can be seen that the periodicity in
the number of connected links is related to the periodicity of the demands (disturbances)
presented in Figure 6.9.
9.4 Discussion and Summary
Table 9.1 shows the KPIs corresponding to the costs associated to each actuator, and
to the required communication links. It can be seen that the lowest economical costs
1
The physical partitioning can be obtained since there is a relationship between each node in the
physical system and each node in the information-sharing network as it has been presented in Remark
8.3 at Section 8.1.3.
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Table 9.1: Summary of KPIs corresponding to operation of actuators and communication
links.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Day KPIcosts (e.u.) KPIlinks (e.u.) KPIcosts (e.u.) KPIlinks (e.u.) KPIcosts (e.u.) KPIlinks (e.u.)
1 22.6773 14723 24.2953 10797 24.2456 14736
2 19.6910 14723 22.2863 9666 21.6782 14736
3 18.2795 14723 22.9248 9671 21.4634 14736
4 17.8871 14723 22.5787 9565 21.3294 14736
5 18.4463 14723 22.9660 9667 21.2401 14736
Total 96.9812 73615 115.0512 49366 109.9567 73680
Overall∗ 73711.98 49481.05 73789.65
∗
The overall cost is computed by adding the total costs for both KPIs, i.e., the total values for KPIEcosts + KPICcost.
KPIcosts = 96.9812 are obtained with the Scenario 1 corresponding to fixed constraints,
i.e., with constant information-sharing network and constant static system partitioning.
However, notice that the Scenario 1 also corresponds to the highest costs associated to
the communication links KPIlinks = 73680. In contrast, Scenario 2 is the one with lowest
communication costs, i.e., KPIlinks = 49366. Moreover, the Scenario 1 has lower econom-
ical costs KPIcosts = 109.9567 in comparison to KPIcosts = 115.0512 of the Scenario 2.
In conclusion, notice that Scenario 2 is the best control strategy considering the overall
performance shown in Table 9.1 if equal relevance is assigned to both KPIs or if more
relevance is assigned to the communication links.
A general methodology to generate distributed density-dependent population dy-
namics has been presented by considering a reproduction rate in the distributed mean
dynamics. Furthermore, it has been shown the relationship between the equilibrium
point of DDPG with the optimal point in a constrained optimization problem by se-
lecting the description of benefits throughout the strategies using the Lagrangian of a
potential function. In addition, the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium point un-
der the D3RD, the D3SD, and the D3PD, has been formally proven for constant and
time-varying population-interaction structures. Then, after introducing this class of dy-
namics and their properties, they have been applied to the design of a DMPC controller
under a time-varying information-sharing network. On the other hand, a multi-objective
partitioning procedure considering several aspects such as amount of links connecting
different partitions, size of partitions, distance among elements, and importance of links
has been presented in order to determine the appropriate partitioning in a large-scale
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system. As one of the most relevant features of the proposed partitioning is that it can be
performed in a distributed manner. Therefore, the DMPC controller based on DDPG is
combined with the distributed partitioning algorithm in two different manners, i.e., with
static and dynamical system partitioning. The results for these two DMPC controllers
based on DDPG and performing both static and dynamical system partitioning are pre-
sented, showing the effectiveness of both the DDPG approach and the partitioning for
large-scale systems. As further work, the proposed non-centralized control design with
partitioning can be tested in presence of faults at some partitions, so that the strategy
facilitates the appropriate isolation.
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Chapter 10
Contributions and Concluding
Remarks
10.1 Contributions
In this thesis, the role of some game-theoretical approaches for the design of optimization-
based controllers (mainly DMPC controllers) has been presented. It has been shown that
the classical population dynamics are appropriate to solve a resource allocation problem
under the framework of full-potential games in Chapter 2. As a first contribution of this
dissertation, and taking advantage of this, an on-line and dynamical tuning methodology
based on population dynamics has been presented in Chapter 3.
In contrast, the population-games approach is unsuitable for the design of controllers
that should consider more requirements associated to communication limitations and
constraints. The classical population dynamics that require full information and that
can deal with a unique coupled constraint and positiveness of variables have been studied.
As a second contribution of this dissertation, the classical population-games approach is
extended to the case in which strategy-constrained interactions are considered in Chapter
4 where a DMPC controller is designed, and a distributed engineering application, which
illustrates the advantages of the contributions in Chapter 4, is presented in Chapter 5.
As a third contribution of this dissertation, the classical population-games approach is
extended to the case in which more coupled constraints can be considered, incorporating
birth and death rates within the population games in Chapter 6. Therefore, these con-
tributions regarding population games and optimization have permitted to consider the
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distributed population dynamics as a powerful tool in the design of DMPC controllers.
Regarding the cooperative/coalitional games, the power index known as the Shapley
value is studied in Chapter 7. The main issue that has been addressed in this thesis is
the high computational burden caused by the combinatory explosion of the traditional
operations to find the Shapley value. To this end, the fourth contribution of this disser-
tation consists in considering a particular characteristic function, which is appropriate
and commonly used for control purposes, allowing to reduce the computational costs to
compute the power index from the order of hours to seconds. Also, it is shown that the
novel proposed approach can be performed under a distributed communication structure.
Over the last part of this thesis, it is discussed the partitioning of large-scale systems
as a useful methodology in the design of non-centralized controllers. As the fifth contri-
bution of this dissertation, it is proposed to perform the partitioning algorithm taking
into account the information-sharing network that is required to compute the control
inputs for a specific control strategy in Chapter 8. In this regard, the partitioning can
be performed over any system and for any control technique, being a general approach.
Furthermore, it is shown in Chapter 9 that it is possible to combine the contributions
presented in Chapters 6 and 8 to develop a dynamical system partitioning for the design
of DMPC based on population games.
10.2 Answering the Research Questions
The conclusions are synthesized by answering the key research questions presented in
Chapter 1 as follows:
(Q1) Which kind of constrained optimization-based controllers can be designed by using
the classical population dynamics and what are the information requirements?
It has been shown in Chapter 2 that the classical population-games approach can
be used for the design of resource-allocation controllers. This is made by exploiting
the relationship of the Nash equilibrium with the optimal point in a constrained
optimization problem (2.13) of a stable and full-potential game (see Theorem 2.1).
Regarding the information requirements, the evolution of the proportion of agents
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in the classical population dynamics requires information about the fitness func-
tions for the whole population (e.g., see the sum term in (2.14), (2.15), (2.16), and
(2.17)). In this regard, when solving a resource-allocation problem with this ap-
proach, it is necessary to guarantee that all the sub-systems receiving the limited
resource can share information to one another. In other words, the classical popula-
tion dynamics represent a centralized controller whereas the distributed population
dynamics presented in Chapter 4 represent a distributed controller.
(Q2) How to develop a dynamical tuning methodology for MPC controllers with low
computational burden?
One of the main inconvenients of some on-line tuning methodologies for MPC con-
trollers is that they require to find multiple points over the Pareto front implying
high computational burden. Chapter 3 has presented a population-games based dy-
namical tuning for the prioritization weight parameters of a multi-objective MPC
controller. The proposed methodology is performed with low computational bur-
den since it only requires to know one point in the Pareto front corresponding to
the current value of the control objectives in the cost function.
(Q3) How to reduce the amount of required information in the evolution of population
dynamics?
The classical population dynamics are deduced from the mean dynamics by con-
sidering that each agent that receives a revision opportunity can select another
agent who is playing any other strategy, i.e., when taking a sample of agents from
the population, then the probability that the sampled population contains each
strategy is the same. This thesis has shown that it is possible to consider strategy-
constrained interactions, i.e., when an agent receives a revision opportunity, this
agent can only select an opponent from a certain subset of agents playing specific
strategies. In this regard, it has been shown that, from the mean dynamics with
strategy-constrained interactions and by using different revision protocols, the dis-
tributed population dynamics are deduced as presented in Chapter 4. Therefore,
the information requirements are reduced and preserving the relevant population-
dynamics properties, i.e., the invariance of the simplex set and the stability of the
equilibrium point.
211
Chapter 10. Contributions and Concluding Remarks
(Q4) How can the population-games approach be used in the design of distributed optimiza-
tion-based controllers?
The main feature exploited in this thesis in order to design optimization-based
controllers by using a population-games approach is that, under the framework of
full-potential games, the Nash equilibrium corresponds to a extreme point of the
potential function as presented in Chapter 2. In this regard, it is possible to solve
the constrained optimization problem in (2.13) by using this game-theoretical ap-
proach. Moreover, once the information requirements have been relaxed according
to the answer to key research question (Q3), then the constrained optimization
problem can be solved in a distributed manner. Furthermore, the optimization
problem presented in (2.13) coincides to the form of a resource-allocation problem,
i.e., this tool is appropriate to control systems in which there is a limited resource
as presented in Chapter 4, where a DMPC controller is designed. On the other
hand, Chapter 5 shows a control application based on population games, i.e., a
distributed formation control under time-varying communication network is de-
signed in a leader-follower fashion and by taking advantage of the properties of the
distributed population dynamics.
(Q5) How can more coupled constraints be considered with the population-games ap-
proach in order to make them suitable for a larger variety of problems in the design
of distributed optimization-based controllers?
The classical and distributed population dynamics are deduced from the mean
dynamics and the distributed mean dynamics, respectively. One of the features of
the mean dynamics is the mass conversion, i.e., any proportion that adopts a new
strategy is leaving another strategy maintaining the population mass constant.
This fact makes population dynamics satisfy the invariance of the simplex (2.9),
and therefore satisfy the constraint (2.13b) along the time. Nevertheless, the mass
conservation does not allow to consider more coupled constraints different from
(2.13b). On the other hand, under the framework of density games, the population
mass evolves along the time. To this end, it is proposed to consider a reproduction
rate in the mean dynamics, i.e., a version of the distributed density-dependent mean
dynamics is introduced in Chapter 6 permitting the deduction of the distributed
density-dependent population dynamics.
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The density-dependent population dynamics also evolve to a Nash equilibrium;
however, this equilibrium is achieved with a population mass such that the repro-
ductions rates are null, i.e., a new condition is incorporated. Therefore, Chapter 6
has shown that these new properties can be conveniently used to solve constrained
optimization problems with multiple coupled constraints enlarging the spectrum
of types of systems that can be controlled by this game-theoretical approach, e.g.,
distributed-density games can be used in the design of DMPC controllers as pre-
sented in Chapter 6.
(Q6) How can the computational burden associated to the computation of the Shapley
power index be reduced and how it can be found under a distributed structure?
The Shapley value is one of the most used power indices in the context of co-
operative games, which is computed by defining a characteristic function and by
considering the contribution of each player to all the possible coalitions that can
be formed. This power index has been widely used in the design of controllers
since it can determine the importance and/or influence of sub-systems, commu-
nication elements, among others. However, the main issue when computing the
Shapley value is the high computational burden due to the combinatorial explosion
specially in the case of several players, e.g., for large-scale system applications. In
order to reduce the computational burden of the Shapley value computation, it has
been defined a specific characteristic function that can be associated to an error in
the control context. By restricting the characteristic function, it is possible to find
an alternative linear calculus that is equivalent to the conventional computation
of the Shapley value, which requires low computational burden as it is formally
presented in Chapter 7. Therefore, the computational time is reduced from hours
to seconds. Moreover, due to the fact that the Shapley value computation results
simpler, then it is possible to compute it under a distributed structure by using
consensus ideas to propagate information. This result permits the use of the Shap-
ley value in the control context for large-scale systems and with non-centralized
control configurations.
(Q7) How can the partitioning of large-scale systems be performed in a distributed man-
ner and how it helps in the design of decentralized optimization-based controllers?
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Most of the partitioning methods use a graph representation of systems, which
might make these methods quite specific for some types of systems, e.g., flow-based
systems. In contrast, it has been proposed to perform a partitioning algorithm
based on the information-sharing graph making the methodology general for any
system and control strategy. Furthermore, due to the fact that the information-
sharing graph also illustrates how the dependence among decision variables is in
order to design a non-centralized controller, it is proposed a distributed partitioning
algorithm. To this end, it has been shown in Chapter 8 that the required operations
in the algorithm can be computed in a distributed manner. In addition, since each
node in the information-sharing graph can make the decision to select a partition,
then the computational burden is reduced.
(Q8) How can the partitioning of a large-scale system be performed dynamically and how
can the population-games approach be used in the design of partitioned optimization-
based distributed controllers?
The appropriate partitioning of a large-scale system might depend on the current
system state, or it might be also affected by disturbances. Therefore, it might
be convenient to implement a dynamical partitioning strategy. According to the
answer for the key research question (Q7), the computational burden for the pro-
posed partitioning algorithm is low and the information requirements to perform
the partitioning can be executed in a distributed manner. Therefore, it is an ap-
propriate tool to make a dynamical partitioning in large-scale systems. In this
regard, it is necessary to have a control strategy that can deal with time-varying
information-sharing graphs. Then, it is plausible to combine the distributed con-
trol design presented in Chapter 6 and the partitioning algorithm introduced in
Chapter 8. Therefore, a DMPC based on population games and performing a
dynamical system partitioning is presented in Chapter 9.
10.3 Directions for Future Research
There are still many open problems regarding the role of evolutionary-game theory for en-
gineering applications. This thesis has made efforts to show game-theoretical approaches
plausible in the design of optimization-based controllers, either complementing a control
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strategy or fully designing controllers under distributed schemes. Some suggested ideas
for future directions are outlined next:
• Extend the results for the multi-population case, which might be a promising
research topic considering populations with heterogeneous agents, or with multiple
equality constraints taking advantage of the invariance of the simplex set.
• The stability results under the distributed population dynamics have been obtained
for full-potential games. It is still an open problem to proof the stability of the
Nash equilibrium under these distributed dynamics for non-full-potential-games
but stable games.
• The deduction of the distributed population games for the discrete-time case in-
cluding the formalism for the stability analysis in function of the sampling time is
proposed. This research topic would allow to test the performance of these types
of controllers in real implementations.
• The result regarding the reduction in the computational time for obtaining the
Shapley power index has been performed for a restricted characteristic function
that is suitable for control purposes. However, there is still an interest to reduce
the computational costs for a generalized characteristic function.
• The contributions regarding the design of distributed predictive controllers based
on population games have been presented for linear systems. It would be interesting
to extend the design methodologies for the non-linear case.
215

References
[1] A. A. A. Abass, M. Hajimirsadeghi, N. B. Mandayam, and Z. Gajic. Evolutionary
game theoretic analysis of distributed denial of service attacks in a wireless net-
work. In Proceedings of the 2016 Annual Conference on Information Science and
Systems (CISS), pages 36–41, Princeton, USA, 2016.
[2] A. Al-Ghazzawi, E. Ali, A. Nouh, and E. Zafiriou. On-line tuning strategy for
model predictive controllers. Journal of Process Control, 11:265–284, 2001.
[3] A. Alessio, D. Barcelli, and A. Bemporad. Decentralized model predictive control
of dynamically coupled linear systems. Journal of Process Control, 21:705–714,
2011.
[4] C. Alo´s-Ferrer and S. Weidenholzer. Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency.
Economics Letters, 93:163–168, 2006.
[5] M. Arnold, R. R. Negenborn, G. Andersson, and B. De Schutter. Distributed pre-
dictive control for energy hub coordination in coupled electricity and gas networks.
In R.R. Negenborn, Z. Lukszo, and H. Hellendoorn, editors, Intelligent Infrastruc-
tures, volume 42 of Intelligent Systems, Control and Automation: Science and
Engineering, pages 235–273. Springer Netherlands, 2010.
[6] G. Bacci, S. Lasaulce, W. Saad, and L. Sanguinetti. Game theory for networks: A
tutorial on game-theoretic tools for emerging signal processing applications. IEEE
Signal Processing Magazine, 33(1):94–119, 2016.
[7] J. Barreiro-Gomez, I. Mas, C. Ocampo-Martinez, R. Sa´nchez Pen˜a, and N. Qui-
jano. Distributed formation control of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles over
time-varying graphs using population games. In Proceedings of the 55th IEEE
217
REFERENCES
Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pages 5245–5250, Las Vegas, USA,
2016.
[8] J. Barreiro-Gomez, G. Obando, C. Ocampo-Martinez, and N. Quijano. Making
non-centralized a model predictive control scheme by using distributed smith dy-
namics. In Proceedings of the 5th IFAC Conference on Nonlinear Model Predictive
Control, pages 501–506, Seville, Spain, 2015.
[9] J. Barreiro-Gomez, G. Obando, and N. Quijano. Distributed population dynamics:
Optimization and control applications. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics: Systems, 47(2):304–314, 2017.
[10] J. Barreiro-Gomez, G. Obando, G. Rian˜o-Bricen˜o, N. Quijano, and C. Ocampo-
Martinez. Decentralized control for urban drainage systems via population dy-
namics: Bogota case study. In Proceedings of the European Control Conference
(ECC), pages 2431–2436, Linz, Austria, 2015.
[11] J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, F. Bianchi, and N. Quijano. Model-free
control for wind farms using a gradient estimation-based algorithm. In Proceedings
of the European Control Conference (ECC), pages 1516–1521, Linz, Austria, 2015.
[12] J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, J. M. Maestre, and N. Quijano. Multi-
objective model-free control based on population dynamics and cooperative games.
In Proceedings of the 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pages
5296–5301, Osaka, Japan, 2015.
[13] J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, and N. Quijano. Evolutionary-game-
based dynamical tuning for multi-objective model predictive control. In S. Olaru,
A. Grancharova, and F. Lobo Pereira, editors, Developments in Model-Based Op-
timization and Control, pages 115–138. Springer Verlag, 2015.
[14] J. Barreiro-Gomez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, and N. Quijano. Dynamical tuning for
MPC using population games: A water supply network application. ISA Transac-
tions (to appear), 2017.
[15] J. Barreiro-Gomez, N. Quijano, and C. Ocampo-Martinez. Distributed control
of drinking water networks using population dynamics: Barcelona case study. In
218
REFERENCES
Proceedings of the 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pages
3216–3221, Los Angeles, USA, 2014.
[16] J. Barreiro-Gomez, N. Quijano, and C. Ocampo-Martinez. Distributed resource
management by using population dynamics: Wastewater treatment application. In
Proceedings of 2nd IEEE Colombian Conference on Automatic Control (CCAC),
pages 1–6, Manizales, Colombia, 2015.
[17] J. Barreiro-Gomez, N. Quijano, and C. Ocampo-Martinez. Constrained distributed
optimization: A population dynamics approach. Automatica, 69:101–116, 2016.
[18] J. Barreiro-Gomez, N. Quijano, and C. Ocampo-Martinez. Distributed MPC with
time-varying communication network: A density-dependent population games ap-
proach. In Proceedings of the 55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
(CDC), pages 6068–6073, Las Vegas, USA, 2016.
[19] T. Basar and G. J. Olsder. Dynamic noncooperative game theory, volume 23. Siam,
1999.
[20] A. Bemporad and D. Barcelli. Decentralized model predictive control. In A. Be-
mporad, M. Heemels, and M. Johansson, editors, Networked Control Systems,
volume 406 of Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, pages 149–178.
Springer London, 2010.
[21] S. Berninghaus and H. Haller. Local interaction on random graphs. Games,
1(3):262–285, 2010.
[22] I. Bomze, M. Pelillo, and V. Stix. Approximating the maximum weight clique
using replicator dynamics. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, 11(6):1228–
1241, 2000.
[23] S. Bornholdt and H. G. Schuster. Handbook of graphs and networks, volume 2.
Wiley Online Library, 2003.
[24] O. Boussaton and J. Cohen. On the distributed learning of Nash equilibria
with minimal information. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on
Network Games, Control, and Optimization (NetGCooP), pages 30–37, Avignon,
France, 2012.
219
REFERENCES
[25] S. Boyd, N. Parikh, E. Chu, B. Peleato, and J. Eckstein. Distributed optimiza-
tion and statistical learning via the alternating direction method of multipliers.
Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning, 3(1):1–122, 2011.
[26] K. Cai and H. Ishii. Average consensus on arbitrary strongly connected digraphs
with time-varying topologies. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 59:1066–
1071, 2014.
[27] S. Di Cairano and A. Bemporad. Model predictive control tuning by controller
matching. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 55:185–190, 2010.
[28] E. Camponogara, D. Jia, B. Krogh, and S. Talukdar. Distributed model predictive
control. IEEE Control Systems Magazine, 22(1):44–52, 2002.
[29] V. Chandan and A. Alleyne. Optimal partitioning for the decentralized ther-
mal control of buildings. IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology,
21(5):1756–1770, 2013.
[30] D. E. Charilas and A. D. Panagopoulos. A survey on game theory applications in
wireless networks. Computer Networks, 54(18):3421–3430, 2010.
[31] E. K. P. Chong and S. H. Zak. An introduction to optimization. Wiley Series in
Discrete Mathematics and Optimization. Wiley, 2011.
[32] P. D. Christofides, R. Scattolini, D. Mun˜oz de la Pen˜a, and J. Liu. Distributed
model predictive control: A tutorial review and future research directions. Com-
puter & Chemical Engineering, 51:21–41, 2013.
[33] P. D. Christofides, R. Scattolini, D. Mun˜oz de la Pen˜a, and J. Liu. Distributed
model predictive control: A tutorial review and future research directions. Com-
puters and Chemical Engineering, 51:21–41, 2013.
[34] R. P. Costa, J. M. Lemos, J. F. C. Mota, and J. M. F. Xavier. D-ADMM based
distributed MPC with input-output models. In Proceedings of the 53rd IEEE
Conference on Control Applications (CCA), pages 699–704, Antibes-Juan Les Pins,
France, 2014.
220
REFERENCES
[35] R. Costa-Castello´ and R. Grin˜o´. A repetitive controller for discrete-time passive
systems. Automatica, 42:1605–1610, 2006.
[36] R. Cressman and V. Krˇivan. Migration dynamics for the ideal free distribution.
The American Naturalist, 168(3):384–397, 2006.
[37] H. Cui and E. W. Jacobsen. Performance limitations on decentralized control.
Journal of Process Control, 12:485–494, 2002.
[38] X. Deng and C. H. Papadimitriou. On the complexity of cooperative solution
concepts. Mathematics of Operations Research, 19(2):257266, 1994.
[39] A. D. Domı´nguez-Garc´ıa and C. N Hadjicostis. Distributed algorithms for con-
trol of demand response and distributed energy resources. In Proceedings of the
50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference,
(CDC-ECC), pages 27–32, Orlando, Florida, 2011.
[40] W. Dunbar and W. Murray. Distributed receding horizon control for multi-vehicle
formation stabilization. Automatica, 42:549–558, 2006.
[41] M. S. Elliott and B. P. Rasmussen. Decentralized model predictive control
of a multi-evaporator air conditioning system. Control Engineering Practice,
21(2013):1665–1677, 2013.
[42] G. Angeline Ezhilarasi and K. S. Swarup. Network partitioning using harmony
search and equivalencing for distributed computing. Journal of Parallel and Dis-
tributed Computing, 72(2012):936–943, 2012.
[43] M. Farina and R. Scattolini. Distributed non-cooperative MPC with neighbour-to-
neighbour communication. In Proceedings of the 18th IFAC world congress, pages
404–409, Milan, Italy, 2011.
[44] D. Ferraioli. Logit dynamics: a model for bounded rationality. ACM SIGecom
Exchanges, 12(1):34–37, 2013.
[45] A. Ferramosca, D. Limon, I. Alvarado, and E. F. Camacho. Cooperative dis-
tributed MPC for tracking. Automatica, 49(2013):906–914, 2013.
221
REFERENCES
[46] M. J. Fox and J. S. Shamma. Population games, stable games, and passivity.
Games, 4(4):561–583, 2013.
[47] A. Ramirez-Jaime N. Quijano G. Rian˜o-Bricen˜o, J. Barreiro-Gomez and
C. Ocampo-Martinez. MatSWMM - an open-source toolbox for designing real-
time control of urban drainage systems. Environmental Modelling & Software,
83:143–154, 2016.
[48] L. Garc´ıa, J. Barreiro-Gomez, E. Escobar, D. Te´llez, N. Quijano, and C. Ocampo-
Martinez. Modeling and real-time control of urban drainage systems: A review.
Advances in Water Resources, 85:120–132, 2015.
[49] F. Garin and L. Schenato. A survey on distributed estimation and control applica-
tions using linear consensus algorithms. Networked Control Systems, 406:75–107,
2010.
[50] J. L. Garriga and M. Soroush. Model predictive control tuning methods: A review.
Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research (I&EC), 49:3505–3515, 2010.
[51] B. Gharesifard and J. Cortes. Distributed convergence to Nash equilibria by adver-
sarial networks with directed topologies. In Proceedings of the American Control
Conference (ACC), pages 5881–5886, Montreal, Canada, 2012.
[52] L. Giovanini. Game approach to distributed model predictive control. IET Control
Theory Applications, 5(15):1729–1739, 2011.
[53] P. Giselsson, M. D. Doan, T. Keviczky, B. De Schutter, and A. Rantzer. Accel-
erated gradient methods and dual decomposition in distributed model predictive
control. Automatica, 49:829–833, 2013.
[54] R. Gopalakrishnan, J. Marden, and A. Wierman. Characterizing distribution rules
for cost sharing games. In Proceeding of the 5th International Conference on Net-
work Games, Control and Optimization (NetGCooP), pages 1–4, Paris, France,
2011.
[55] O. Grodzevich and O. Romanko. Normalization and other topics in multi-objective
optimization. In Proceedings of the Fields-MITACS Industrial Problems Workshop,
pages 89–101, Toronto, Ontario, 2006.
222
REFERENCES
[56] J. Grosso. Economic and robust operation of generalised flow-based networks.
Doctoral dissertation. Automatic Control Department. Universidad Polite`cnica de
Catalunya, 2015.
[57] J. M. Grosso, C. Ocampo-Martinez, and V. Puig. Learning-based tuning of super-
visory model predictive control for drinking water networks. Engineering Applica-
tions of Artificial Intelligence, 26:1741–1750, 2013.
[58] J. M. Grosso, C. Ocampo-Martinez, V. Puig, and B. Joseph. Chance-constrained
model predictive control for drinking water networks. Journal of Process Control,
24:504–516, 2014.
[59] A. Gupta. Fast and effective algorithms for graph partitioning and sparse-matrix
ordering. IBM Journal of Research and Development, 41(1):171–183, 1997.
[60] P. Hammerstein and O. Leimar. Evolutionary game theory in biology. Handbook
of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 4:575–617, 2015.
[61] N. He, D. Shi, J. Wang, M. Forbes, J. Backstrom, and T. Chen. User friendly robust
MPC tuning of uncertain paper-making processes. Proceedings of the 9th IFAC
Symposium on Advanced Control of Chemical Processes (ADCHEM), 48:1021–
1026, 2015.
[62] S. Hidalgo-Gallego, R. Nu´n˜ez-Sa´nchez, and P. Coto-Milla´n. Game theory and
port economics: A survey of recent research. doi: 10.1111/joes.12171. Journal of
Economic Surveys, 2016.
[63] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund. Evolutionary games and population dynamics. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
[64] B. Hu and A. Linnemann. Towards infinite-horizon optimality in nonlinear model
predictive control. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 47(4):679–682, 2002.
[65] G. Jaeger. Applications of game theory in linguistics. Language and Linguistics
Compass, 2(3):406–421, 2008.
[66] J. L. W. V. Jensen. Sur les fonctions convexes et les ine´galite´s entre les valeurs
moyennes. Acta Mathematica, 30(1):175–193, 1906.
223
REFERENCES
[67] S. Kamelian and K. Salahshoor. A novel graph-based partitioning algorithm
for large-scale dynamical systems. International Journal of Systems Science,
46(2):227–245, 2015.
[68] T. Keviczky, F. Borrelli, and G. Balas. A study on decentralized receding horizon
control for decoupled systems. In Proceedings of the American Control Conference
(ACC), pages 4921–4926, Boston, USA, 2004.
[69] H. K. Khalil. Nonlinear systems. Prentice Hall, 2002.
[70] M. A. Khan, H. Tembine, and A. V. Vasilakos. Evolutionary coalitional games:
design and challenges in wireless networks. IEEE Wireless Communications,
19(2):50–56, 2012.
[71] I. Y. Kim and O. L. de Weck. Adaptive weighted sum method for multiobjective
optimization: a new method for pareto front generation. Structural and Multidis-
ciplinary Optimization, 31:105–116, 2006.
[72] M. R. Kleinberg, K. Miu, N. Segal, H. Lehmann, and T. R. Figura. A partitioning
method for distributed capacitor control of electric power distribution systems.
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 29(2):637–644, 2014.
[73] R. Lahkar and W. H Sandholm. The projection dynamic and the geometry of
population games. Games and Economic Behavior, 64(2):565–590, 2008.
[74] N. Li and J. R. Marden. Designing games for distributed optimization. IEEE
Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing, 7(2):230–242, 2013. Special issue
on adaptation and learning over complex networks.
[75] H. Lim, J. Park, D. Lee, and H. J. Kim. Build your own quadrotor: Open-
source projects on unmanned aerial vehicles. IEEE Robotics Automation Magazine,
19(3):33–45, 2012.
[76] D. Limon, T. Alamo, and E. F. Camacho. Enlarging the domain of attraction of
MPC controllers. Automatica, 41(2005):629–635, 2005.
[77] J. Maciejowski. Predictive control: with constraints. Pearson education, 2002.
224
REFERENCES
[78] J. M. Maestre, D. Mun˜oz de la Pen˜a, A. Jime´nez Losada, E. Algaba, and E. F.
Camacho. A coalitional control scheme with applications to cooperative game
theory. Optimal Control Applications and Methods, 35:592–608, 2014.
[79] J. M Maestre and R. R Negenborn. Distributed model predictive control made easy,
volume 69. Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.
[80] J. M. Maestre and R. R. Negenborn, editors. Distributed model predictive control
made easy, volume 69 of Intelligent Systems, Control and Automation: Science
and Engineering. Springer, 2014.
[81] L. Magni and R. Scattolini. Stabilizing decentralized model predictive control of
nonlinear systems. Automatica, 42(2006):1231–1236, 2006.
[82] J. Marden and J. Shamma. Game theory and distributed control. Handbook of
Game Theory with Economic Applications, 4:861–899, 2015.
[83] J. R. Marden, S. D. Ruben, and L. Y. Pao. A Model-Free Approach to Wind Farm
Control Using Game Theoretic Methods. IEEE Transactions on Control Systems
Technology, 21(4):1207–1214, 2013.
[84] J. R. Marden, H. Peyton Young, and L. Y. Pao. Achieving pareto optimal-
ity through distributed learning. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization,
52(5):2753–2770, 2014.
[85] I. Mas and C. Kitts. Dynamic control of mobile multirobot systems: the cluster
space formulation. IEEE Access, 2:558–570, 2014.
[86] J. Maynard Smith and G. Price. The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246:15–18,
1973.
[87] D. Mayne. Model predictive control: Recent developments and future promise.
Automatica, 50(2014):2967–2986, 2014.
[88] I. Menache and A. Ozdaglar. Network games: theory, models, and dynamics.
Morgan & Claypool Publishers, 2011.
225
REFERENCES
[89] M. Mesbahi and M. Egerstedt. Graph theoretic methods in multiagent networks.
Princeton series in applied mathematics. Princeton University Press, Princeton
(N.J.), 2010.
[90] E. Mojica-Nava, C. A. Macana, and N. Quijano. Dynamic population games for
optimal dispatch on hierarchical microgrid control. IEEE Transactions on Systems,
Man, and Cybernetics: Systems, 44(3):306–317, March 2014.
[91] L. Moreau. Stability of multiagent systems with time-dependent communication
links. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 50(2):169–182, 2005.
[92] J. Mota, J. Xavier, P. Aguiar, and M. Puschel. D-ADMM: A communication-
efficient distributed algorithm for separable optimization. IEEE Transactions on
Signal processing, 61(10):2718–2723, 2013.
[93] M. A. Mu¨ller, D. Angeli, and F. Allgo¨wer. On the performance of economic
model predictive control with self-tuning terminal cost. Journal of Process Control,
24:1179–1186, 2014.
[94] F. J. Muros Ponce, J. M. Maestre, E. Algaba, T. Alamo, and E. F. Camacho. An
iterative design method for coalitional control networks with constraints on the
Shapley value. In Proceedings of the 19th IFAC World Congress, pages 1188–1193,
Cape Town, South Africa, 2014.
[95] A. Nagurney and D. Zhang. Projected dynamical systems in the formulation,
stability analysis, and computation of fixed demand traffic network equilibria.
Transportation Science, 31:147–158, 1997.
[96] J. F. Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 36(1):48–49, 1950.
[97] M. Nayeripour, H. Fallahzadeh-Abarghouei, E. Waffenschmidt, and S. Hasanvand.
Coordinated online voltage management of distributed generationusing network
partitioning. Electric Power Systems Research, 141(2016):202–209, 2016.
[98] R. R. Negenborn and J. M. Maestre. Distributed model predictive control: An
overview and roadmap of future research opportunities. IEEE Control Systems
Magazine, 34(4):87–97, 2014.
226
REFERENCES
[99] R. R. Negenborn, B. De Schutter, and J. Hellendoorn. Multi-agent model predic-
tive control for transportation networks: serial versus parallel schemes. Applica-
tions of Artificial Intelligence, 21(3):353–366, 2008.
[100] S. Novak, K. Chatterjee, and M. A. Nowak. Density games. Journal of Theoretical
Biology, 334(2013):26–34, 2013.
[101] M. A. Nowak and R. M. May. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature,
359(6398):826–829, 1992.
[102] A. Nu´n˜ez, C. Ocampo-Martinez, J.M. Maestre, and B. De Schutter. Time-varying
scheme for noncentralized model predictive control of large-scale systems. Mathe-
matical Problems in Engineering, 2015(560702):1–17, 2015.
[103] G. Obando, A. Pantoja, and N. Quijano. Building Temperature Control based
on Population Dynamics. IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology,
22(1):404–412, 2014.
[104] C. Ocampo-Martinez. Model predictive control of wastewater systems. Advances
in industrial control. Springer Verlag, 1st edition, 2010.
[105] C. Ocampo-Martinez, D. Barcelli, V. Puig, and A. Bemporad. Hierarchical and
decentralised model predictive control of drinking water networks: application to
Barcelona case study. IET Control Theory and Applications, 6(1):62–71, 2012.
[106] C. Ocampo-Martinez, S. Bovo, and V. Puig. Partitioning approach oriented to the
decentralised predictive control of large-scale systems. Journal of Process Control,
21(2011):775–786, 2011.
[107] C. Ocampo-Martinez, V. Puig, G. Cembrano, and J. Quevedo. Application of
predictive control strategies to the management of complex networks in the urban
water cycle. IEEE Control Systems Magazine, 33(1):15–41, 2013.
[108] S. Olaru, A. Grancharova, and F. Lobo Pereira. Developments in model-based
optimization and control. Springer Verlag, 2015.
[109] R. Olfati-Saber, J. A. Fax, and R. M. Murray. Consensus and cooperation in
networked multi-agent systems. Proceedings of the IEEE, 95(1):215–233, 2007.
227
REFERENCES
[110] G. Owen. Game theory. Academic Press, 1995.
[111] G. Owen and L. S. Shapley. Optimal location of candidates in ideological space.
International Journal of Game Theory, 18(3):339–356, 1989.
[112] L. Ozkan, J. Meijs, and A. C. P. M. Backx. A frequency domain approach for
MPC tuning. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Process Systems Engineering,
pages 15–19, Singapore, 2012.
[113] A. Pantoja and N. Quijano. A population dynamics approach for the dispatch of
distributed generators. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, 58(10):4559–
4567, 2011.
[114] A. Pantoja and N. Quijano. Distributed optimization using population dynamics
with a local replicator equation. In Proceedings of the 51st IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control (CDC), pages 3790–3795, Maui, Hawaii, 2012.
[115] S. Parsons and M. Wooldridge. Game theory and decision theory in multi-agent
systems. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 5(3):243–254, 2002.
[116] A. Pashaie, L. Pavel, and C. J. Damaren. A population game approach for dynamic
resource allocation problems. International Journal of Control (to appear).
[117] A. Pashaie, L. Pavel, and C. J. Damaren. A population game approach
for dynamic resource allocation problems. International Journal of Control
DOI:10.1080/00207179.2016.1231422, pages 1–16, 2016.
[118] D. Pe´rez-Castrillo and D. Wettstein. An ordinal shapley value for economic envi-
ronments. Journal of Economic Theory, 127(1):296–308, 2006.
[119] J. Poveda and N. Quijano. Dynamic bandwidth allocation in wireless networks
using a shahshahani gradient based extremum seeking control. In Proceedings of
the 6th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization
(NetGCooP), pages 44–50, Avignon, France, 2012.
[120] J. Poveda and N. Quijano. Shahshahani gradient-like extremum seeking. Auto-
matica, 58:51–59, 2015.
228
REFERENCES
[121] N. Quijano, C. Ocampo-Martinez, J. Barreiro-Gomez, G. Obando, A. Pantoja,
and E. Mojica-Nava. The role of population games and evolutionary dynamics in
distributed control systems. IEEE Control Systems, 37(1):70–97, 2017.
[122] D. M. Raimondo, L. Magni, and R. Scattolini. Decentralized model predictive
control of nonlinear systems: An input-to-state stability approach. International
Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control, 17:1651–1667, 2007.
[123] E. Ramirez-Llanos and N. Quijano. A population dynamics approach for the water
distribution problem. International Journal of Control, 83:1947–1964, 2010.
[124] J. B. Rawlings, D. Bonne´, J. B. Jørgensen, A. N. Venkat, and S. B. Jørgensen. Un-
reachable setpoints in model predictive control. IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, 53(9):2209–2215, 2008.
[125] J. B. Rawlings and D. Q. Mayne. Model predictive control: theory and design. Nob
Hill Publishing, 2009.
[126] J. B. Rawlings and B. T. Stewart. Coordinating multiple optimization-based con-
trollers: New opportunities and challenges. Journal of Process Control, 18:839–845,
2008.
[127] W. Ren and R. W. Beard. Consensus seeking in multiagent systems under dynam-
ically changing interaction topologies. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
50(5):655–661, 2005.
[128] A. Richards and J. P. How. Robust distributed model predictive control. Interna-
tional journal of control, 80(9):1517–1531, 2007.
[129] S. Riverso, M. Farina, and G. Ferrari-Trecate. Plug-and-play decentralized model
predictive control for linear systems. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
58(10):2608–2614, 2013.
[130] S. Riverso, M. Farina, and G. Ferrari-Trecate. Plug-and-play model predictive
control based on robust control invariant sets. Automatica, 50(2014):2179–2186,
2014.
229
REFERENCES
[131] W. Saad, Z. Han, H. V. Poor, and T. Basar. Game-theoretic methods for the smart
grid: An overview of microgrid systems, demand-side management, and smart grid
communications. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 29(5):86–105, 2012.
[132] J. Sanchez-Soriano. An overview on game theory applications to engineering.
International Game Theory Review, 15(03):1340019, 2013.
[133] W. Sandholm. Evolutionary implementation and congestion pricing. Review of
Economic Studies, 69(3):667–689, 2002.
[134] W. H. Sandholm. Population games and evolutionary dynamics. Cambridge, Mass.
MIT Press, 2010.
[135] W. H. Sandholm, E. Dokumaci, and R. Lahkar. The projection dynamic and the
replicator dynamic. Games and Economic Behavior, 64:666–683, 2008.
[136] R. Scattolini. Architectures for distributed and hierarchical model predictive con-
trol – A review. Journal of process control, 5:723–731, 19.
[137] J. D. Schwartz and D. E. Rivera. Simulation-based optimal tuning of model pre-
dictive control policies for supply chain management using simultenuous perturba-
tion stochastic approximation. In Proceedings of the American Control Conference
(ACC), pages 14–16, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA, 2006.
[138] M. E. Sezer and D. D. Sˇiljak. Nested ε−decompositions and clustering of complex
systems. Automatica, 22(3):321–331, 1986.
[139] G. Shah and S. Engell. Tuning MPC for desired closed-loop performance for
MIMO systems. In Proceedings of the American Control Conference (ACC), pages
4404–4409, San Francisco, USA, 2011.
[140] L. S. Shapley. A value for n-person games. Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28:307–
317, 1953.
[141] M. J Smith. The stability of a dynamic model of traffic assignment-an application
of a method of lyapunov. Transportation Science, 18(3):245–252, 1984.
230
REFERENCES
[142] B. T Stewart, A. N Venkat, J. B Rawlings, S. J Wright, and G. Pannocchia. Coop-
erative distributed model predictive control. Systems & Control Letters, 59(8):460–
469, 2010.
[143] A. Tavakoli, M. Negnevitsky, and K. M. Muttaqi. A decentralized model pre-
dictive control for operation of multiple distributed generators in islanded mode.
doi:10.1109/tia.2016.2616396. Transactions on Industry Applications, 2016.
[144] P. D. Taylor and L. B. Jonker. Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics.
Mathematical Biosciences, 40(1):145–156, 1978.
[145] H. Tembine, E. Altman, R. El-Azouzi, and Y. Hayel. Evolutionary games in
wireless networks. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B:
Cybernetics, 40(3):634–646, 2010.
[146] R. Toro, C. Ocampo-Martinez, F. Logist, J. Van Impe, and V. Puig. Tuning of
predictive controllers for drinking water networked systems. In Proceedings of the
18th IFAC World Congress, pages 14507–14512, Milan, Italy, 2011.
[147] Q. N. Tran, R. Octaviano, L. O¨zkan, and A. C. P. M. Backx. Generalized predictive
control tuning by controller matching. In Proceedings of the American Control
Conference (ACC), pages 4889–4894, Portland, USA, 2014.
[148] P. Trodden and A. Richards. Cooperative distributed MPC of linear systems with
coupled constraints. Automatica, 49(2):479–487, 2013.
[149] M. Vallerio, J. V. Impe, and F. Logist. Tuning of NMPC controllers via multi-
objective optimisation. Computers and Chemical Engineering, 61:38–50, 2014.
[150] J. H. van der Lee, W. Y. Svrcek, and B. R. Young. A tuning algorithm for model
predictive controllers based on genetic algorithms and fuzzy decision making. ISA
Transactions, 47:53–59, 2008.
[151] H Voos and B Nourghassemi. Nonlinear control of stabilized flight and landing for
quadrotor UAVs. In Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on Advanced Control and
Diagnosis, pages 1–6, Zielona Go´ra, Poland, 2009.
231
REFERENCES
[152] Liuping Wang. Model predictive control system design and implementation using
MATLAB. Springer Publishing Company, Incorporated, 1st edition, 2009.
[153] Y. Wang, C. Ocampo-Martinez, and V. Puig. Stochastic model predictive control
based on Gaussian processes applied to drinking water networks. IET Control
Theory and Applications, 10:947–955, 2016.
[154] Y. Wang, C. Ocampo-Martinez, V. Puig, and J. Quevedo. Gaussian-process-based
demand forecasting for predictive control of drinking water networks. In C. G.
Panayiotou, G. Ellinas, E. Kyriakides, and M. M. Polycarpou, editors, Critical
Information Infrastructures Security. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8985:
CRITIS 2014, pages 69–80. Springer International Publishing, 2016.
[155] Y. Wang, W. Saad, Z. Han, H. V. Poor, and T. Baar. A game-theoretic approach
to energy trading in the smart grid. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 5(3):1439–
1450, 2014.
[156] H. Waschl, D. Alberer, and L. del Re. Automatic tuning methods for MPC en-
vironments. In R. Moreno-Dı´az, F. Pichler, and A. Quesada-Arencibia, editors,
Computer Aided Systems Theory - EUROCAST 2011: 13th International Confer-
ence. Revised Selected Papers, Part II, pages 41–48. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012.
[157] H. Waschl, J. B. Jogensen, J. K. Huusom, and L. del Re. A tuning approach for
offset-free MPC with conditional reference adaptation. In Proceedings of the 19th
World Congress, pages 24–29, Cape Town, South Africa, 2014.
[158] J. W. Weibull. Evolutionary game theory. The MIT Press, London, England, 1997.
[159] W. Wojsznis, J. Gudaz, T. Blevins, and A. Mehta. Practical approach to tuning
MPC. ISA Transactions, 42:149–162, 2003.
[160] L. Xiao and S. Boyd. Optimal scaling of a gradient method for distributed resource
allocation. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 129:469–488, 2006.
[161] L. Xie, X. Cai, J. Chen, and H. Su. GA based decomposition of large scale
distributed model predictive control systems. Control Engineering Practice,
57(2016):111–125, 2016.
232
REFERENCES
[162] A. S. Yamashita, A. C. Zanin, and D. Odloak. Tuning the model predictive control
of a crude distillation unit. ISA Transactions, 60:178–190, 2016.
[163] M.N. Zeilinger, Y-Pu, S. Riverso, G. Ferrari-Trecate, and C.N. Jones. Plug and
play distributed model predictive control based on distributed invariance and op-
timization. In Proceedings of the 52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
(CDC), pages 5770–5776, Florenze, Italy, 2013.
233

Nomenclature
A adjacency matrix of the graph G
A˜ adjacency matrix of the graph G˜
A(p) adjacency matrix of the graph G(p)
A¯i matrix for dynamic model of the i
th UAV
Ad state matrix for a system
Ad,i state matrix for an i
th sub-system
aij element in the i
th row and jth column in the adjacency matrix A
a˜ij element in the i
th row and jth column in the adjacency matrix A˜
a
(p)
ij element in the i
th row and jth column in the adjacency matrix A(p)
A set of UAVs
A˜ set of anchor elements
B¯i matrix for dynamic model of the i
th UAV
Bd control input matrix for a system
Bd,i control input matrix for an i
th sub-system
Bl disturbance input matrix for a system
B set of sink elements in a distribution flow-based network
C matrix of relevance factors
cij element in the i
th row and jth column in the matrix C
ci vector of the measured position parameters of the i
th UAV
C energy and water costs
C˜` individual cost of the `
th player
CS energy and water costs with static tuning strategy
CD energy and water costs with dynamic tuning strategy
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NOMENCLATURE
cdi measurement of the position parameter d of the i
th UAV
Ck set of components of the graph G˜k at time instant k
D matrix of distances
d index to make reference to different populations
d˜ function of distance between two nodes
d˜ij element in the i
th row and jth column in the matrix D
d vector of the nd disturbances
dˆ sequences of disturbances
D set of populations
ep` error p` − p
?
`
ez` error z` − z
?
`
E Lyapunov function
EV Lyapunov function
E1 storage function (also Lyapunov function)
E2 storage function (also Lyapunov function)
E set of links/edges of the graph G
E˜ set of links/edges of the graph G˜
Eˆ set of links/edges of the graph Gˆ
Ei set of links/edges of the graph corresponding to the ith topology
Eji set of links/edges of the graph corresponding to the jth partition in
the ith topology
E`k set of links/edges of the graph G`k
f population game, and vector of fitness functions
fd dth population game, and vector of fitness functions for the dth popula-
tion
f ji population game, and vector of fitness functions for the j
th partition in
the ith topology
fi fitness function corresponding to the i
th strategy
fdi fitness function corresponding to the i
th strategy in the dth population
F set of followers
g function that determines the index of a partition for a specific node (par-
titioning context)
g˜ amount of desired players per coalition (power-index context)
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NOMENCLATURE
g¯xi upper-bound parameter determining non-safe sectors for the i
th system
state
g¯ui upper-bound parameter determining non-safe sectors for the i
th control
input
gx
i
lower-bound parameter determining non-safe sectors for the ith system
state
gu
i
lower-bound parameter determining non-safe sectors for the ith control
input
G undirected graph defining possible strategic interactions in a population
game
G˜ undirected graph corresponding to the system structure (interaction
among sub-systems)
G¯ directed graph representing a distribution flow-based network
G(p) graph with adjacency matrix A(p) in function of p
Gi graph corresponding to the ith topology
Gji graph corresponding to the jth partition in the ith topology
G`k the `th partition of the graph G at time instant k
Hp prediction horizon in an MPC controller
hi height of the i
th tank
hˆi external benefit for the i
th node
hmax,` maximum level of the `
th tank
hˆ`i external benefit for the i
th node to change to the `th partition
hˇi internal benefit for the i
th node
J cost function in an MPC controller
Ji the i
th cost function in a multi-objective MPC controller
J˜i the i
th normalized cost function in a multi-objective MPC controller
J `i cost function of the i
th sub-system in an MPC controller
Jfi terminal cost of the i
th sub-system in an MPC controller
Jutopiai the i
th value from the vector Jutopia
Jnadiri the i
th value from the vector Jnadir
Jutopia utopia point
Jnadir nadir point
k discrete time step
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NOMENCLATURE
K` discharge coefficient of the `
th tank
K set of indices for partitions
L Laplacian of the graph G
L(p) Laplacian of the graph G(p)
L˜(p) modified Laplacian in terms of p
lij element in the i
th row and jth column in the Laplacian L
l
(p)
ij element in the i
th row and jth column in the Laplacian L(p)
l˜
(p)
ij element in the i
th row and jth column in the Laplacian L˜(p)
L Lagrangian function
L` fair costs for the `
th player determined by the Shapley value
m number of partitions
M number of agents in a population
M˜ vehicle mass
Mk matrix for communication key performance index
n number of strategies in a population games
nu number of control inputs
nx number of system states
nd number of disturbances
nu,i number of control inputs for the i
th sub-system
nx,i number of system states for the i
th sub-system
nji number of strategies for the j
th partition in the ith topology
NE(f) set of Nash equilibria for the population game f
Ni set of neighbors of the ith node for the the graph G
N˜i set of neighbors of the ith node for the the graph G˜
O coalition
p vector of portion of agents, or population state
pi reference parameters for the i
th UAV local controller
pd vector of portion of agents in the dth population, or the dth population
state
pji population state for the j
th partition in the ith topology
pi portion of agents selecting the i
th strategy
pdi portion of agents selecting the i
th strategy in the dth population
pji,` portion of agents selecting the `
th strategy for the jth partition in the
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NOMENCLATURE
ith topology
Pi number of partitions for the i
th topology
Pi set of partitions for the ith topology
Pk partitioning at time instant k
PLMPC optimization problem corresponding to a local MPC controller
PMPC optimization problem corresponding to a centralized MPC controller
PDSD optimization problem corresponding to distributed Smith dynamics
qin,` inflow of the `
th tank
qout,` outflow of the `
th tank
Qi prioritization matrix of an MPC controller for the i
th sub-system
Q˜ prioritization matrix of an MPC controller
Q total flow resource in a distribution flow-based network
Qi,k set of available partitions for the ith node at time instant k
Ri prioritization matrix of an MPC controller for the i
th sub-system
R˜ prioritization matrix of an MPC controller
ri vector of references for the i
th sub-system
rdi reference for the i
th UAV for the dth position parameter
R¯xi upper region for system-state constraints
R¯ui upper region for control-input constraints
Rxi lower region for system-state constraints
Rui lower region for control-input constraints
R set of source elements in a distribution flow-based network
Ri set of available source elements for the ith non-source element
S set of strategies
S˜ set of nodes representing sub-systems
S¯ set of elements in the distribution flow-based network
S¯st set of storage elements in the distribution flow-based network
S¯ac set of actuator elements in the distribution flow-based network
S¯jo set of joint elements in the distribution flow-based network
S¯si set of sink elements in the distribution flow-based network
S¯so set of source elements in the distribution flow-based network
S`k set of nodes in the `th partition at time instant k
Sˆ`k external nodes in the `th partition at time instant k
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NOMENCLATURE
Sˇ`k internal nodes in the `th partition at time instant k
t continuous time instant
T number of topologies
T∆ tangent space of the simplex set
T set of topologies
U vector of control inputs within the prediction horizon
u vector of control inputs
u¯ maximum for the vector of control inputs
u minimum for the vector of control inputs
uˆ sequence of control inputs
ui vector of control inputs for the i
th sub-system
U feasible set of control inputs
Vk matrix defining differences among number of elements for different
partitions at time instant k
Vi prioritization matrix for the terminal cost in an MPC controller
V potential function
Vc characteristic function
v system state function
vi decoupled system state function for the i
th
v˜i coupled system state function for the i
th
vij,k element in the i
th row and jth column in the matrix Vk at time ins-
tant k
V set of players
Vji set of players for the jth partition in the ith topology
Wk cost matrix for partitioning
wij,k element in the i
th row and jth column in the matrix Wk at time ins-
tant k
Wzk set of optimal nodes in the partitioning algorithm at time instant k
X vector of system states within the prediction horizon
Xr vector of references within the prediction horizon
x vector of system states
x¯ maximum for the vector of system states
x minimum for the vector of system states
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NOMENCLATURE
xˆ sequence of system states
xr vector of references
xi vector of system states for the i
th sub-system
xs vector of the desired lower value for system states
X feasible set for the system states
z` `
th state in a distribution flow-based network
zmax,` maximum value for the `
th state in a distribution flow-based network
z vector of system states in a distribution flow-based network
zji vector of system states in a distribution flow-based network for the j
th
partition in the ith topology
zjmax,i maximum value for the vector of system states in a distribution flow-
based network for the jth partition in the ith topology
∆U vector of control-input slew rates within the prediction horizon
∆u vector of control-input slew rates
∆ simplex set in a population games
∆d simplex set for the dth population
∆o simplex set for the density-dependent population game, positive orthant
int∆ interior of the simplex set
int∆d interior of the simplex set for the dth population
∆′ simplex set without considering positiveness of variables
δ reproduction rate function for all strategies
δi reproduction rate function for the i
th strategy
ε? desired resource-feeding co-relation index
ε` resource-feeding co-relation index
γ scalar weight for an objective in the MPC controller
γi scalar weight for the i
th objective in the MPC controller
ς auxiliary variable for lower limit system-state constraint
ςˆ sequence of auxiliary variable
µ Lagrange multipliers
µr` information provided from sub-system r to sub-system `
% revision protocol
%˜ mean value
%ij switch rate from strategy i to strategy j
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NOMENCLATURE
λ Lagrange multipliers
pi population mass
pid dth population mass
piji population mass for the j
th partition in the ith topology
Φ(`) Shapley value of the player `
Γ˜ diagonal matrix of the active constraints
Γu vector of the control-input constraints
Γx vector of the system-states constraints
Γji sub-system of the distribution flow-based network for the j
th partition
in the ith topology
ϕ prioritization vector for the partitioning algorithm
ϕj prioritization for the j
th objective for the partitioning algorithm
Σji sub-system of the population dynamics for the j
th partition in the ith
topology
τ sampling time
τ? maximum resource-feeding index of the network
τc critical sampling time
τi network resource-feeding index of the i
th node
τ ` maximum resource-feeding index per partition
σj j
th objective in the partitioning algorithm
ηi incentives of the i
th to change partition
κ parameter for stop condition in the partitioning algorithm
α vector of energy and water costs throughout the prediction horizon
α1 vector of constant energy costs
α2,k vector of time-varying water costs
ξ decision variables in a quadratic-programming problem
ξˆ sequence of the decision variables in a quadratic-programming problem
within the prediction horizon
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